


































This thesis asks the question, “How does an ecclesial context shape the theological 
apprehension and praxis of justice?”  In particular, it will be asked how, in view of its 
members having been admitted into God’s restoring justice in Christ, the church 
might embody in the world this same justice of restoring right relationships.  By 
surveying the history of Christian reflection on the nature of justice, we will show 
how different conceptions of justice emerged from and shaped in turn their 
surrounding social and philosophical contexts, and the sphere of corrective justice in 
particular.  This raises the question of whether this judicial response is an adequate 
reflection of what it means to do justice as disclosed in the biblical story. 
 
Building on the premise that the biblical understanding of the justice of God is best 
understood as a saving, liberating, and restorative justice, rather than a purely 
retributive justice, it will be argued that an alternative conception of justice needs to 
emerge, one that is more anchored in the story of Scripture and lived out in the 
community that reads Scripture so that it might be embodied in life.  I propose 
bringing the insights of ecclesial ethics, an approach that emphasizes the distinctive 
nature of the church as the community that forms its mind and character after its 
reading of Scripture, with the theory and practice of restorative justice, a way of 
conceiving justice-making that emerged from the Mennonite-Anabaptist tradition.   
 
By bringing an ecclesial approach to bear on restorative justice, this thesis will show 
why a theological account of the theory and practice of restorative justice is fruitful 
for articulating and clarifying the witness of the church, especially in the face of 
conflict or wrongdoing.  This can help extend the church’s imagination as to how it 
might better become God’s community of restoration as it reflects on the ways in 










This project began with a sketchy set of intuitions from a student not yet formed in 
the craft of distinguishing good ideas from their poor cousins.  To reach the point 
where this body of work stands, hopefully, in a coherent and accessible form, 
something must have happened along the way.  First to be indicted are my doctoral 
supervisors, Murray Rae and Christopher Marshall.  Murray has instilled in me the 
truth that a few words carefully chosen, combined with the persistent pursuit of where 
theology makes a difference, is sufficient to the task.  Chris deserves to be singled out 
for going far beyond the role of supervisor.  Through his friendship, generous support, 
and rich dialogue, I have been inducted into a world where restorative justice is a way 
of life.  He is a living testimony to the conviction that Christ’s restorative Spirit 
enlarges our human capacity for compassion.    
 
This project would not have been possible were it not for the financial support from 
the University of Otago in the form of a doctoral scholarship.  Towards the final 
stages of the PhD, and with a family to support, I am extremely grateful to the 
assistance provided by the Anglican Dioceses of Wellington and Christchurch.  In 
particular, to be granted the Maurice Goodall Scholarship by South Canterbury 
Anglican Care provided both the finances and the encouragement needed to finish the 
journey.  
 
There is an unwritten story that lies behind my exploration of the church as a 
community of restoration, a story that grounds why I embarked on this journey in the 
first place.  To the people who have constituted that thing we call Urban Vision, 
whether from the early days or more recently, I hope you might recognize your story 
inscribed within these pages.  Thank you for releasing me to do this work, but, more 
importantly, thank you for existing as a sign to God’s reign of justice producing a 
people of peace.  A special word of thanks goes to Wayne Kirkland for his proof-
reading at the final stage of the thesis. 
 
Many life changes have occurred over the course of my studies, and going through it 




Mick and Ruby Duncan, who unwittingly drafted me into their initiatives for 
restoration of the other and of the church.  No amount of preparation is adequate, 
however, for becoming a parent and a partner.  Tessa, Sammy, and Micah, you are the 
joy of my life which makes the struggle all the worthwhile.  And to Cat, my partner in 
mission, in love, and in renovation; another chapter added to the book we are writing 
together with our lives.  Who would have thought this “unlikely romantic pairing,” 
the “pirate” and the “school-teacher,” could make for such a rich story.    
 
The final word belongs, however, to Jesus.  You brought about a restoring work in my 
own life, calling me out from that wandering exile and arraigning me with this 
Christian tribe.  Hopefully my attempt to make sense of this community befits your 
















































































































After his retirement as General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, the great 
twentieth century missionary theologian and ecumenicist, Lesslie Newbigin, issued a 
challenge to the WCC’s flagship programme, “Justice, Peace and the Integrity of 
Creation” (JPIC).  While the programme readily affirmed that Christianity is a faith 
that does justice, Newbigin pointed out that there is nothing specifically Christian 
about the longing for justice or peace.  In fact, it is in “the name of justice that nations 
make wars and that oppressed people take to violence,” neither of which should be 
endorsed by the church.1  The WCC’s uncritical adoption of the language of justice 
and peace could, in Newbigin’s opinion, foster a “web of illusion” whereby each 
person distorts what is due him or her and so treats their neighbour as a threat.  
 
Newbigin issues an important word of caution to the church if it is to have integrity in 
its witness to the gospel.  The church is not called simply to align itself with the cry 
for justice, but also to challenge the “root-paradigms” underlying the dominant 
conceptions of justice.2  This is particularly pertinent to the modern era where a 
specifically individualistic and secular paradigm of justice has obscured from focus 
any thick conception of the common good.  According to Newbigin, there is “little 
possibility of achieving an agreed definition of justice within the conceptual 
framework of secular liberalism.”3  If the church capitulates to this mode of 
reasoning, it will eventually find its distinctive contribution eroded and will be viewed 
as merely one party in an irreconcilable political debate. 
 
According to Newbigin, what is needed in today’s world is not just for Christians to 
add their voice to the wider concern for peace and justice, but rather to ask whether 
there is a specifically Christian way of seeking these goods.  He briefly gestures 
towards a possible answer, suggesting that the church is the bearer of an “open 
secret,” that the true nature of justice has been decisively revealed in God’s 
                                                
1 Lesslie Newbigin, ‘Whose Justice?,’ The Ecumenical Review 44, no. 3 (1992): 308. 
2 In Newbigin’s words, the church is in the “business of radical conversion,” including a conversion of 
the mind and its perception of what constitutes justice, ibid., 311. 




justification of the ungodly.4  Understood in Christian terms, justice has its source in 
the Triune God and is manifest in the restoration of relationships, through the acts of 
repentance and forgiveness.  The church has been admitted to this restoration through 
its participation in Christ.  It is to “embody the justice of God” by welcoming the 
sinner, standing in solidarity with those on the margins, and continually pointing to 
“the One in whom God’s justice has been made manifest in the strange victory of the 
cross.”5 
 
Newbigin’s brief yet suggestive comments reflect a number of the concerns that will 
be pursued in this study.  His diagnosis of the present situation resonates with the 
perspective advocated here, as does his suggestion that the greatest need is for local 
Christian communities to “embody the justice of God” in their respective contexts.  
This study is concerned with the ethics of justice, but it seeks to highlight the 
importance of the embodied reality of the church and the difference this consideration 
makes to the ethical task. 
 
One of the most significant recent shifts in the discipline of Christian ethics has been 
the recovery of an appreciation of the centrality of the ecclesia to Christian life.  If it 
was once presumed that general society was more or less Christian and that Christian 
ethics was more or less concerned with prescribing moral principles for a 
Christianised society, such a presumption no longer holds true.  Not only has society 
become decidedly less Christian (if it ever were so), the formalistic universalism 
characteristic of modern ethical thought is now deemed to be insufficient.  The ethical 
task confronting us now is to attend to the character of human life – how it has been 
formed, its context and history, the language used to express this reality, and so on.   
 
This new appreciation for the contextual particularity of human existence has evoked 
new directions in ethical inquiry: less prescriptive, more descriptive; less generalised, 
more particularised; less abstract, more embedded.  For Christian ethics, this shift has 
resulted in a far richer account of how the ecclesia comprises a particular context 
within which Christian convictions are embodied.  The term ecclesia denotes both the 
theological term for “church” while also pointing to the earliest self-understanding of 
                                                
4 Ibid. 




the church as an “assembly” of citizens within a particular political context.  The 
recent trend towards an ethics of the ecclesia, covered in Chapter Two, is reflective of 
a broader recovery of the distinctiveness of Christian convictions and of the 
particularity of the Christian tradition.  Theological ethicists are turning their attention 
to the social and political character of the ecclesia as indispensable to the forming of 
Christian character and the church’s moral vision.  
 
While this shift towards the development of an ecclesial ethic has not met with 
widespread acceptance, nonetheless it has provided the impetus for some significant 
reassessments of related disciplines in Christian theology.6  One such reassessment 
has been in the field of biblical interpretation, which was one of the first casualties of 
a distinctly modernist methodology.  Rather than individual exegetes approaching the 
bible with the tools of historical and literary criticism, a new appreciation has arisen 
of the role of the community in interpreting the bible as Scripture, as it seeks to live 
faithfully before God in its respective context.  The “theological interpretation of 
Scripture,” as it has come to be known, places an emphasis on how the story of 
Scripture is being embodied (or mis-embodied) by the reading community of faith.7 
 
This thesis is broadly situated within this ecclesial mode of ethical inquiry with 
respect to the understanding and practice of justice.  It asks, “How does an ecclesial 
context shape the theological apprehension and praxis of justice?”  Its proposition is 
that the church does not so much possess a theory of justice as it understands itself 
constituted by an ethos of justice-making.  This is not to say theoretical concepts have 
no use in the church’s thinking.  Rather, it means that from an ecclesial perspective 
justice is better understood in a dynamic sense, as something the church participates 
in and grasps the meaning of primarily through the doing of justice.  The church as 
the Body of Christ inhabits a particular form of justice, a justice sourced in a divine 
personality.  This is what in the biblical and theological traditions is called the “justice 
                                                
6 The recent criticisms by Nicholas Healy, surveyed in Chapter Two, stand out as one recent example 
of how ecclesial ethics is being met within the theological disciplines. His singling out of Stanley 
Hauerwas is not surprising, as most of the criticisms of ecclesial ethics are directly aimed at Hauerwas 
or indirectly at his influence over the field of Christian ethics more generally.  
7 While many works could be cited here, see especially, Stephen E. Fowl, Engaging Scripture: A 
Model for Theological Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); Stephen E. Fowl and L. 
Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life (London, UK: SPCK, 




of God,” a justice that God both exemplifies in his own being and actions and that 
God requires of his people.  By exploring the ecclesial context in which the justice of 
God is understood I hope to spark the contemporary church’s imagination as to how it 
might better embody this justice through its life together and its mission in the world. 
 
The presupposition behind the ecclesial turn in Christian ethics is that there is a 
significant difference between this way of proceeding and other forms of inquiry.  In 
other words, the church witnesses to the difference God makes by gathering a 
community around his Son.  Just as Christ is different from all creation by virtue of 
his union with God, so the church that gathers in him is also different from the world: 
behold a “new creation” (2 Cor. 5:17).  With respect to justice, this difference resides 
in how the church participates in God’s justice-making as embodied in the life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  The pressing challenge for ecclesial ethics is the 
degree to which the church actually reflects the practices and character of the justice 
revealed in Christ.   
 
This challenge is especially acute in contemporary society where the understanding of 
justice is increasingly fragmented.  Justice has become a deeply contested concept in 
the post-modern era.  Churches too are increasingly divided between different 
conceptions of justice.  Some churches emphasize the socio-economic ramifications 
of justice by speaking about “social justice,” with the result that distributive 
conceptions are at the forefront.  Others emphasize the spiritual dimensions of justice 
by speaking about God’s righteousness justifying the ungodly, with the result that 
individualized and spiritualized conceptions are dominant.  Still others emphasize 
justice as therapy, where inclusion and acceptance are viewed as self-sufficient goods 
for a just society.   
 
The church’s fragmented witness on questions of justice reflects a fragmented and 
limited understanding of justice itself.  Detached from its biblical moorings and 
ecclesial context, Christian claims about justice can often end up being distorted or 
truncated as they are captured by or interpreted within categories derived from the 
human situation.  The long history of criminal justice theory and practice, which is 
briefly surveyed in Chapter One, reflects such a distorted understanding of justice 




been perceived.  While theologians have been reticent to equate divine justice with 
human systems of justice, a two-way traffic of ideas has nevertheless flowed between 
portrayals of God’s justice and human systems of law, justice, and punishment.  The 
justice of God has steadily acquired a more abstract and retributive determination by 
being interpreted in a forensic rather than ecclesial context.  This in turn has opened 
the door to legalistic and punitive practices of justice in general society.  
 
By attending to the connection between the church’s understanding of justice and the 
form of its witness in human affairs, this study will show how a more theologically 
informed understanding of justice has direct implications for the church’s witness, not 
least when responding to conflict and wrongdoing.  When its interpretation of justice 
is grounded in the relational realities implied by the biblical terminology (especially 
tsedeqah and mishpat in Hebrew and dikaiosyne in Greek), and interpreted in light of 
such central biblical categories as covenant and community, justice acquires a far 
richer and more dynamic meaning.  We will argue that, from a biblical perspective, 
the justice of God is best understood as a relational and restorative reality that is 
primarily oriented towards the restoration of right relationships.  Such a relational 
conception allows for a more holistic and fundamentally more compassionate 
understanding of justice, especially corrective justice.   
 
The traditional justice-related goals of accountability and responsibility not only look 
different from a relational perspective, they intersect with ideas of resolution, 
reparation, and transformation – or what the biblical tradition calls repentance and 
forgiveness.  The problem for Christian thought is not the need to reconcile or balance 
God’s love or mercy with God’s justice, as has been commonly assumed in the 
theological tradition; the challenge is to understand God’s justice in a way that 
upholds and includes his mercy.  From such a perspective, justice uncoupled from 
mercy is simply unjust; mercy without justice ceases to be mercy, for mercy is 
fulfilled in perfect justice.  This is the justice the church is called to embody in its 
collective life, bearing witness to the restorative justice of God. 
 
Understanding God’s justice as a restorative justice provides critical insights into the 
distinctive life of the ecclesia that have remained largely undeveloped within ecclesial 




framework makes to notions of peace-making, but little has so far been done on the 
difference it makes to the pursuit of justice.  Where the subject of justice has been 
raised, it is often to question the church’s ready endorsement of justice, as in 
Newbigin’s caution to the WCC.8  While there are some exceptions to this, none has 
gone very far in explicating how justice as a restorative reality lies at the heart of the 
church’s experience of, and witness to, God’s justice.   
 
For example, in his book Good Punishment? James Logan rightly argues that the 
United States’ propensity for mass imprisonment rests on an understanding of justice 
as retributive degradation.9  While Logan offers an alternative to incarceration based 
on the ecclesial practice of penance, he provides no substantive corrective to the 
prevailing notion of justice itself.  Similarly Daniel Bell Jr. makes what appears to be 
a significant step in the right direction in his essay, “Jesus, the Jews, and the Politics 
of God’s Justice,” in which he offers a critical reading of how concepts of justice 
feature in relation to the church’s reading of Scripture.10  Yet Bell’s contribution 
remains suggestive at best.  It leaves many unanswered questions about how the 
church might embody a justice informed by, and given shape through, its particular 
convictions and practices. 
 
While those associated with the ecclesial turn in ethics have not written extensively 
about the nature and practice of justice, there are ecclesial traditions that have 
reflected deeply about what it means to do justice from a restorative angle.  In its 
early inception in the Mennonite-Anabaptist community, restorative justice was 
understood primarily as a “peace-making justice,” an approach to conflict and 
wrongdoing that focused on restoration, reconciliation, and reparation of the harm 
done.11  In Chapter Three we will survey how the Anabaptist tradition provided fertile 
ground for forging connections between peacemaking and the contemporary concerns 
                                                
8 For example, the influential chapter “The Politics of Justice: Why Justice is a Bad Idea for Christians,” 
in Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom?: How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a 
Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1991), 45-68.  
9 James S. Logan, Good Punishment?: Christian Moral Practice and U.S. Imprisonment (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2008). 
10 Daniel Bell Jr., ‘Jesus, the Jews, and the Politics of God’s Justice,’ Ex Auditu 22 (2006): 87-112; see 
also his Liberation Theology after the End of History: The Refusal to Cease Suffering (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001).  
11 See, David Cayley, The Expanding Prison: The Crisis in Crime and Punishment and the Search for 




about the damaging impact of the prevailing criminal justice system.  What emerged 
as the Victim Offender Reconciliation Project (VORP) quickly resonated with 
churches concerned about the problematic outcomes of the public justice system.  It 
soon became clear that restorative justice practice gave expression to an alternative 
conception of justice, resembling the biblical concept of shalom, a concept that 
combines justice-making and peace.12  This holistic conception of justice was given 
new expression as it was mediated through the ecclesial identity and practices of the 
Anabaptist peacemaking tradition. 
 
The restorative justice concept has since grown into a field of criminological theory 
and practice that has far surpassed the expectations of its early church-based 
practitioners.  Over the past four decades, as Van Ness and Strong argue, restorative 
justice has moved from being a “community-based alternative” to the criminal justice 
system, to being both a “source of public policy” and a “viable part of the criminal 
justice system” in many jurisdictions around the world.13  In the recent four-volume 
edited work on restorative justice, Carolyn Hoyle rightly states, “… over the last two 
decades there has been more written about restorative justice than almost any other 
criminological topic.”14  But as it has grown to become an accepted component of 
public justice systems, it has also been adapted to suit the presuppositions and 
language of the public arena.  To a large degree, restorative justice has been 
secularized and construed as just another option within a justice system it once 
protested against.  While not overtly hostile to a Christian perspective, restorative 
justice has eschewed its dependence on the theological insights that led to its 
conception. 
 
This mainstreaming of restorative justice practice within secular discourse has 
presented new challenges for furthering the church’s imagination of justice as a power 
that restores.  On the one hand, the acceptance and spread of a restorative 
                                                
12 The seminal text here is Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice 
(Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1990); Zehr largely drew on P. B. Yoder, Shalom: The Bible’s Word for 
Salvation, Justice, and Peace (Newton, Kans.: Faith and Life Press, 1987); and, Millard C. Lind, 
Yahweh Is a Warrior: The Theology of Warfare in Ancient Israel (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1980). 
13 Daniel W. Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative 
Justice, 4th ed. (New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2010), 34. 
14 Carolyn Hoyle, “General Introduction,” in Restorative Justice, Vol. 1: The Rise of Restorative Justice 




understanding of justice is an occasion for the church to rejoice.  While recognising 
the dangers of cooption and control, the early pioneers of restorative justice saw it as 
integral to the church’s mission to the world, offering a more faithful rendering of 
justice.  On the other hand, the church now has to contend with its own continued 
relevance to the restorative justice field.  What distinctive contribution can the church 
possibly make to this now complex and increasingly professional body of practice, 
especially when multiple other identities and interests occupy the restorative justice 
space?   
 
It is the goal of this thesis to show that such a contribution does in fact matter and that 
it must be understood as arising from the church’s very raison d’etre.  In other words, 
the church’s distinctive contribution to the wider restorative justice field must be 
informed by the ways in which the justice of God is taking shape in its own 
community.  This involves bringing together the insights developed by ecclesial 
ethics with those of restorative justice practice. 
 
If the burden of proof appears now to lie with the church in explaining its relevance to 
restorative justice, this is in no small part due to the lack of theological reflection 
among the early pioneers of the movement.  Considering the exponential growth of 
restorative justice since its inception in the 1960-70s, it is surprising that only a 
handful of theological thinkers have sought to provide treatments of the subject.  
Howard Zehr is widely recognised as the grandfather of the restorative justice 
movement.  While not a theologian per se, he provided the initial articulation of a 
theology underlying this conception of justice by drawing on selected Old Testament 
scholarship.15  Yet as a criminal justice historian and restorative justice practitioner, 
Zehr did not view his role as one of broadening or deepening these initial theological 
soundings.  Those with more theological expertise, most notably Christopher 
Marshall, have contributed significantly to exploring the intersection of restorative 
justice with biblical, and in particular, New Testament theology and ethics.   
 
                                                
15 See particularly his chapter, “Covenant Justice: The Biblical Alternative,” in Zehr, Changing Lenses, 
126-57. In terms of theological works, Zehr largely draws on Millard Lind, Perry Yoder and the 




My project builds on Marshall’s premise that, “the first Christians experienced in 
Christ and lived out in their faith communities an understanding of justice as a power 
that heals, restores, and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and kills, and that this 
reality ought to shape and direct a Christian contribution to the criminal justice debate 
today.”16  In the nearly two decades since Marshall put forward this premise, scant 
attention has been paid to restorative justice by the very community that bequeathed 
its own conception of justice to the restorative justice movement in the first place.  
The development of restorative justice theory and practice has far outstripped the 
level of theological reflection on it, with the result that the theological and ecclesial 
underpinnings of restorative justice remain obscure.   
 
For example, Anthony Bash in his Forgiveness and Christian Ethics fails to see the 
connection between the biblical understanding of justice, which is concerned with 
life, community, and relationships, and restorative justice, which, he claims, is more 
narrowly concerned with criminal justice reform.17  But, as this thesis will argue, 
restorative justice emerged precisely as an outworking of the biblical mandate to seek 
peace and reconciliation between people (and their communities), who have suffered 
relational injury.  On the other hand, there are those like Michael Gorman and Stanley 
Hauerwas, both of whom describe God’s justice as a “restorative justice,” but never 
acknowledge this concept’s indebtedness to the field of practice wherein it 
originated.18  The adjective “restorative” becomes merely another qualifier of the 
noun justice, without reference to the distinctive way in which restorative justice was 
formed as an ecclesial practice, to restore relationships harmed by wrongdoing. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to address this lack of attention in theological reflection to 
the ecclesiological dimension and implications of understanding the justice of God as 
a restorative justice.  If the subject of restorative justice requires deeper theological 
reflection, as I believe it does, and if ecclesial ethics provides a helpful way of 
furthering such reflection, what might be entailed in such an undertaking?  I suggest 
                                                
16 Christopher D. Marshall, Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and 
Punishment (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2001), 33. 
17 Anthony Bash, Forgiveness and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
147. 
18 Michael J. Gorman, Becoming the Gospel: Paul, Participation, and Mission (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2015), especially 212-60; Stanley Hauerwas, “Jesus, the Justice of God,” in War and the 




three tasks that need to be accomplished; they may be categorized as the descriptive, 
the prescriptive, and the suggestive tasks.   
 
The descriptive task must attend to the context(s) in which the church has understood 
the justice of God to impinge on the human landscape.  As already noted, conceptions 
of divine justice have not only shaped the church but also had an impact on the 
enactment of public justice.  Without a clear understanding of the way in which 
justice-related ideas have flowed between different spheres of life, any proposal for 
reform in one area risks making arbitrary changes that have unintended consequences 
elsewhere.  This thesis attempts the descriptive task by offering a critical account of 
how the ecclesial context in which God’s justice has been understood intersects with 
the criminal justice context, both historically and in the contemporary restorative 
justice field.  This requires uncovering the ecclesiological footprint beneath the 
various construals of justice, since conceptions of justice are never far removed from 
their particular social form.   
 
By telling the story of how the Western criminal justice system emerged in 
relationship to theological convictions about the nature of God’s justice, it will 
become clear how assumptions regarding divine justice always carry social and 
practical implications.  Justice is not a static concept or abstract idea that can be 
known apart from the various contexts, practices, and relationships that give it 
concrete form.  A besetting problem in the theological tradition is that justice has too 
often been understood in isolation from its proper biblical and ecclesial context.  
Theologians have tended to appropriate metaphors of justice drawn from their wider 
social setting rather than drawing deeply on the biblical witness to God’s justice and 
the lived experience of the community of faith.  This has often resulted in highly 
retributive understandings of justice.  
 
The prescriptive task concerns the need to clarify what norms ought to guide the 
church’s understanding of the justice of God.  While human judgments about the 
nature of reality are unavoidable, the church has always held that human reason alone 
is insufficient to determine the truth, both because it is prone to distortion and because 
God’s ways in the world cannot be apprehended by human wisdom alone.  For this 




divine truth.  With respect to its apprehension of justice, it is to the unfolding story of 
God’s justice in the biblical account that the church must look for guidance.  In 
particular, such reflection should center around the story of Jesus, who is presented as 
the definitive expression of God’s saving justice in the world, and of the church, 
which is understood to be the primary witness to and instrument of the justice of God 
on earth through its participation in Christ.  In Chapters Four to Six, I will explore the 
biblical story of God’s justice and then focus attention on two passages that exemplify 
the nature of God’s justice – Jesus’ parable of the Prodigal Son and Paul’s 
instructions to the church in Corinth.  These chapters illustrate what is necessary for 
re-centering the church’s witness on God’s restoring justice. 
 
Finally, the suggestive task will propose ways in which the church might go about 
embodying God’s justice on earth.  I will argue, first, that the church is already 
engaged in forms of restorative justice within its own liturgical life.  By inviting 
sinners and victims to participate in the liturgical acts of confession, the declaration of 
forgiveness, passing of the peace, culminating in the Eucharist, the church remembers 
and proclaims the restoring justice it has received in Christ.  At the end of the worship 
gathering, the church is commissioned to go out into the world to proclaim and 
embody this same justice of right relationships.  This will lead to an examination of 
how the church might extend its work of restorative justice through its common life 
and missional life.   
 
Taken together, the descriptive, prescriptive, and suggestive aspects of this thesis 
show how the ecclesia is a prime locus for understanding the justice of God, and why 
the church must continue to find ways of embodying an expression of justice in the 
world that points to God’s restorative and healing purposes.  This must always take 
place in conformity to the way in which the justice of God is disclosed in the biblical 
story in general and through the story of Jesus in particular. 
 
We noted earlier that contemporary churches all too often reflect a partial and 
fragmented understanding of justice, which prevents them from bearing witness to a 
better way of responding to conflict and wrongdoing.  Congregations are all too often 
embroiled in antagonistic relationships, and exhibit a pessimistic attitude that conflict 




surprising, the church’s inability to respond restoratively to internal conflict is deeply 
perturbing.  By offering an account of how God’s justice can be outworked in the life 
of the church, and by articulating the virtues and practices needed to respond 
restoratively to conflict, this thesis seeks to provide a distinctive contribution to 
ecclesial ethics, and to the kind of ecclesial witness that is so essential today.  Such a 
witness will testify to how God’s justice is at work, restoring the world by bringing 










What is the relationship between the ecclesia’s apprehension of the justice of God and 
other conceptions of justice in the human realm?  How has this relationship 
functioned at different times in church history and what impact has this had on 
society’s response to injustice and wrongdoing?  This chapter has two principal aims.  
First, to set out how different conceptions of justice have developed through the 
course of Christian history, and second, to trace the practical and social consequences 
of the church’s theological understanding of God’s justice.  As will be shown, how 
the church understands the concept of justice has implications not just for the life of 
the community of faith but also for the wider social order, and in particular for the 
way it responds to wrongdoers and their victims.  This will require attending to the 
way in which concepts of justice have been shaped by the social settings in which 
they are forged and practiced, as justice cannot be known apart from the historical 
contexts, practices, and relationships that give it concrete form.  By offering a broad 
overview of the complex and changing relationship between the church’s 
understanding of justice and its sociological embodiment, this chapter will show how 
different conceptions of justice owe much more to Greco-Roman antecedents than to 
Scripture. 
 
One recurring feature through Christian history has been the way in which theologians 
have adopted conceptions and metaphors of justice drawn from the surrounding social 
world in order to explicate the church’s confession of the justice of God.  This has 
created what Timothy Gorringe calls a “structure of effect” in which there have been 
consequences both for theology and society.1  Theologians have usually been reticent, 
and for good reason, to equate divine and human justice.  Even so, there remains a 
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causal connection between them, with understandings of one influencing the other.  
As will be seen, forensic and juridical notions of justice have had a controlling 
influence on the church’s understanding of divine justice.  This has resulted in God’s 
justice acquiring an increasingly retributive and legalistic flavor, as well as in 
reinforcing retributive practices in the criminal justice system. 
 
This two-way flow of ideas between theological interpretations of justice and societal 
responses to criminal justice can readily be traced in Western history.  Even in 
contemporary secular societies, the practice of justice often rests on unacknowledged 
theological assumptions about law, punishment, and crime bequeathed to them from 
the Christian theological tradition.  It might even be said that the modern criminal 
justice system is a secular parody of previous ecclesial notions of justice, sin, and 
atonement.  
 
In the historical survey that follows we will focus particularly on times of societal 
upheaval, since it was at these moments that the church’s understanding of justice 
evolved in response to the surrounding societal turmoil.  As the church’s place in 
society changed, so did its witness to justice.  As a broad generalisation, when the 
church had a more liminal role in society it was more likely to embody a vision of 
justice that reflected the redemptive and transformative presence of Christ in the 
community.  Where it was perceived to be coterminous with the prevailing social and 
political order it tended to advocate a view of justice that reinforced the status quo, 
one that was increasingly abstract and retributive.  This in turn opened the door to 
harsh and punitive practices in wider society. 
 
Our historical survey begins by considering the conception of justice that emerged in 
Greco-Roman philosophy, where the understanding of diké as being immanent in the 
natural order exerted considerable influence on later theological reflection, even as it 
came under much-needed critique.  This will be followed by a brief consideration of 
the post-apostolic church’s approach to justice-making, where it sought to conform 
itself to the example of Jesus as the model of God’s justice.   
 
Subsequently, in the late fourth century Augustine of Hippo advocated a more 




and society.  With the legal revolution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the 
consolidation of papal power created new forms of centralized authority supported by 
strongly legal conceptions of justice.  The theology of Anselm of Canterbury 
smoothed the way for the triumph of legalistic and retributive interpretations of 
justice.  The sixteenth century Protestant Reformation saw an increasingly sharp 
distinction being drawn between the demands of God’s law and justice, and the free 
grace offered in the gospel.  This was a distinction that paradoxically reinforced the 
retributive dimensions of the civil justice system while extending the possibility of 
evading God’s punitive justice through faith and repentance in the practices of the 
church. 
 
Following the eighteenth century Enlightenment, as secular modernity took shape, the 
repressive and retributive conceptions of justice prevailing in the civil order came to 
be justified on grounds other than theological belief.  Immanuel Kant’s theory of 
justice, for example, rests solely on appeals to universal reason and individual 
autonomy.  Closer to our own time, another epochal shift is occurring as modernity 
enters its twilight.  One consequence of late modernity’s loss of any unifying narrative 
is the erosion of any consensus on the meaning of justice.  Criminal justice practice is 
now increasingly subject to political whims and a highly anxious public.  This forms 
the context in which the contemporary church must bear witness to God’s justice, 
which it must do by testing to what degree these different conceptions of justice are 





In his commentary on the Laws, the first century B.C.E Roman jurist Cicero declared 
that justice – ius – is encapsulated in the formula suum ius cuique tribuere: “to render 
to each what is due them.”2  It was this understanding of justice that governed 
relations in society.   
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There is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law 
which establishes this justice.  This law is right reason, which is the true 
rule of all commandments and prohibitions.  Whoever neglects this law, 
whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.3   
 
Cicero later goes on to stipulate what justice requires when dealing with wrongdoers.  
He states, “If a person transgresses any of these rules, the penalty shall fit the crime 
… In this way each offender is to be paid back in his own coin – violence being 
punished by death or exile, greed by a fine, improper canvassing by disgrace.”4  
Justice requires that each receive their just desert, to be rewarded or punished 
according to what they deserve. 
 
Cicero’s interpretation of justice relied on a mythology stretching back at least as far 
as Homer.  According to Homer, the universe had a single fundamental order that, 
while not created by the gods, was nonetheless governed by them.  It was Zeus’ virgin 
daughter Dikê (“justice”) who presided over nature and society by the principle of 
“right,” ensuring epieikeia (fairness or equity) through the balancing of rewards and 
punishment.  For the Greeks, justice was believed to be immanent in the natural order 
as a principle that ensured order and balance.5  Human justice thereby required acting 
in accordance with the immanent order, eventually being regarded as a quality of the 
virtuous soul.  This understanding of justice operated according to what Colin Gunton 
calls a “violent grace,” as people were fated to receive what was strictly their due.6  
Anything more or less was regarded as an infraction of natural justice.  
 
Socrates and Plato furthered the Greek concept of justice by arguing that justice had a 
perfect form that could be cultivated by the virtuous soul.  According to this 
conception, as MacIntyre notes, societal rules for ensuring justice were secondary to 
the “disposition to give to each person, including oneself, what that person deserves 
                                                
3 Cicero, De Legibus.  
4 Ibid., III, 11, 46. Cited in Darrin W. Snyder Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace: The Message 
of the Cross and the Mission of the Church (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2012), 
44. 
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), 14. 
6 Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian 




and to treat no one in a way incompatible with their deserts.”7  Justice moved from 
being a reciprocal quality to an individual property of the virtuous.  According to 
Plato, those who were just, held the polis together and therefore deserved positions of 
authority within it.  Those who were judged to be deficient of virtue were to be cured 
by the discipline of punishment.8  In Martha Nussbaum’s opinion, Plato exemplifies 
the political embodiment of Homer’s theology where “strict dike is a harsh and 
symmetrical world in which order and design are preserved with exceptionless 
clarity.”9   
 
The understanding of punishment as righting the balance of the moral order finds firm 
ground in Greek thinking.  However, it is the order of the soul that is paramount.  In 
the Gorgias, Plato cites Socrates: “[T]here is no other possible way to get rid of 
injustice” than “by way of pain and suffering.”10  The imposition of pain was thought 
to transform an unjust man into a person who is “either more virtuous or less 
wicked.”11  Punishment is here orientated towards the moral reformation of the 
offender’s soul, rather than satisfying a need on behalf of the one offended against.   
 
Plato’s conception of justice as an immanent ideal form within the cosmic order 
continued to influence Greco-Roman philosophy, even if the approach to attaining 
knowledge of that form would change.  Plato’s student Aristotle would complete the 
project of his teacher by providing an account of archê (first conceptions and 
principles) grounded in the imperfect and particular reality of the polis.12  The form of 
justice can only be known, argued Aristotle, by attending to its particular expressions, 
where it is already embodied and implicitly acknowledged.  Working with this model 
of epagôgê (“induction”), it became clear to Aristotle that retributive exchange is an 
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9 Martha Craven Nussbaum, Sex & Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 159; 
cited in Richard H. Bell, Rethinking Justice: Restoring Our Humanity (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2007), 14. 
10 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 109 (525b). 
11 Plato, The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Harmondsworth,: Penguin, 1970), 854. In Plato’s Laws, 
the pseudonymous Athenian specifies extreme punishments for the very hardened criminals, those who 
are well beyond any thought of cure. The punishments elected for these criminals extend beyond the 
grave. This feature of Greek thought led Corlett to conclude that, “If this is not a bold form of 
retributivism, then there is no such theory as retributivism,” J. Angelo Corlett, “Punishment and the 
Socratic Roots of Retributivism,” in Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 10. 




aspect of justice that is essential for holding society together: “Men seek to return 
either evil for evil – and if they cannot do so, think their position mere slavery – or 
good for good – and if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange 
that they hold together.”13   
 
The Greco-Roman philosophical conception of justice would exert considerable 
influence over the church’s later theological categories for understanding justice, even 
as the concept underwent significant changes.  While Christianity remained relatively 
marginal in society it posed little threat to the Roman commonwealth.14  Yet as 
Augustine was later to observe, according to Cicero’s own definition of a 
commonwealth the early church already represented a rival tradition of justice taking 
root.  As Cicero argues in De Republica, what defined the Roman people as the true 
and superior commonwealth was its, “common acknowledgment of law [i.e., an 
agreement about right or justice], and by a community of interests.”15  To the degree 
that the church acknowledged a different conception of law and justice at work, as it 
gathered around the interests of God’s kingdom we notice an altogether new 




Later sections of this thesis will explore the apostolic church’s apprehension of justice 
as attested in the New Testament.  At this point it is enough to note that the church’s 
witness to justice during the first three centuries largely continued the emphasis of the 
apostolic period in at least two respects.  First, when the early church Fathers spoke 
about justice or righteousness it was often in relationship to God’s justice, since all 
justice was thought to flow from its divine source.  Second, the early church’s 
response to wrongdoers was significantly conditioned by its understanding of 
repentance and the need to restore sinners to the forgiven community.  What is not 
                                                
13 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
1132b-33a. 
14 Especially considering the propaganda of imperial notions of justice and law. See, Simon R. F. Price, 
Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984); and in Pauline studies Neil Elliot, Liberating Paul: The Justice of God and the Politics of the 
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seen in the writings of this period are extensive treatises on justice, nor any overt 
challenging of the machinations of imperial justice.  Instead, the emphasis is on 
embodying within their own communities an alternative conception of justice 
grounded in the dawning reality of God’s kingdom.   
 
In his only surviving letter, Clement of Rome reflects a typical concern of this period 
as he writes to the church in Corinth.  After a dispute that had resulted in the 
deposition of the presbyters, Clement instructs the Corinthians that while they are 
indeed to admonish one another, it should always be for the purpose of restoring the 
wayward person in love.  He quotes from the book of Job, “Blessed is the man whom 
the Lord reproveth, and reject not thou the warning of the Almighty.  For He causes 
sorrow, and again restores [to gladness]; He woundeth, and His hands make whole.”16  
Clement reflects the early Christian belief that correction comes from the Lord, and 
the goal of such chastisement is restoration.  In imitation of the Lord’s ways, Clement 
exhorts church members to be exemplary in their love for one another and to banish 
hostile attitudes contrary to the church’s calling. 
 
Clement’s exhortation is more than a private word of rebuke; it expresses an 
alternative understanding of justice.  His commendation to imitate the Lord and his 
justice is already to interpret justice within a framework unknown to Greek thinking.  
For the Greeks, justice was governed by the gods but it did not reside in them, nor was 
justice understood in terms of love.  For Clement, justice was a quality to be known 
and imitated through God’s self-revelation in Christ as the just One.  As Justin Martyr 
in the second century would later write, the true character of righteousness is found in 
those who have “the knowledge of God and of His Christ,” for they are proved just in 
their service by being obedient to the Lord.17  He writes again in his Apology, “we 
have been taught, and are convinced, and do believe, that He accepts those only who 
imitate the excellences which reside in Him, temperance, and justice, and 
philanthropy, and as many virtues as are peculiar to a God who is called by no proper 
name.”18   
 
                                                
16 Clement of Rome, “First Epistle to the Corinthians,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1907), Chap. LVI, 20.  
17 Justin Martyr, “Dialogue with Trypho,” in ibid., Chap. XXVIII, 208.  




It is significant that the early Fathers saw no tension between God’s justice and God’s 
other attributes.  A contrasting view was advocated by Marcion in the third century, 
who argued that the Hebrew God could not possibly be the Father of Jesus Christ.  
Marcion promoted the idea that the “Father” is without any judicial faculty; he is pure 
goodness, and as such this Father saves us from the Old Testament God who rebukes 
and judges humanity.  In effect, Marcion attributed to the Old Testament God the 
unmerciful and harsh reality depicted by the Greek notion of Dikê.  The orthodox 
church’s rejection of Marcionism was also therefore a rejection of justice so 
understood.   
 
In his rebuttal of Marcion, Irenaeus argues that the God worshipped by Christians is 
both just and good and that neither attribute can exist on its own without the other 
becoming distorted.  By splitting God from the Father, Irenaeus believed that Marcion 
was “unconsciously taking away the intelligence and justice of both deities.”19  
Rather, the Father is good and wise precisely by exercising his justice in a way that 
shows his goodness.  As Irenaeus puts it,  
 
[The Father] is Lord, and Judge, and the Just One, and Ruler over all.  For 
He is good, and merciful, and patient, and saves whom He ought: nor does 
goodness desert Him in the exercise of justice, nor is His wisdom lessened; 
for He saves those whom He should save, and judges those worthy of 
judgment.  Neither does He show Himself unmercifully just; for His 
goodness, no doubt, goes on before, and takes precedency.20 
 
 
By upholding God’s saving justice over against the Father saving us from justice, 
Irenaeus invested the concept of justice with a meaning that was altogether unfamiliar 
to the Greco-Roman tradition.  He conceived of justice as a reality that restores and 
saves, rather than hurts, punishes, and kills.  This was how he understood God’s 




                                                







The ecclesial context in the fourth century was significantly altered by two events.  
First, beginning with the reign of Emperor Constantine, Christianity began to acquire 
power and status in the Roman Empire.  This meant that official persecution of 
Christians ended and the church was endowed with the privileges of land, buildings, 
and authority.  Second, by the end of the fourth century the survival of the Empire 
came under threat, as did the church which enjoyed its protection.  In a time of 
societal turmoil the church needed to show itself as having a status independent of the 
Empire, while at the same time being no less than a fully political body.  To 
understand how this context shaped the church’s understanding of justice we turn to 
the theologian who would define the terms by which the church’s relationship to 
society was understood, as well as its understanding of juristic norms. 
 
The bishop-theologian, Augustine of Hippo, is widely regarded as being responsible 
for bequeathing to the Western tradition an understanding of justice that infused 
classical thinking with the concerns of the New Testament.  In the opinion of 
Belousek, “Western Christian thinking concerning justice and peace has been shaped 
down the centuries by the writings of two great theologians, Augustine and Aquinas.  
And the thinking of Augustine and Aquinas on justice and peace was influenced 
substantially by Greco-Roman philosophy, especially Aristotle and Cicero.”21  
Augustine was not the first to attempt a synthesis of Greco-Roman philosophy and 
Christian theology; Clement of Alexandria and Origen stand out as cases in point.  
Yet no Christian thinker presented as powerful and enduring a framework for 
interweaving theological concerns with Roman political philosophy.   
 
Two features of the Augustinian legacy are especially significant for our purposes.  
First, Augustine enables the repressive function of the governing authorities to be 
justified by a semblance of justice rather than a full embodiment of justice.  This 
interpretive move opens the door to a two-way flow of ideas between a sphere that 
practices something less than complete justice and the church’s role in endorsing such 
limited conceptions of justice.  Second, in Augustine’s schema God’s justice suffers 
                                                




from an internalizing drift as it impinges on the human landscape.  Justice-making in 
the context of relationships is largely subordinated to the pursuit of a penitent soul.  
 
According to Dodaro, Augustine’s use of the term iustitia involves the conflation of 
three general sets of meaning.22  The first comes from Greco-Roman philosophy, 
which regarded justice as “the habit of the soul or the virtue whereby one gives to 
each individual his due.”  The second derives from the New Testament as understood 
by Latin patristic writers and equates the virtue with the love (caritas) that is due God 
and neighbour.  The third resembles the Pauline notion of dikaiosyne, understood as 
the “condition of the soul whereby it stands in a ‘right,’ because properly ordered, 
relationship with God, its Creator.”23  This range of meaning Augustine gives to 
iustitia enables him to harmonize the volitional aspect of love and a view of humanity 
as created for right relationship with an ordered view of nature.  For example, Dodaro 
cites Augustine’s definition of justice as “love serving God alone and thus ruling well 
those things subject to human beings.”24  “Ruling well” means enabling one’s 
neighbours to receive what is their due as prescribed by divine law and by nature. 
 
Augustine’s merging of caritas and iustitia meant that the perfect virtue of justice 
exists, as Deane puts it, by the “spontaneous order of love.”25  Justice describes the 
condition where all things are in perfect order, specifically the objects of our love, 
which for Augustine are to be directed towards God and neighbour.  This true justice 
was manifest in only one person according to Augustine, since there has only been 
one who loved perfectly.  Because Christ was without sin, he alone is truly just and 
has no need of the correction due sin.  In other words, justice properly understood has 
nothing to do with the negative concepts of retribution or coercive punishment, 
because all things exist in perfect order where God’s will is consummate.  For 
Augustine, there is no tension between mercy and justice insofar as they cohere in 
God’s nature. 
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Augustine clearly shared the early church’s concern to establish justice 
christologically, yet he is far more reticent about where this impinges on the human 
landscape.  The early Fathers generally emphasized Christ’s defeat of Satan and 
vanquishing of sin, thereby construing divine justice in terms of a power that freed the 
church from the realm of darkness.  Augustine, on the other hand, was captivated by 
the doctrine of universal sinfulness, pervasive even in the church.  Consequently, the 
perfect virtue of justice was unattainable in this earthly existence.26  Augustine had a 
rather dark view of the human condition.  He writes, “this moral life itself is wholly 
one of punishment, for it is all temptation.”27  He intensifies the conflict between the 
Adamic condition of sin and the new life in Christ to such an extent that the former 
overwhelms the present age while the latter can only be anticipated in hope.  
 
To understand Augustine’s strict separation between divine and human justice, we 
must appreciate the changing context within which he understood the outworking of 
God’s justice.  Writing in the fourth century, Augustine was under no illusion about 
the extent to which the church shared many of the same weaknesses prevalent in 
wider pagan culture.  The line that separated the church from the world was becoming 
increasingly blurred as a consequence of Constantine’s adoption of Christianity.  
There were people in the church who viewed ecclesiastical office as a pathway to 
worldly status.  Accordingly, Augustine argued that God alone was capable of 
distinguishing between the righteous and those who are “instruments of 
unrighteousness.”28  Thus even as he encourages “mutual forgiveness” in the 
company of the faithful, it becomes increasingly difficult to know who this might 
apply to.  
 
Added to this was the polemical context of Augustine’s dispute with Pelagius.  
According to Dodaro, this significantly coloured Augustine’s employment of the term 
justice.29  Like Augustine, Pelagius argued that Christ was indeed the “just man.”  
However, to this he added that alongside Christ there were others who lived as 
examples of perfect justice, notably the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament.  
                                                
26 For an overview of this shift see, Adonis Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice: The Cross in Historical 
and Cultural Contexts (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), esp. 14-28. 
27 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), Book XXI, Chap. 14, 1072. 
28 Ibid., Book XV, Chap. 6, 642. 




On account of his doctrine of the Trinity and of original sin, Augustine clearly 
distinguished the justice of God exemplified in Christ and the justice displayed by the 
faithful before God.  Following the Pelagian controversy, Augustine speaks in terms 
of the gradual growth of justice in the believer as a result of the specific effects of 
Christ’s grace.  However, it will never be the complete attainment of justice in its 
perfect form.   
 
Augustine’s impact on the church’s conception of justice was considerable.  He 
bequeathed the idea that in order to understand justice, one first had to be just, and the 
only way to live justly is to have one’s soul purified and healed of its ignorance and 
weakness resulting from sin.  Thereafter justice would be understood primarily in a 
penitential sense.  The just would be known by their piety as they practice what 
Dodaro calls the “spiritual arts of penitence – self-examination, confession, prayer for 
pardon, and forgiveness of others.”30  Only those who knew the depths of their sin and 
who acknowledged their dependence on the grace and mercy of God were, in 
Augustine’s opinion, fit to rule justly. 
 
Augustine’s penitential conception of justice was a powerful heuristic device for 
distinguishing the just society.  This is nowhere more evident than in Augustine’s 
departure from the Ciceronian account of a republic based on justice.  With respect to 
Cicero’s notion of a just statesman speaking to the people about justice and so 
forming a common weal, Augustine writes, “Rome was never a republic, because true 
justice had never a place in it.”31  Not until Christ could a republic exist that might 
rightly be considered just.  It was of this city that Scripture spoke when it said, 
“Glorious things are said of thee, O city of God.”  It is thus on account of God’s 
justice in Christ that there are “two kinds of human society,” one which exists by the 
pure grace of God, thereby attaining a higher level of justice, and the other that can 
only ever reflect a semblance of justice.32  At present, these two cities are 
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“commingled … entangled together,” which means that citizens of the heavenly city 
are called to seek after the peace of the earthly city.33  
 
Having made clear that the two cities are formed by their respective loves, Augustine 
resists seeing the earthly city as entirely given over to evil.  Self-love, or pride, is the 
distortion of love as it should be, but there are differing degrees of distortion.  The 
best condition of the earthly city is where it “desires earthly peace, albeit only for the 
sake of the lowest kind of goods; and it is that peace which it desires to achieve by 
waging war.”34  For Augustine, just as a modicum of peace can be attained by the 
means of war, so also a modicum of justice can be achieved by the coercive 
punishments of judgment.  Prior to Augustine, there was a far greater reticence about 
theologically justifying the practice of either soldiery or judging, since both were 
involved in the shedding of blood.35  Augustine introduced a dialectic that enabled 
both these practices to be theologically validated by something less than ideal peace 
and justice. 
 
After Augustine, both military and judicial vocations were considered exempt from 
the commandment “thou shall not kill,” so long as a “just law” authorized them.  In 
his commentary on the Ten Commandments, Augustine develops a formula that 
would henceforth define judicial procedure: “When a man is killed justly, it is the law 
that kills him, not you.”36  The “ministry of the laws,” as it came to be known, 
required that a Christian judge or soldier act under a just and lawful authority when he 
kills.37  The repressive function of the governing authorities was henceforth 
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considered a necessary part of the natural order, since without it sinfulness would 
overwhelm the peace and justice of the earthly city. 
 
In synthesizing the Ciceronian notion of justice as immanent in the natural order with 
the New Testament concern for relationships righted by love, Augustine effected 
change in both conceptions.  The imperial justice of the earthly city came to be 
viewed as a partial reflection of justice properly understood.  And yet, it was regarded 
as no less important for maintaining a rightly ordered society, so long as its earthly 
magistrates abandoned the pretence of being above the sinners over whom they were 
ordained to rule.  The true church, by contrast, is endowed with the practices needed 
to achieve true justice, which in this earthly existence can be achieved through the 
penitential rites that bring healing and purification to the just soul.  The church’s 
witness to God’s justice turns inward by focusing on the conditions that restrain the 
sinful desires within.  This is at some remove from understanding justice as a quality 




Just two years before Augustine started writing The City of God, the imperial city of 
Rome had fallen to Alaric and his party of raiding Goths (410 A.D.).  The eventual 
disintegration of the Empire meant that by the sixth century Roman systems of law 
and justice no longer exercised any meaningful authority over its citizens.  According 
to legal historian Harold Berman, the institutions for delivering justice ceased 
functioning as a “deliberate expression of conscious reason or of will” by those in 
official authority, and instead were left to the “common conscience” of local 
peoples.38  From the sixth to the tenth centuries, Western Europe operated mostly on 
the basis of tribal systems of “community justice” alongside penitential practices 
originated in Christian monasteries.  
 
Berman’s description of the European attitude to law during this period highlights the 
uniqueness of this period: 
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No one had attempted to organize the prevailing laws and legal institutions 
into a distinct structure.  Very little of the law was in writing.  There was 
no professional judiciary, no professional class of lawyers, no professional 
legal literature.  Law was not consciously systematized.  It had not yet 
been “disembedded” from the whole social matrix of which it was a part.  
There was no independent, integrated, developing body of legal principles 
and procedures clearly differentiated from other processes of social 
organization and consciously articulated by a corps of persons specially 
trained for that task.39   
 
 
The Germanic tribal legal systems of this period were primarily reparative in nature.  
The primary context for doing justice was the family or village unit, where the 
emphasis fell on maintaining community relationships and ensuring victims were 
compensated, often in the form of financial reparations.40  Law and judgment were 
primarily orientated towards holding people together and served more a mediatory or 
communicative role than a decision-making or rule-making role.  There was a feudal 
system of punishment, although this was viewed as an option of last resort, if a 
negotiated outcome could not be found.41  What mattered in the majority of offences, 
as Zehr puts it, “was the actual harm done, not the violation of laws or an abstract 
social or moral order … The feud was one way of resolving such situations, but so 
was negotiation, restitution, and reconciliation.”42 
 
In continuity with Augustine’s penitential theology, the concepts of crime and sin 
were viewed as interchangeable in the feudal context.  Both were defined in terms of 
an offense against actual victims and their kinfolk and, just as importantly, as against 
God.  The conviction that all were sinners, highlighted by Augustine, actually 
produced a remarkably chastened attitude to the punishment of criminals.43  The 
concepts of repentance and forgiveness were an integral part of the understanding of 
                                                
39 Ibid., 50. 
40 For example, the Laws of Ethelbert, which were promulgated by the ruler of Kent in 600 AD, 
contained detailed schedules of financial reparation for various injuries caused. Each part of the body 
that was injured carried a price that must be paid to the victim, or in the case of death, the victim’s 
family. See, ibid., 55; Gorringe, God’s Just Vengeance, cf. 89, 95. 
41 In the development of the feudal system of punishment, Gorringe points out, “all wrongdoing is 
[perceived as] an attack on the community.” Therefore, the community is compelled to find a way to 
satisfy all parties through a reconciliatory process, and only if such an outcome cannot be reached the 
wrongdoer is expelled from the human community, God’s Just Vengeance, 88.  
42 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice, 3rd ed. (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald 
Press, 2005), 99. 
43 As Whitman argues in his examination of the medieval practice of the juridical ordeal, Whitman, 




justice, which was further reinforced by the monastic system of penitentials.  Penance 
was viewed as “medicine for the soul,” a preparation for reconciliation with the wider 
community by way of faith and works, so that the “idea of punishment was 
subordinated to the idea of cure.”44  Crime, like sin, was viewed relationally as 
separation from God and community.  This meant that more than punishment, what 
the offender needed was to be cured of the effects of sin and so be brought back into 
right relationships.   
 
Yet as the penitentials came to be written down, paradoxically the tendency was to 
turn morality into a codified system.45  As such, the penitentials focused less on 
primary questions about the nature of the moral life and instead concentrated on those 
actions that ought to be avoided or corrected if one were to aspire to live morally.  
This led to certain wrongful actions being codified in a way that would later be 
understood as crimes.  Moreover, by viewing actions apart from personal agency, 
these penitentials were already interpreting wrongdoing at some abstraction from its 
effect on human relationships. 
 
A significant change occurred with the rediscovery of Roman law in the eleventh 
century.  With this came the mechanism to view the papal church as a juristically 
distinct institution rather than as part of the corpus permixtum of society, in which 
Augustine’s two cities were intertwined.  Ironically it was Augustine’s two cities 
model that provided the theological framework for segregating the church from the 
secular realm, precisely on account of the church’s embodiment of a justice distinct 
from secular justice. 
 
In his magisterial work A Secular Age, Charles Taylor argues that the first movement 
towards secularisation began not with society’s drift away from religion but rather 
with the consolidation of the Western Church into a distinct entity under the papacy of 
                                                
44 “The ultimate penance was excommunication, which signified deprivation of the right to participate 
in the sacraments of the church (including communion, marriage, burial, and others); this purported to 
cut off – temporarily – the relationship of the sinner to God and to the church,” Berman, Law and 
Revolution, 71-72. 
45 I take these points from two sources: Stanley Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Ethics,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21-40; 





Gregory VII.46  Discontent with medieval rulers intruding into ecclesiastical matters 
led Gregory to push for greater church autonomy.  In order to achieve this autonomy, 
the Western church adopted Roman law as the basis for creating a system of canon 
law, which then became fundamental to the church’s identity.  “Roman law,” as Zehr 
observes, “was formal, rational, codified law based on logic and fundamental 
principles.  Instead of being based on custom and history, this law stood alone.”47  
The Latin speaking papal theologians saw this independent law as a tool for 
establishing and protecting the church’s independence.  It should be noted that the 
Eastern church, which looked to Constantinople rather Rome as its founding city, did 
not incorporate law as so integral to the church.48 
 
Drawing on Augustine, Gregory effectively equated the civitas Dei with the church, 
while placing himself at its head.  The Western church thus came to define itself as 
“the very embodiment of justitia,” writes Skotnicki, a divinely ordained juristic 
institution.49  It now had the liberty to impose laws and judgments with respect to 
internal ecclesiastical matters, while other authorities exercised rule over a distinct 
realm of secular matters.  Secular justice systems served as a worldly counterpart to 
the ecclesiastical justice system.   
 
A number of consequences for the understanding and practice of justice resulted from 
the splitting of medieval society into ecclesial and secular jurisdictions.  First, the 
system of community justice began to decline as a contest for judicial authority 
ensued between the medieval church and medieval monarchies.  Whitman observes 
that each party in this contest sought to “monopolize violence – to take control of the 
process of justice, forcing Europeans to settle their conflicts in centralized court 
settings.”50  In order to impress their new legal authority over the local population, the 
very notion of law was removed from its communal context.  Community oriented 
processes that involved people most directly harmed by an offence would eventually 
                                                
46 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), 265-66. 
47 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 111. 
48 The Eastern and Western sections of the Church split in the eleventh century (1054 B.C.E.), it is 
possible that the significance given to the concepts of law and justice were a major contributor to this 
split.  
49 Skotnicki, Last Judgment, 65. Augustine’s differentiation between the city of God and the city of 
man based respectively on the common object of their love was arguably not intended to harbour ideas 
of an earthly Christian state, even if he did provide the conceptual framework for such a Christian state. 




give way to outcomes imposed from on high.  The legal interests of centralized 
authorities were increasingly placed above the needs of victims, offenders, and their 
local relationships.51 
 
Second, the separation of ecclesial and secular jurisdictions was paralleled by a 
separation of the concepts of sin and crime.  Canon theologians introduced this sharp 
distinction by institutionalizing the public litigation of ecclesiastical offences under 
the new inquisitorial judicial method.52  Yet at the same time as removing jurisdiction 
over sins from secular authority, they also opened up a new space for any “act 
punishable by royal or other ‘lay’ officials [as] henceforth to be punished as a 
violation of secular law and not as a sin, that is, not as a violation of a law of God.”53  
This move marked the beginning of a trend where the state claimed a monopoly in 
dealing with matters of criminality.  
 
Third, the very language of “jurisdiction over sins” signals an even more basic change 
to the concepts of sin and crime.  Both were now defined as against law rather than as 
against victims and God.  The once relational definition of separation from God and 
neighbour now “came to be understood in legal terms as specific wrongful acts or 
desires or thoughts for which various penalties must be paid in temporal suffering, 
whether in this life or the next.”54  Offences once deemed a local problem needing to 
be resolved relationally were now defined as crimes against law.  Berman rightly 
characterizes this definition as “retributive,” since it focuses less on putting right the 
specific relationships injured by wrongdoing and more on effecting a balance within 
the legal order. 
 
Fourth, with wrongdoing being interpreted legalistically, both ecclesial and secular 
authorities came to understand justice as the punishment of lawbreakers.  The 
formalizing of a system of laws greatly extended the role of centralized authorities in 
handing down sentences.  Papal canonists revived the old Augustinian rule that 
punishments were justified as the “ministry of the laws,” which in Skotnicki’s opinion 
                                                
51 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 115. 
52 See, Skotnicki, Last Judgment, 113-14. 
53 Berman, Law and Revolution, 185. 




produced a “theological justification for a harsh justice toward legal infractions.”55  
Justice, as Zehr writes, “became a matter of applying rules, establishing guilt, and 
fixing penalties.”56  And the penalties could be severe.  As Gratian in the Decretum 
would later write, “If holy men and public powers waging wars are not transgressors 
of that mandate: ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ although they kill some criminals worthy of 
death … if it is not shedding blood to punish murderers and prisoners, but the ministry 
of laws …” then “it is obvious that [secular authorities are] permitted not only to whip 
the evil, but also to kill them.”57   
 
One further feature of this shifting ecclesial context must be noted, and it relates to the 
increasingly significant role granted to human authority.  Berman writes that the 
system of law and penalties decreed by the papacy had direct implications on “the 
nature and destiny of man, his search for salvation, [and] his moral freedom.”58  In 
short, all guilt could be dealt with by human means in this new legal era, which in 
effect displaced the role of divine agency.  Freedom of choice became the determining 
factor in a person’s progress toward salvation.  “The route was charted by a system of 
punishments and rewards that extended from this world through the next, until the 
final goal was reached.”59  While seriously at odds with Augustine’s understanding of 
human freedom, it was his internalizing justice as a condition of the human soul that 
eventually gave way to a system of justice oriented towards treating human guilt. 
 
Accordingly, it was the separation of church and state on the basis of legal jurisdiction 
that gave rise to the now basic concepts of the Western criminal justice tradition.  
These included the institutionalizing of the administration of law, the differentiation 
of crime and sin, and the justification of punishment as the main currency of justice.  
Berman goes so far as to state that modern Western law is no more than a “secular 
residue of religious attitudes and assumptions which historically found expression 
first in the liturgy and rituals and doctrine of the church and thereafter in the 
                                                
55 Skotnicki, Last Judgment, 73. 
56 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 113. 
57 Skotnicki, Last Judgment, 78-79; who is quoting from Stanley Chodorow, Christian Political Theory 
and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 236. 
58 Berman, Law and Revolution, 184. 




institutions and concepts and values of the law.”60  What began in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries would not reach full bloom until the nineteenth century.  However, 
the beginnings of the modern criminal justice system can be traced to theological and 




The concept of justice that evolved during this momentous period found its firmest 
theological grounding in the work of Anselm of Canterbury.61  According to Berman, 
the flow of ideas between theological concepts and notions of law and justice reached 
a climax in Anselm’s doctrine of the atonement.  It was Anselm who “first gave 
Western theology its distinctive character and its distinctive connection with Western 
jurisprudence.”62  According to Gorringe, what Anselm bequeathed to posterity was 
“the insight that atonement and a retributivist view of punishment belong together.”  It 
was his exposition of the death of Christ that “pumped retributivism into the legal 
bloodstream.”63  In effect, if not by intent, Anselm smoothed the way for the church’s 
understanding of justice to be removed from its relational context.  
 
In Cur Deus Homo?, Anselm sets out his defence of the incarnation against the 
objection of unbelievers.  While the logic of Anselm’s argument has endured in the 
church’s theology, it is little known that Anselm himself consciously avoided making 
recourse to Scripture, since he was attempting to refute the objection of unbelievers 
who did not accept the biblical account.64  By employing metaphysical categories 
shared with his surrounding culture, Anselm tried to show that the death of the God-
man is a logical necessity.  As he states in the preface, his account “proves by 
                                                
60 Berman goes on to say that “[w]hen these historical roots are not understood, many parts of the law 
appear to lack any underlying source of validity,” ibid., 166. 
61 Anselm’s most recent biographer, Richard Southern, writes, “It can scarcely be too strongly 
emphasized that the span of Anselm’s life covered one of the most momentous periods of change in 
European history, comparable to the centuries of the Reformation or the Industrial Revolution,” 
Richard Southern, Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
4.  
62 Berman, Law and Revolution, 177. 
63 Gorringe, God’s Just Vengeance, 224. 
64 As McIntyre puts it, “the Cur Deus Homo is not written in faith, by faith and for faith; it is not faith’s 
attempt to understand its own inner intellectual structure. It is, rather, faith’s logical refutation of the 
objections of unbelievers, who maintain its irrationality,” John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A 




necessary reasoning that it is impossible for any man to be saved without him.”65  In 
his attempt to render Christian faith intelligible to unbelievers, Anselm draws on 
prevailing feudal concepts of law and justice without them being reworked in light of 
the biblical account. 
 
In so doing, Anselm unwittingly turned these concepts into universal principles that 
were then deemed to be an immanent part of reality due to the incarnation.  Berman 
points to the “objectification of general categories of thought” in Anselm’s theology 
that allowed concepts like sin, crime, humanity, and law to be treated apart from their 
“concrete manifestations.”66  In making God the upholder and enforcer of an infinite 
and hypostatized law, the effect was to remove law and justice from being embedded 
in actual relationships.  This opened the way for God’s relationship to humanity to be 
interpreted in highly abstract and ultimately punitive terms, which in turn lent weight 
to remotely administered systems of law supplanting local systems of community 
justice.67 
 
More problematic is the manner in which Anselm incorporates a notion of justice into 
God’s nature that stands in tension with God’s forgiveness.  Anselm argued that 
because God’s justice cannot allow a world of disorder, the sinfulness of humanity 
requires either an equivalent punishment or satisfaction.68  Anselm dismisses out of 
hand the possibility that God could simply forgive all sinfulness because this would 
contradict the whole moral order of justice, and so could have nothing to do with God 
(cf. I.12-13, I. 24).  Justice is thereby considered to be an essential attribute of God, 
while forgiveness is not, and even when God might be said to forgive it is only after 
                                                
65 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo? Preface, (italics mine). 
66 Berman, Law and Revolution, 176. 
67 It would, however, be incorrect to attribute the title “penal substitution” to Anselm’s doctrine of 
atonement, or even to describe his theology as legalistic. This can be seen in the distinction made by 
Dániel Deme who argues that for Anselm it was not “divine justice which is deactivated by the 
sacrifice of the Son, but the punitive will,” Dániel Deme, The Christology of Anselm of Canterbury 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003), 85. One of the shortcomings of McIntyre’s otherwise astute reading of 
Anselm is his relative disinterest in the wider reforms taking place within the fields of law and crime, 
which he justifies by focusing on Anselm’s own intended task of apologetic theology. 
68 The punishment, in other words, would have to be as infinite as is God: “as man, by sinning, steals 
what is God’s [infinite honour], so God, by punishing, takes away what is man’s [his very existence],” 




his justice is satisfied.69  Anselm’s diminution of forgiveness and mercy within the 
outworking of justice is more congruent with Greco-Roman understandings of justice 
than it is with the biblical tradition.  
 
Finally, Anselm’s portrayal of God’s justice secured a necessary place for retributive 
punishment in the church’s imagination.  Even though Anselm intended his readers to 
come to an appreciation of how Christ saves humanity from punishment, nevertheless 
it is still through punishment that the moral order is put right again.  
 
And if, when wrong-doing strives to disturb the right order of things, 
Divine wisdom did not annex these conditions, in the very universe which 
God ought to regulate there would be a certain uncomeliness arising from 
the beauty of order being violated, and God would seem to fail in His own 
arrangements.  And as both these things are unseemly, they are impossible, 
so that it is necessary that satisfaction or punishment follow every sin.70 
 
Here it is evident that Anselm’s understanding of justice is as much an aesthetic as a 
moral concern.71  The force of Anselm’s argument is that any possible infraction of 
justice, understood legally, necessitates an equal response of punishment or 
satisfaction.72  Anselm’s theology led to its secular parody where, as Berman puts it, 
“justice in and of itself, justice an sich, requires that a violation of a law be paid for by 




In the period following the papal and legal revolutions, a great deal of continuity was 
thought to exist between human conceptions of justice and divine justice, and also 
between human legal systems and God’s law.  The church was believed to be 
                                                
69 Even McIntyre, a sympathetic reader of Anselm, highlights this as a significant lacunae in Anselm’s 
thought which ultimately arises from Anselm’s “theological conception of justice in God” defined in 
terms of “bringing punishment upon sin,” McIntyre, Anselm and His Critics, 103.   
70 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, I.15. 
71 The concept of justice in Anselm’s understanding is concerned with “the importance of fittingness, 
order and beauty which the social order must exemplify,” Gorringe, God’s Just Vengeance, 96. 
72 “The new concepts of sin and punishment based on the doctrine of the atonement … given by 
Anselm and his successors in Western theology was [justified by] the concept of justice itself. Justice 
required that every sin (crime) be paid for by temporal suffering; that the suffering, the penalty, be 
appropriate to the sinful act; and that it vindicate (‘avenge’) the particular law that was violated,” 
Berman, Law and Revolution, 183. 




instituted by God to formulate laws that reflected the divine will.  Confidence in the 
church as a divinely ordained juristic institution rested on the belief that divine 
principles of law and justice were immanent in nature and could be apprehended by 
reason.  The close relationship between reason and natural law was especially fostered 
by the medieval scholastic method, which produced highly elaborate and sophisticated 
systems for apprehending divine truth.  Yet this tradition of natural law had its 
antecedent as much in Greco-Roman philosophy as in Scripture.  It was the 
rediscovery of Roman law by the canon theologians that initiated the legal revolution 
in the first place.   
 
By the late medieval era, natural law was all-pervasive in the church’s theology.  It 
allowed the church to be construed as a juristic institution with the prerogative to 
regulate all of human life.  God’s gift of salvation now came to be mediated by a 
system of rewards and punishments controlled by ecclesiastical authorities.  This was 
the ecclesial context that gave rise to the sixteenth century Reformation, which sought 
to bring about a new vision of the church.  Yet in order to reform the church, the 
prevailing concepts of law and justice also had to be reformulated. 
 
Two generalizations may be made about the new direction given to the concepts of 
law and justice ventured by the magisterial Reformers.  First, the justice of God is 
understood to contradict the operation of justice in the human realm.  Luther 
especially separated divine and human justice by equating the former with God’s 
gratuitous love in justifying humanity, and the latter with the outworking of God’s 
wrath on sinful humanity.  Second, the church’s witness to justice becomes divided 
between its testimony to the justice of God outworked in grace and mercy on the one 
hand, and its duty to societal systems of justice for the repressing of sinfulness on the 
other.  Overall the church’s conception of God’s justice becomes even more inward, 
while at the same time it continues to justify a societal system of justice that fails to 





By his doctrine of sola fide Luther attacked the way salvation had been turned into a 
legalistic operation of human works instead of a divine operation of elected grace.74  
He argued that the church was to be governed solely by the power of the Holy Spirit, 
not by the juristic categories of law or justice.  More so than Calvin, Luther divested 
law of any positive function within the church.  Law was seen as the alien work of 
God, while grace and love were said to be God’s proper work.  Luther almost views 
the work of law and the gospel of grace as opposing wills within God, which he 
portrayed vividly in the image of “God against God,” with “God’s opus proprium of 
grace and mercy overcoming his opus alienum of judgment and damnation.”75  While 
Luther and Calvin disagreed over whether the proper essence of law belonged to 
God’s nature, both agreed that in response to human sinfulness, law could only ever 
have a penal or condemnatory function.76   
 
It is important to point out that even though Luther divested the law of any positive 
function within the church, he did not weaken law as the basis for civil society.  Both 
Luther and Calvin inherited from the legal revolution the belief that society depends 
on centralized systems of law.  Their contribution was to formalize the role of law in 
the relationship between the temporal sovereignty of the state and the spiritual 
authority of the church.77  Civil authorities were invested with a divinely ordained 
duty to wrest the world from its squalor of sin by enforcing law.  For example, Luther 
wrote in 1524, 
 
Let no one dare think that the world can be ruled without blood.  The 
secular [welltlich] sword should and must be red and bloody [blutrustig], 
for the world will and must be evil.  Thus is the sword God’s rod and 
vengeance on it.78 
 
                                                
74 Article 76 of Luther’s ninety-five theses reads: “We assert to the contrary, and say that the pope’s 
pardons are not able to remove the least venial of sins as far as their guilt is concerned.” With such 
statements as these Luther eroded the papacy’s claim to have juristic authority over salvation, John 
Dillenberger, ed. Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings (Garden City, NY: 1961). 
75 Gorringe, God’s Just Vengeance, 134. In Gorringe’s opinion, Luther’s radical theology of God’s 
grace overcoming His wrath led him to eschew Anselm’s satisfaction theory in favour of a theology of 
divine exchange where Christ once and for all takes our place.  
76 As Vidu cites, “God reveals himself to us in the law and declares what kind of God he wishes to be 
towards us, lays down what he demands of us, and, in short, everything necessary to be known,” Vidu, 
Atonement, Law, and Justice, 96. 
77 “The true originality of the Reformational legal philosophy consists in the particular arrangement of 
the temporal authority in relation to the spiritual authority of the church,” ibid., 91 (original in italics). 
78 Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 




The civil law thus acted as a “constrained and forced righteousness,” as Calvin put it, 
providing just enough righteousness in civil society to ward off the digressive 
passions of this sin-ridden world.79   
 
The “forced righteousness” provided by the government’s repression of sinfulness 
was believed by the reformers to create the right social conditions for divine salvation.  
In other words, the condemning function of the law was thought to act as a mirror to 
reflect back the sinner’s miserable condition and thus bring him to a place of 
repentance before the grace of God.  As John Witte Jr. argues, the civil use of the law 
was believed to lead naturally to its theological use.80  The law condemns, but thanks 
be to God, who in his grace justifies the sinner who repents.   
 
The division that Luther introduces into the concept of law was largely based on a 
division within his theology of justice.  Luther was emphatic that the justice of God is 
revealed solely in the cross of Jesus Christ and that this meaning can only be 
contradictory of human conceptions of justice in the earthly city.  Having languished 
under the meritorious and penitential system of justice, Luther felt liberated by the 
discovery that God’s justice is revealed through the grace that justifies in faith.81  It 
was this discovery that led him to discard the theological presupposition that God’s 
justice supervened on anything in nature, and could thereby be conditioned by nature.  
In so doing, Luther introduced an even more radical differentiation between the divine 
and human realms, granting near autonomy to both.   
 
Luther’s conception of justice certainly has its strengths, insofar as the justice of God 
is aligned more closely to the way in which God reveals himself in the crucified 
Christ.  Luther safeguards God’s justice from being overly determined by alien 
concepts of justice.  Yet at the same time, Luther continues the Augustinian trajectory 
of interpreting God’s justice in an inward and spiritualized direction.  The conception 
                                                
79 John Witte Jr., God’s Joust, God's Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 265. 
80 Witte Jr. traces the widespread formulation of the reformed doctrine of the law throughout the 
modern period where it gained special prominence in English and American puritan theology. Witte Jr. 
shows that similarity between the uses of the law as developed by theologians (civil, theological, 
educational) and their parallel forms among secular jurists (deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation), ibid., 
266ff. 
81 James D.G. and Alan M. Suggate Dunn, The Justice of God: A Fresh Look at the Old Doctrine of 




of two contrasting kingdoms, one represented by the physical and material and the 
other by the inward and spiritual leads to a conception of divine justice that is 
unconcerned with the concrete material realities of life.82  Furthermore, by aligning 
God’s justice with his grace while still justifying the repressive system of justice in 
the civic sphere, Luther opens the way for endorsing a conception of justice that is 
completely different to the church’s witness to the justice of God. 
 
The Reformers’ understanding of law and justice made sense in a Christianized 
society where both civil and ecclesiastical domains interacted, to such a degree that 
even their articulation of moral law was ultimately oriented towards the salvation of 
the sinner.  Yet as Witte points out, secular jurists during this era largely followed this 
theological framework, except in one significant respect.83  Instead of subsuming 
moral law under a general theory of salvation they subsumed law under a theory of 
government.  While structurally and pragmatically similar, secular jurists eschewed 
the ultimate telos of justice by viewing the coercive and repressive functions of 
government as aimed at nothing more than conformity to a law-abiding morality.84  
As Christianity’s influence in society began to wane, this secularist interpretation of 




The shift to a predominantly secular worldview in Western society was neither 
immediate nor linear.  We previously noted its origination in the eleventh century as 
the papacy sought to consolidate its authority over civil magistrates, and in Luther’s 
“doctrine of the two kingdoms,” which formalized this separation by granting near 
autonomy to secular and ecclesial authority respectively.  In the wake of the 
Enlightenment this autonomous secular sphere was invested with an importance that 
would virtually eclipse the ecclesial sphere altogether.  Secularism coalesced with the 
                                                
82 Vidu points out that Luther’s theology has not escaped the accusations of Marcionism since “the 
style and energy of Lutheran theology to argue away from the body, from the law, from the letter, and 
toward the spiritual, the inward,” Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice, 103.   
83 Witte Jr., God’s Joust, God’s Justice, 264-85. 
84 Witte Jr. offers an indictment of the moral collapse of criminal justice theory, but does not go as far 





modern turn to the individual and in particular to the capacity of individuals to reason 
for themselves.   
 
No thinker is more influential in this period with respect to the concept of justice than 
Immanuel Kant.  In his Rechtslehre, Kant reframed the concept of justice by aligning 
it with the post-Enlightenment agenda.  Justice is given a rational justification by 
rooting it in a consensus between autonomous individuals.  Kant’s starting point is the 
individual in a state of nature, unencumbered by moral obligations and the bonds of 
relationality.  The individual in this condition is concerned only with their private 
interests, doing “what seems good and right in his own eyes, entirely independent of 
the opinion of others.”85  In order to avoid the inevitable violence of this condition, 
individuals traded their unencumbered freedom in the state of nature for a freedom 
enshrined in publicly recognized laws, a convention regarded by Kant as the social 
contract.86  
 
Justice is the name given to the conditions of this “juridical Union.”87  In this way, 
Kant equates justice with a publicly recognized system of laws formed to protect 
individual rights.  The institutionalisation of law as a rational system is not grounded 
in nature but rather in the individual’s freedom of choice.  He justifies the rationality 
of this system by narrating a creation story in which violence and disorder preceded 
the emergence of public law and the birth of the nation state.  The commutative and 
reparative justice that prevailed before the legal revolution of the eleventh century 
appears in Kant’s narrative as the “dark ages.”   
 
The individualistic orientation of Kant’s reasoning serves to obscure from focus any 
conception of the public good that might stand above the individual.  Justice is no 
longer understood in terms of “a substantive morality of the good,” as Brad Gregory 
                                                
85 Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of 
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1887), 163, 57. 
86 Or as Hegel formulates it: “Right in itself passes over in civil society into law.  My individual right, 
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argues, but instead is turned into “a formal morality of rights.”88  Justice also loses its 
teleological dimension, which for previous theologians was preserved by their 
subsuming justice under an account of salvation history.  For Kant, justice is an end in 
itself and cannot be subject to any other good without compromising the individual’s 
freedom. 
 
The tradition of German idealism that begins with Kant and was carried forward by 
Hegel, intended to depict a coherent and enlightened account of justice in which 
justice remains dispassionate and objective.  Encapsulated within law, justice is 
transposed into a transcendent principle that is both detached from, and disinterested 
in, the complex and subjective world of human relationships.89  This move 
represented something of a return to the Greek idea of justice as immanent in nature, 
an immovable form, purified of all passion, desire, and emotion.   
 
When it comes to the justice of punishment, Kant’s passion for precision and 
objectivity is unrelenting.  Crime is defined by Kant as the conscious choice of 
individuals to go against the public order of right, which means that the criminal 
abdicates his place within the social contract and so renders himself “incapable of 
being a Citizen.”90  Public justice requires that the moral order of “Right” be restored 
by the principle and standard of the “Right of Retaliation.”91  According to Kant, 
“pure and strict Justice” requires that every crime be annulled by retaliation on the 
criminal, and where this is not achieved society may as well dissolve itself and revert 
to a violent state of nature.92 
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It needs to be highlighted that this conception of retributive justice operates with a 
high degree of abstraction.  Maintaining the transcendent character of justice, both 
Kant and Hegel focus on the general justification for justice as punishment but remain 
uninterested in how this is actually implemented.  Hegel openly admits that his 
conception of justice as retribution is hypothetical.  It works better as an “abstract 
thought of free will and personality” dealing with the “inner identity” of crime and its 
annulment, than it does in its concrete application.93  Likewise the parties to a crime 
are treated as an abstraction, since it is the law and the principle of right that needs to 
be satisfied.  Danielle Allen rightly observes that Kant “effectively purified the 
concept of retribution of its historical connection to anger, to citizens’ wills, to 
passion and desire.”94  In this conception, justice has no reference point in the real 
world of human relationships, which means that wrongdoers and their victims may be 
treated with dispassionate reason. 
 
The Western theological tradition from Augustine to Luther always relegated the form 
of justice in the earthly city to a secondary status within the divine order.  Human 
justice was believed to be a parody of true justice, yet this form of justice was still 
necessary in a world of sinfulness, where digressive passions always threaten to take 
over.  Human justice is therefore necessarily retributive or punitive.   
 
Kant’s account of justice reflects this same negative determination, yet without its 
divine counterpart.  By eclipsing the divine, Kant’s human centered justice is utterly 
retributive, driven by a punitive will, and completely divorced from the workings of 
mercy and a compassionate sentiment.95  Interestingly, according to Jeffrie Murphy, 
the purpose of punishment in Kant’s understanding is to root out the “inner 
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viciousness” of the criminal.96  Punishment is not only for the wrongdoing done, but 
is in some sense meant to target human evil itself.  This accords perfectly with the 
purpose of human justice given by the Augustinian tradition.   
 
The real problem, however, is that with the rise of secularism there disappears from 
view any place for the counter witness of the church to a justice that is primarily 
restorative or salvific.  We are left with a conception of justice that reveals its 
usefulness through repressing evil but which is incapable of pointing to any positive 
good beyond this.  Such a reductionist account of justice may rest on secular 
assumptions, yet its emergence owes much to the arrangement between divine and 
human justice in the theological tradition.  The justice of God revealed in Christ and 
affirmed in the church had become so introverted and spiritualized that it no longer 
had any currency in a world that deemed theology to be increasingly irrelevant or 
irrational.  The secular conception of justice, therefore, was divested of any 
connection to grace, mercy, and forgiveness. 
3. Criminal	Justice	in	the	Contemporary	Context	
 
We come now to our own day, the late modern period, to the secular world come of 
age.  Of particular interest is how the concept of justice has been construed in 
response to changing societal understandings of crime.  We have seen how the 
ecclesial context that shaped earlier conceptions of justice has progressively receded 
into the background.  Today it is no longer the church but the state and society that 
form the most immediate context for understanding justice.  Justice is by and large 
viewed now as extrinsic to the church and its doctrine. 
 
We have also noted how the modern turn to the individual was driven in part by a 
confidence in human reason to establish secure foundations for a society come of age.  
This confidence produced a period of heightened optimism in the human capacity for 
progress.  The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were an era of optimism 
about the ability of socially engineered solutions to address societal ills.97  Crime 
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control took a “progressive approach to offending,” writes Barbara Hudson.  It 
attempted to “eradicate the problems of social and environmental deprivation that 
engendered crime and delinquency, and to seek the rehabilitation of those who none 
the less found themselves on the wrong side of the law.”98  Crime was viewed as 
either the result of inadequate provisions or as the product of defective socialization. 
 
This understanding of crime as the outcome of social deficit led to what David 
Garland calls an era of “penal welfarism.”  “The solution for crime,” Garland 
explains, “lay in individualized correctional treatment, the support and supervision of 
families and in welfare-enhancing measures of social reform – particularly education 
and job creation.”99  The implementation of these correctionalist and welfarist ideals 
required an ever-expanding body of professionals, and it was believed to be the duty 
of the state to deliver such services.  Incarceration was viewed as a last resort 
measure, although once incarcerated criminals were often subject to indeterminate 
behaviour modification regimes that were no less torturous than previous 
punishments.  
 
There was a clear consensus among criminologists of this era that the retributive 
rationale for punishment provided by Kant and others was a backward, ignorant, and 
unscientific response to crime.  The sentiment expressed in a 1933 publication 
captured the general mood well: “The infliction of pain is never justified merely on 
the ground that it visits retributive punishment upon the offender.  Punitive retribution 
is never justifiable in itself.”100  According to Michael Tonry, the consequentialist 
view of punishment reached its heights in America with the publication of the most 
influential criminal law document of the twentieth century, the Moral Penal Code 
(1962).  Even though it was written by “the most establishmentarian lawyers 
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midcentury America had to offer,” retributivist ideas were almost totally absent in this 
document.101 
 
Writing in the 1970s, the popular Christian thinker C.S. Lewis deplored the fact that 
the above “Humanitarian Theory” had become “almost universal among [his] fellow-
countrymen.”102  Lewis’ objection was directed both at the view of humanity it 
portrayed and at the absence of any concept of justice.  While the “scientific” 
approach to criminology appeared progressive and humane, Lewis thought that it was 
actually a “dangerous illusion and disguises the possibility of cruelty and injustice 
without end.”103  The problem lay in its view of human failure or sinfulness as a 
disease needing to be cured.  This “simple minded view of fallen human nature” 
placed corrective justice in the hands of psychotherapists whose concern was with 
treatment, not justice.104  Justice, in Lewis’ opinion, belonged to the sphere of desert 
and punishment, not to the medical sphere of healing and treatment.  By treating the 
criminal as a patient needing to be cured, Lewis believed that humanitarians had 
“tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether” and no longer saw him “as 
a human person made in God’s image.”105  In the interests of the criminal, Lewis 
urged a “return to the traditional or Retributive theory” of justice.   
 
The concerns raised by Lewis were mirrored on the other side of the Atlantic in an 
influential book by Karl Menninger entitled, Whatever Became of Sin?  Menninger 
made the historical observation that “Sins had become crimes,” and now in the 
modern era “crimes were becoming illnesses.”106  Criminal justice institutions had 
become devoid of notions of guilt and moral responsibility.  Menninger sought to 
recapture the language of sin to “close the moral gap,” to clearly proclaim “what is 
right from what is wrong,” and ultimately to reinvigorate the church’s moral 
leadership.  
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The concerns of these Christian thinkers reflected a growing sentiment in the church 
that the notions of sin and justice needed to be recovered in society’s response to 
wrongdoing.  It was believed that the reinvigoration of justice as punishment would 
communicate to secular citizens the normative values of right and wrong that had 
once been so central to Western Christianized society.107  The cry for penal reform by 
some Christians was also mirrored by a secular movement for reform, one of whose 
aims was the further marginalization of the church’s influence in justice matters.   
 
According to Antony Duff, a generation of liberal theorists between the 1960s-70s led 
a penal reform movement that held as its premise the interiorization of religious ideas 
and values.  A key feature of this liberal outlook was a separation between the concept 
of sin and the conception of wrongdoing appropriate to criminal law.108  This 
differentiation between sin and crime rested on the presumption that sin was internal 
and hidden, and therefore of no concern to public society.  Crime, on the other hand, 
was expressly public in nature, which was why criminals ought to be held publicly 
responsible for their actions.109  The criminal justice system should have no 
connection to theological concepts – the logical conclusion of the long history that 
saw the interiorization and abstraction of the church’s understanding of justice and 
sin.   
 
The decade of the 1970s marked what Francis Allen calls “the decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal,” and what Barbara Hudson terms the rise of the “‘justice’ model 
of corrections.”110  In stark contrast to the optimism of the correctional ideals that 
sought to implement “what works,” the new era was guided by the pessimistic 
judgment of Robert Martinson that “nothing works.”111  Discontent with what was 
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perceived to be an intrusive body of professionals, individualized and disparate 
sentencing, ineffective treatment programmes, and a loss of the offender’s private 
rights, led to widespread reforms of the criminal justice system.   
 
This reform agenda was driven not so much by criminologists or correctional experts 
as by philosophers and jurists seeking to reinvigorate the Kantian tradition of 
retributive justice.  One of the leading proponents behind this shift was Andreas von 
Hirsch who set out this agenda for reform in the report for the Committee for the 
Study of Incarceration (1976), published under the title Doing Justice.112  More 
recently, von Hirsch has argued that the initial attractiveness of remodelling the 
criminal justice system on retributive theory lay in its “attempts to give notions of 
justice a central role.”113  Justice is achieved, argues Von Hirsch, by having a more 
objective sense of moral censure, something lost in the loftier goals of crime 
prevention and therapeutic intervention. 
 
Barbara Hudson points out that the new “justice” model of retributive punishment 
marked a return to seventeenth and eighteenth century moral and political philosophy.  
It reflected a Hobbesian view of the state, where its duty to citizens was solely that of 
enforcer-protector.  Von Hirsch’s report puts it plainly: “Permeating this report is a 
determination to do less rather than more … we have here a crucial shift in 
perspective from a commitment to do good to a commitment to do as little mischief as 
possible.”114  Likewise, there was a return to a Kantian “free will individual rationality 
model of human nature.”115  The criminal was to be punished solely for his choices so 
that he might “expiate his guilt and become morally whole again.”116  Neither the state 
nor the penal system had any obligation to correct social injustices or change moral 
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attitudes, which according to Hudson represents a severely reductionist account of 
justice.117 
 
There has been an enormous social cost incurred from criminal justice practice 
losing connection to a unifying common good.  Garland argues that since the 
reforms of the 1970’s, “criminal law and penal policy have been working 
without clear route maps on a terrain that is largely unknown.”118  This 
aimlessness coincided with the cultural upheavals of late modernity, the 
disintegration of Christendom and the rise of neoliberal economic theory.  
Together they have produced a culture that is insecure in its normative values 
and more prone to accept repressive controls on those who appear to be a threat 
to the liberal order.119  Garland argues that criminal justice policy has become 
reactive to the social pressures of an,  
 
… increasingly insecure economy that marginalizes substantial sections of 
the population; to a hedonistic consumer culture that combines extensive 
personal freedoms with relaxed social controls; to a pluralistic moral order 
that struggles to create trust relations between strangers who have little in 
common; to a “sovereign” state that is increasingly incapable of regulating 
a society of individuated citizens and differentiated social groups; and to 
chronically high crime rates that co-exist with low levels of family 
cohesion and community solidarity.120 
 
Crime control has shifted from being a relatively small concern on the part of 
criminological experts to becoming a dominant concern of the general population.  
 
Politicians have capitalized on the ramped up fear of criminals by promising to “get 
tough” on crime and reduce its threat to civil society.  In blatant contradiction of 
expert opinion and evidence-based practice, penal policy has come to be defined by 
slogans such as, “Prison works,” “Three-strikes you’re out,” “No frills prisons,” 
“Adult time for adult crime,” “Zero-tolerance,” and “Tough on crime, tough on the 
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causes of crime.”121  Purporting to be common sense, the voice of the people and a 
return to basics, such slogans in reality prey on a new era of social insecurity.122 
 
Garland argues that prison has undergone a reinvention in this new social landscape.  
It is “located precisely at the junction point of two of the most important social and 
penal dynamics of our time: risk and retribution … With the absolutist logic of a penal 
sanction, it punishes and protects, condemns and controls.”123  Criminals are “no 
longer clients in need of support, but risks to be carefully managed,” writes Kim 
Workman.124  Rates of incarceration have increased sharply where these justice 
reforms have been embraced.  In the United States alone, incarceration rose 500% 
between 1973 and 1997, even though the crime rate continued to decrease.  Some 
theorists now argue that punishment is justified as an expressive gesture of outrage, 
and even a desire for revenge.125   
 
The social science commentary on the modern day justice system is extensive.  The 
opinion of Garland and Sparks represents the consensus.  Penal policy is no longer 
based on “research findings and expert advice, but instead on highly politicized 
articulations of public sentiment that strike many criminologists as ill-informed, 
explicitly punitive, and downright anti-modernist in character.”126  Having been 
propelled by a theory of justice devoid of theological reasoning, we might ask 
whether a theological perspective could have provided a different trajectory?  Put 
differently, are there resources within the theological tradition that would lead us to 
question whether the modern day justice system embodies the best conception of 
justice after all?   
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This chapter has surveyed historical developments in the theory and practice of justice 
in order to show, first, that different conceptions of justice exist within the church’s 
tradition, and second, that the church’s theological understanding of the justice of God 
has social and practical ramifications not only for the life of the church but also for 
the society it inhabits.  It is clear that the church’s perspective on the meaning of 
God’s justice spills over into broader social practices, especially relating to how 
wrongdoers and their victims are dealt with.  The secular criminal justice system took 
shape and developed in direct relationship to ecclesial notions of law, justice, and sin. 
 
By drawing attention to the social outworking of the church’s understanding of 
justice, we have seen how justice is not a static concept or idea that can be known 
apart from the various contexts, practices, and relationships wherein it is expressed 
and takes concrete form.  It is deeply shaped by the social and relational context 
within which it is understood and practiced.  This is not to suggest that justice has no 
objective existence; it is rather to say that justice is deeply intertwined with the real 
concerns of life as it is actually lived, and it is this that gives justice its distinctive 
dynamic.  Justice is not primarily or substantively a theoretical concept, despite recent 
attempts to develop comprehensive theories of justice; it is an experiential reality that 
bears directly on the stuff of real life.   
 
In considering the fluctuating fortunes of justice through Western Christian history, 
some recurring themes can be detected.  One recurring feature has been the church’s 
conviction that justice is objectively grounded in the divine nature.  Justice was 
thought to be perfect and holy because it coheres in God, and against this divine 
standard of justice all of its lesser human forms must be weighed.  This led to the 
recognition that the human perception of justice is always distorted, imperfect, and in 
need of continual correction.  This was a particularly strong feature of the Augustinian 
tradition.  It was only in the modern, increasingly secular era, with its confidence in 
the powers of human reason and the diminution of the traditional theological 





The conviction that God’s justice is the standard against which all human forms of 
justice must be measured is good theology, but this in itself it not impervious to 
distortion.  Our survey has shown how the justice of God has often been defined in 
terms drawn uncritically from the surrounding social order, such that God’s justice 
and holiness tended to acquire a detached and retributive determination.  God has 
been conceived in terms of a harsh judge exacting his retributive justice on sinful 
humanity.  God’s justice has been distanced from the world of human relationships, 
and the church’s emphasis on justice has become more inward, individualized and 
spiritualized. 
 
While the church’s practice of the justice of God became predominantly focused on 
individual salvation through forensic justification, its theological assumptions and 
commitments still exerted a formative influence in the secular sphere.  The emergence 
of the modern criminal justice system evolved in relation to theological conceptions 
about the nature of divine and human justice.  These assumptions still exert 
considerable influence over the meaning and practice of justice in the public sphere 
today, though they are little acknowledged.    
 
It is the goal of this thesis to ask whether the conceptions of justice bequeathed by the 
church to the modern criminal justice system are actually reflective of the church’s 
own best theology.  In particular, is a retributive and ultimately punitive notion of 
corrective justice the best way to understand the justice of God?  I will argue that it is 
not, for at least two main reasons.  Firstly, it interprets God’s justice in categories that 
are neither theologically nor Scripturally warranted and, secondly, it fails to 
understand the church as a community called to embody true justice in the world 
through relationships of peace and restoration.  As we will see in the next chapter, this 











In the Preface to A Better Hope, Stanley Hauerwas dedicates his book to “The 
Ekklesia Project.”  He explains that those who constitute the Project  
 
come from quite different ecclesial backgrounds, some are academics and 
some are not, and we bring quite different agendas to the work of the 
group.  Yet as the Declaration makes clear, we are united in our 
commitment to reclaiming the church as an alternative people for the 
good of the world.1   
 
According to this group, the witness of the church is under serious threat in the 
contemporary era.  Increasingly eclipsed by forces that seek to conform Christian 
lives to “partisan ideologies and identities,” the church’s witness has been 
subordinated to the “imperatives of economic and political power holders and 
institutions.”  The Ekklesia Project provides a forum to unite supporters around the 
conviction that the church, as God’s ekklesia, is “called out” from the world to be “an 
alternative community – a resource of resistance to the social and political structures 
of the age.”2  
 
While it might strike some as unusual to consider the church as a community of 
resistance witnessing to an alternative mode of life, the Declaration is not meant to be 
innovative.  In fact, the invitation extended by the Ekklesia Project is to engage in a 
recovery of the church, whose allegiance to Jesus as the Lord of life makes this 
community “a foretaste of the Kingdom of God.”  The resistance advocated by the 
Project appears to be based on rather traditional practices – the confession of God’s 
Tri-unity, worship under the guidance of the Spirit, furthering the catholicity of the 
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church, a vital prayer life, performing works of mercy, and observing a fast – all of 
which together constitute “a form of prayerful resistance to the idolatrous practices of 
our culture.”   
 
Above all else, however, the members of the Ekklesia Project argue that the church 
loses its proper vocation when it compromises with the world’s “culture of death.”  As 
their Declaration states: “We believe that the process of renewing the church in our 
day requires Christians to rethink all those values and practices that presume a smooth 
fit between killing and discipleship.”  Therefore, in addition to being God-centered 
and church-centered, the Project is committed to being “Shalom-centered.”  For them, 
peacemaking is the church’s central mode of life as an alternative community. 
 
The Ekklesia Project is one example of a trend in recent theological discourse towards 
a recovery of the empirical church as central to the formation of a distinctively 
Christian witness.  The features highlighted above are largely reflective of this broad 
trend – a view of the church as an alternative community; resistance to cooption by 
the world’s wisdom, expressed through liturgical practices; and the singling out of 
nonviolence as the heart of the church’s witness.  Leading this recovery has been a 
cadre of academics writing in the field of Christian ethics who are predominantly, but 
not exclusively, working in a North American context.  
 
This chapter argues that the emerging discourse of “ecclesial ethics” provides a 
productive way of crystallizing the justice dimensions of the church’s existence and 
mission.  The reasons for situating the concerns of this thesis within ecclesial ethics 
are multiple.  First, ecclesial ethics offers a corrective to the interiorisation and 
spiritualisation of justice we discussed in the previous chapter.  Ecclesial ethics argues 
that the church is called to embody a visible witness in the world that is social and 
political in character.  Second, ecclesial ethics underscores the problematic 
consequences of construing God’s justice in terms drawn from non-Christian 
conceptions of justice.  It insists that the church’s moral reasoning must arise out of its 
own epistemic base and employ the convictions, grammar, narratives, and vision that 
are integral to the forming of Christian character.  Third, the centrality ecclesial ethics 
affords to peacemaking as fundamental to the church’s witness offers another 




punitive justice system.  This peacemaking dimension offers a fresh way of thinking 
about the difference the church should make to considerations of justice.   
 
While highlighting how the task of Christian ethics might gain from a recovery of the 
centrality of the church, there is still much work to be done in this recovery project.  
The concept of justice has not particularly received the kind of attention one would 
expect, especially in connection to the task of peacemaking that features so highly.  
This chapter will begin by charting the direction ecclesial ethics has taken thus far, 
and will conclude with a consideration of where the approach still needs to be 
extended, with respect to its understanding and practice of justice.  
2. The	Emergence	of	Ecclesial	Ethics	
 
The term “ecclesial ethics” does not denote a discrete theological discipline, nor has 
any prominent theologian used this designation to describe their work.  The term is 
coined in the book Introducing Christian Ethics, by Sam Wells and Ben Quash, to 
designate an approach to Christian theology, and Christian ethics in particular, that 
gives priority to the “life made possible by Christ for Christians.”3  This simple 
description captures several ways in which ecclesial ethics differs from other 
approaches to Christian ethics.   
 
First, ecclesial ethics is unapologetically “for Christians.”  It is not an account of the 
ethical life that is for anybody or everybody; it does not attempt to develop a 
“universal ethics” applicable to all situations.4  Rather, it gives specific attention to 
those who are said to be the “first fruits” of God’s transformation of the world in 
Christ.  This is not because their moral behaviour is more exemplary than anyone 
else’s, but simply because they are the people God has claimed to bring about his 
kingdom.   
 
Second, the “life” made possible in Christ is understood as embodied, situated, and 
dynamic.  In contrast to accounts of the moral life that are decidedly abstract and 
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theoretical, which rest on a static sense of the self that mechanistically applies 
principles and rules to the external world, the ecclesial approach emphasizes the 
agency and the ecclesial situatedness of the Christian life.  This life has a distinctive 
character that is formed through the concrete practices of the particular community 
called the church, which in turn is located in the midst of salvation history – what God 
is doing in Christ and his church to bring creation to fulfillment.   
 
Third, the distinctive character of this ecclesial life is understood in relation to the 
person and work of Christ.  His death and resurrection make possible a new way of 
life, to which the practices of the church bear witness.  This means that ecclesial 
ethics is guided by a particular kind of practical reasoning, one that focuses on 
discerning what obedience to God’s saving purposes disclosed in Christ requires, and 
that is attentive to the divine presence in the community.   
 
The distinctiveness of this understanding of Christian ethics is also apparent in the 
sharply polemical tone that marks much of the writing on the subject.  For example, 
Stanley Hauerwas, who is one of the leading advocates of the approach, has titled his 
books in highly oppositional terms: After Christendom?: How the Church is to 
Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas; Against the 
Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society; Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing 
the Bible from Captivity to America; Dispatches From the Front: Theological 
Engagements with the Secular; and, jointly published with William Willimon, 
Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, A Provocative Assessment of Culture 
and Ministry for People Who Know Something Is Wrong.5  Many of the key thinkers 
whose work has influenced ecclesial ethicists have displayed a similar polemical 
edge.  These include Alasdair MacIntyre’s piercing assessment of the fragmentation 
and incoherence of modern ethics,6 John Milbank’s protest against the hegemony of 
the social sciences,7 or, going further back, Karl Barth’s forthright “Nein!” to the idea 
                                                
5 Hauerwas, After Christendom?; Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (New 
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1985); idem, Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity 
to America (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993); idem, Dispatches from the Front: Theological 
Engagements with the Secular (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994); Stanley and 
William H. Willimon Hauerwas, Resident Aliens: A Provocative Christian Assessment of Culture and 
Ministry for People Who Know That Something Is Wrong (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989). 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981). 




of interpreting God’s revelation in light of cultural categories.  Basing itself on 
arguments of such epic proportions, ecclesial ethics is clearly concerned with 
something far bigger than a minor adjustment in Christian thinking.  
 
The shift that ecclesial ethics is advocating relates primarily to the recovery of the 
church as the proper context for Christian life.  It always proposes some form of 
declension narrative in which the visible difference of the church has been eclipsed, 
thereby resulting in a distortion of the Christian witness.  When exactly this decline 
started is disputed.  Some trace it to the late medieval period while others go further 
back to the time of the Emperor Constantine.  There is a common narrative trajectory 
that imagines a time when the communal and institutional life of the church was 
shaped around particular practices derived from, and dependent on, particular 
perceptions of truth, and looks forward to a time when this will be so again.8  It should 
be noted, however, that not all attempts to recover the visibility of the church as an 
ethically distinctive community have in mind the same church to be recovered.   
 
In describing the eclipse of the church, two different narratives are commonly 
encountered: one that focuses on relatively recent developments while the other 
canvases a larger historical period.  In one, ecclesial ethics tells a story about how 
ethics in the modern era effectively displaced the church as the constant for ethical 
inquiry with a new constant, that of the autonomous individual.  In the second, 
ecclesial ethics offers a far-reaching historical narrative about the collapse of the 
church as an alternative witnessing community largely occasioned by its collusion 
with earthly rulers and authorities.  We will consider each of these accounts in turn 




Ecclesial ethics starts with a repudiation of the general form of ethical inquiry in the 
modern era, and of Christian ethics in particular, which is individualistic, rationalistic, 
and universalistic.  Broadly characterized, modern ethics is aimed at everybody and 
anybody, since it takes for granted the capacity of every individual to be guided by 
                                                




reason.  It proceeds on the basis of self-evident principles apprehended by natural 
reason that must then be put into effect by individual citizens for the guiding of 
society.  To the extent that Christian ethics has been shaped by this modern approach 
it has become less concerned with the distinctive reasoning of the church, and has lost 
touch with the importance of the church as the primary site for Christian social 
practice.   
 
Underlying the modern approach is the Enlightenment assumption that the institution 
of the church and the practices of religious faith are an impediment to natural reason.  
The individual’s immanent consciousness is believed to be a more reliable source of 
truth than the external authority of ecclesiastical dogma.  Accordingly, the 
epistemological framework of modern ethics is essentially individualistic and 
rationalistic.  What is not amenable to reason is considered irrelevant to moral truth, 
which immediately excludes divine revelation and faithful obedience as a reliable 
basis for knowledge.  
 
This specifically modern approach has tended to take the form of identifying general 
principles to guide individuals in moments of decision.  It is assumed that individuals 
act on the basis of self-evident principles, ideals, or rules, and the task of ethics is to 
prescribe the principles most accessible to reason.  While the various prescriptions 
might appear to be quite different on the surface, whether it is Kant’s more legalistic 
categorical imperative or Joseph Fletcher’s principle of agapic love, in both cases the 
starting point is the individual’s freedom to act on the basis of rational principles.9   
 
When Christianity is accommodated to this approach, it is typically reduced to a series 
of fundamental principles or values that can serve as the basis for Christianizing wider 
society.  William Temple’s bestseller Christianity and Social Order, typifies this 
approach.10  Temple viewed the church as the custodian of social and moral principles 
for the forming of individual conscience.  Yet the church itself disappears into the 
background when it comes to putting these principles into effect, since this task falls 
                                                
9 Joseph F. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966). We 
introduced Kant’s approach to ethics in Chapter One. 




to individual citizens and technical experts.11  Christian theology more generally 
mirrors this approach when it proceeds from a separation between doctrine, as an 
exercise in systematic reason, and ethics, as concerned with right practice.   
 
According to Wells and Quash, the modern account of ethics is characterized by its 
unacknowledged pretentiousness to speak in universal categories, which in turn serves 
to erode any sense of a Christian difference.  It is universalistic because it is 
indiscriminate about its subject and therefore about the limits of its perspective.12  It is 
an ethic for anyone, irrespective of race, history, culture, or personal development, 
because these situational factors are deemed superfluous to the more important 
principles that underlie judgments.  It is also an ethic for everyone, in that it is 
considered mandatory – on account of its alleged universal foundations.  Christian 
ethics is forced by these parameters to make ethical prescriptions that can reasonably 
be asked of anyone and everyone, irrespective of their knowledge of, or personal 
formation in, the Christian story.  The ways in which God is at work in the church 
forming a people in the likeness of Jesus Christ through the Spirit is deemed 
irrelevant.   
 
By suppressing our encumbered nature as socially contingent actors, this approach 
makes who we are to be of far less ethical significance than what we think.  By 
elevating the role of individual choice, modern ethical theory and its postmodern 
offspring have deemed “making the right choice” to be more important than “making 
people right.”  This represents perhaps the largest shift away from pre-modern (and a 
specifically Christian) ethics, which focused far more on the formation of moral 
agents.   
 
The modern turn to the individual subject, in the opinion of ecclesial ethicists, has 
public implications.  When ethical deliberation is centred on the will of the individual, 
the problem arises as to how to speak about social goods that transcend individual 
interests.  There is thus little basis for agreement on and working towards the once 
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at this point technical knowledge may be required and judgments of practical expediency are always 
required,” ibid., 58. 




traditional goal of a unified common good.  Modern societies are no longer viewed as 
ordered towards some unitive good, since they are but a collection of individuals each 
seeking their own private good.  Wells and Quash note, “the idea of justice as a 
unitive force has receded before the idea of justice as a distributive force – i.e., one 
that oversees and regulates the pursuit of private goods and rival interests.”13  This 
reordering has also had a devastating impact on the relationship between individuals 
and the church.  The church has increasingly been conformed to the role of catering to 
individual interests rather than individuals constituting an ecclesial society seeking the 
eternal good.   
 
Two main approaches have tended to dominate ethical discussion in modernity, both 
of which have their counterparts in Christian ethics.  The first focuses on what is 
reasonable, with moral decisions being based on what is intrinsically right or wrong.  
This approach is de-ontological in the sense that judgments are not contingent on the 
nature of particular beings.  It presumes, as Wells notes, “there is a proper state of 
things, which has always been so, and that departing from it will violate, infringe, or 
unbalance this proper state.”14  The value of Christianity, according to this logic, lies 
in its provision of a strong conception of the moral order, based on the notion of 
natural law or the law of created order.  This is also why the deontological approach 
has a strongly retrospective or conservative tendency.   
 
The second approach focuses more on what appears to be useful, with decisions being 
judged according to their outcomes.  In contrast to the deontological emphasis on the 
intrinsic value of right, this approach is consequentialist and looks to extrinsic values.  
Accordingly, Christianity is here judged on the basis of how well it enables 
individuals to maximize their personal good, even when these goods are external to 
the church. 
 
Both of these approaches have significantly undermined the epistemological 
significance of the church by rendering it subservient either to some more basic moral 
order or to the pursuit of goods external to the church.  Theological conceptions of 
justice have drifted in both of these directions.  When presupposing a strong 
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conception of the moral order, justice tends to acquire a legalistic and retributive tone.  
When presupposing the equitable distribution of goods, in the absence of any unitive 
description of the common good, justice becomes about the maximization of 
individual rights. 
 
Given the concentration on moments of decision, modern ethical deliberation is more 
concerned with complex quandaries than it is with the ordinary, everyday concerns of 
citizens.15  While ethical discussion has always been the domain of philosophers, in 
the modern period it occurs at an even greater remove from everyday life.  For 
Christian communities, this renders their common concerns ethically uninteresting, 
especially in comparison to the sort of quandaries faced in bio-ethics, eugenics, 
population control, and so on. 
 
The chief protagonist in the modern era who sought to marry Christian ethics with the 
post-Enlightenment intellectual ethos is Friedrich Schleiermacher.  In his magisterial 
work The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher argued that the essence of the “Christian 
Idea” lay within the individual subject, what he described as “God-consciousness.”16  
This consciousness was already latent in its lower forms within society at large as a 
“feeling of absolute dependence,” although the awakening of this consciousness 
depended to a degree on the nurturing of church leaders and teachers.  For 
Schleiermacher, the theological task is oriented towards the maturing of humanity, 
and in particular to the cultivation of civilization and national identity.  
 
Schleiermacher continued the Enlightenment tradition of making the human subject 
the datum of ethical reflection.  He effectively turned Christianity into a principle or 
feeling that must then be appropriated by the individual subject.  He also continued 
the separation of principle and practice by distinguishing some essence of Christianity 
that could be known apart from its peripheral characteristics.  For ecclesial ethics, the 
real problem with Schleiermacher’s work is how he construes the theological 
                                                
15 For a description of decisionism as a form of “Quandry Ethics” see, Edmund Pincoffs, ‘Quandry 
Ethics,’ Mind  (1971): 552ff. Pincoffs later expanded on his earlier work in, Quandaries and Virtues: 
Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986). Brock points out how 
decisionist ethics has gravitated towards complex choices, like those made at the beginning and end of 
life, Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010). 




disciplines as in service to some more essential task – civilization, the university, the 
nation – rather than to their proper role in the church’s proclamation of Jesus Christ.17 
 
Ecclesial ethics has emerged, then, in response to the damage caused to the gospel by 
a sharp turn to the individual.  Yet, in the opinion of some ecclesial ethicists, the era 
of modern individualism is but the inevitable historical consequence of a more far-
reaching error.  The eclipse of the church as an alternative visible community with its 
own distinctive reasoning and social identity occurred, not in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, but was occasioned by what has been called the “Constantianian 
Shift.”18  
 
While this assertion features in many of the accounts provided by ecclesial ethicists, it 
is by no means uncomplicated, either in terms of its historical detail or its theological 
implications.19  Even though the shift is identified with the conversion of the Roman 
Emperor Constantine (312-37 CE), it might just as appropriately be called an 
ecclesiological shift, given how far the church itself was redefined during this period.  
John Yoder is typical of those who stress the far-reaching implications of this shift.   
 
[B]efore Constantine, Christians knew as a fact of experience that there 
was a church, and they had to take it on faith that God governs history.  
After Constantine, Christians knew for a fact that God governs history 
(Constantine was one of their number, after all), but they had to take it on 
faith that there is a church.  That is the shift in the meaning of salvation 
history for which Constantine is the symbol … the eschatology of the New 
Testament has been turned upside down.20 
 
For Yoder, prior to Constantine the church was viewed as the primary arena in which 
God’s eschatological purposes were being fulfilled.  The call on Israel long ago to be 
a “called out” people that would be a “light to the nations,” was now coming to 
fulfillment in the church.  Accordingly, the early church conceived of itself as an 
                                                
17 For an example of how Schleiermacher is regarded in ecclesial ethics, see Hauerwas, “On Doctrine 
and Ethics,” 30-34. 
18 This term was popularized by John H. Yoder, specifically in his essays: John H. Yoder, “The 
Meaning of the Constantinian Shift,” in Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009), 57-74; idem, “The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics," 
in The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984), 135-
47.  
19 One contribution that has intentionally set out to complicate the narrative told by ecclesial ethics in 
relation to Constantinianism is, Peter J. Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire 
and the Dawn of Christendom (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2012). 




ecclesia, an assembly of citizens called out from among the nations, a proleptic 
realization of God’s “New Jerusalem” (Rev. 21), a “chosen race, a royal priesthood, a 
holy nation, God’s own people” (1 Pet. 2:9).  
 
After the conversion of Constantine and the progressive Christianization of the 
Empire, it was the Empire that came to be seen as the primary venue for the 
realization of God’s reign, and demanded the obedience of its Christian subjects.  
Baptism, which previously expressed loyalty to Christ and his rule, now applied to all 
citizens.  The visible church became co-terminus with general society.  As Wells puts 
it,  
 
… the identity of the church was transformed.  Far from being an often-
persecuted minority, it became the government … The church became the 
arbiter of truth and justice for all people, not just those who by 
commitment and conviction shared its faith.  The [true] church became 
invisible.21 
 
One response to this shift is illustrated by Augustine, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Augustine did not believe that everyone in the empirical church belonged to 
God’s elect.  The church was divided between its visible and invisible aspects.  What 
is most significant, however, is that Augustine equated the “true Church” with its 
social invisibility, for only God sees those who are truly his own.  Even those holding 
offices in the church – its priests and bishops – need not be part of the elect in order 
for their sacraments to be valid for the invisible elect.22   
 
While Augustine’s response is obviously more complex than this, his diminution of 
the importance of the true church’s social visibility had serious consequences.  It 
accelerated the assimilation of the church to worldly practices, detracting from the 
first task of the church to be, as Hauerwas argues, a “contrast model,” by which the 
world may see that all in the world is not yet of God’s kingdom and so repent of its 
destructive ways.23  Secondly, the focus of God’s redemptive work was increasingly 
turned inward, to become a matter between God and an individual’s soul.  This 
anticipates the individualization of ethics in the modern era.  Thirdly, Christian ethics 
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became predominantly concerned with what could reasonably be expected of all 
citizens, regardless of the level of personal piety.  Ethics, in other words, became 
more about social conformity than describing the Christian difference in the world.  
This paved the way for the emergence of the tradition of universal ethics formulated 




As already noted, ecclesial ethics claims not to be an innovation, but rather a recovery 
of the church as a confessional and ethically distinctive community.  Wells and Quash 
trace the beginning of this recovery to the “theological revolution” initiated by Karl 
Barth.  Having witnessed the ethical failure of his liberal Protestant teachers in 
capitulating to the Kaiser’s militant policies in Germany during World War I, Barth 
came to regard this failure as the result of a “theological wrong turn.”24  This wrong 
turn was related to the tendency to regard some cultural arrangement or moral 
principle as having an independent and abiding validity, which then serves as the 
controlling principle for understanding history, identity, and even theology itself.   
 
Barth was convinced that the introduction of such an “alien element” into theology 
cannot but lead the entire church astray.25  Schleiermacher exemplifies the problem by 
framing Christianity in the terms of his German culture.  German liberal Protestantism 
thereby became synonymous with the fate of German culture, including its 
understanding of Volk and Reich that were later exploited by Hitler.  We have noted 
the same problem with respect to justice.  By interpreting the justice of God in 
categories foreign to the biblical testimony, the church promoted an understanding of 
justice that contradicted its own story, which led to its endorsement of a harsh and 
punitive justice in the earthly realm. 
 
According to Barth, Christian theology, if it is to remain true to its subject, begins in 
the faith that God has decisively spoken in the person of Jesus Christ. 26  This event 
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calls into question every cultural, religious, and epistemological foundation that 
claims any sense of constancy, including the human subject.  By implication, the only 
constant that matters is God’s decision never to be except to be for us in Jesus Christ, 
which means that Christ is the fundamental ground and norm for ethics.  “The 
doctrine of God,” by which Barth means God’s self-communication of his very nature 
to humanity in Jesus Christ, “must be expressly defined and developed and interpreted 
as that which it also is at every point, that is to say, ethics.”27  Ethics begins, in other 
words, as we are encountered and concretely claimed by the dynamic event of God’s 
speaking, in much the same way as Paul was encountered by the risen Christ on the 
road to Damascus.  This explains why Barth’s ethics takes on a decidedly Trinitarian 
form, because God communicates his very self rather than some good or principle that 
can be known apart from who the Triune God is in himself.28 
 
According to Wells and Quash, Barth’s significance for ecclesial ethics lies primarily 
in his sweeping rejection of all forms of cultural necessity and moral principle outside 
the sphere of God’s self-communication in Jesus Christ.  Yet it is arguably Barth’s 
more positive project that has led to a recovery of confidence in the church as the 
place where God’s concrete claim is made visible.  For Barth, the good of humanity is 
taken up and fulfilled in the life of Christ.  This means that humanity’s realization of 
its good must be formed in response to, and participation in, the way that God makes 
himself present in Jesus Christ.29  Ethics is primarily concerned, therefore, with the 
goodness or rightness of certain ways of life as they are exposed to this confrontation 
by and fellowship with Jesus Christ.  The church, as the body of Christ, is singled out 
as the proper context where this confrontation and fellowship take place, which led 
Barth to be necessarily concerned with how the church’s life is actually lived.  
 
Barth’s theological project has numerous implications for ecclesial ethics.  His 
understanding of theology as a practical discipline in service of the church’s witness is 
                                                                                                                                       
reference to Luther’s language of God’s speaking. The emphasis on God’s speaking is often flatly 
called “divine command theory,” which in Brock’s opinion fails to capture much of the dynamic 
quality intended, Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 172. 
27 Barth, Church Dogmatics, II:2, 513. 
28 This is why Barth situates his discussion of theological ethics within his Doctrine of God. 
29 As Barth writes, “‘to become obedient,’ ‘to act rightly,’ ‘to realise the good,’ never means anything 
other than to become obedient to the revelation of the grace of God; to live as a man to whom grace has 




of particular importance.  The decision to name his life-long work Church Dogmatics 
is not incidental.  As John Webster explains, theology for Barth is  
 
… primarily devoted to the task of describing the “space” which agents 
occupy, and gives only low priority to the description of their character and 
to the analysis of quandary situations in which they find themselves … A 
Christianly successful moral ontology must be a depiction of the world of 
human action as it is enclosed and governed by the creative, redemptive, 
and sanctifying work of God in Christ, present in the power of the Holy 
Spirit.30  
  
As this quote suggests, what matters is how human action is described; the 
performance of a certain action has meaning only insofar as it is inscribed within a 
certain “space.”  For Schleiermacher that “space” was the inner experience of the 
individual, whereas for Barth it is the dynamic event of God’s speaking through his 
Son and Spirit to his church.   
 
For Barth’s interpreters this has occasioned an entirely different approach to the 
relationship between theology and ethics.  In particular, it has led to the dissolution of 
the “and” that held the two subjects apart throughout the modern era.  The distinctions 
drawn in modernity between doctrine and ethics, belief and behaviour, were part of an 
attempt to rescue Christianity from its antiquated metaphysical beliefs by giving it 
new relevance as ethical religion.31  Under Barth’s influence, theology is freed from 
such modern prejudices because, “dogmatics itself must be ethics and that ethics can 
be only dogmatics.”32  Theology describes the “moral space” wherein human actions 
become meaningful.  Ethics is therefore best understood in relation to the traditional 
language of the church, such as the doctrine of God, revelation, election, creation, and 
atonement or reconciliation.33 
 
The emphasis on the descriptive task of theology relies, of course, on having a 
grammar appropriate to the subject under question.  George Lindbeck ushered in a 
                                                
30 John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-2. 
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more self-conscious beginning to ecclesial ethics by developing Barth’s insights with 
reference to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and in particular his claim that 
language takes form within the rules and manners of particular communities.34  
Lindbeck argued that doctrine, in the form Barth understood it, acted as “communally 
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude and action.”35  In other words, theological 
speech depends upon the practices and grammar of an actual lived community.  The 
church is first of all a community of practice, not an abstract repository of principles 
or concepts.  This means that theological statements always reflect a particular social 
and political space.  Christian concepts of justice, accordingly, ought to be understood 
in light of the practices and language of the community of faith.  
 
Recognition of the way in which theological language is embodied in communities of 
faith has given rise to another significant impetus for an ecclesial ethic.  While Barth 
was first and foremost a systematic theologian, he brought to this task a rich 
engagement with the biblical text that was remarkably free of historical criticism.  
Barth was convinced that the bible provided the Christian community with a grammar 
and language to live faithfully before God.  In that respect his work anticipated what 
has become known as the “theological interpretation of Scripture.”36  Barth’s 
distinctive recourse to Scripture was highlighted by Hans Frei in his The Identity of 





We have seen how ecclesial ethics has pushed back on the universalizing tendency of 
modern ethics by recovering the importance of character, tradition, and narrative as 
indispensible ethical categories.  More important than helping reasonable individuals 
make right decisions is the need to develop people of character who act instinctively 
rather than out of crisis.  This is precisely what the church is called to do. 
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The main objection to “decisionism,” as McClendon puts it, “is that it sets out to show 
how to make decisions, but never reckons with who it is who makes these decisions.”  
“What decisionism lacks, and previous ethical systems so regularly display, is concern 
with the qualities of human character in the individual and the community”38  Even 
though the concentration on decisions is representative of a turn towards the subject, it 
turns out that this “subject” is no one in particular.  There is no essential connection 
made between personal agency and actions.  And yet, most people most of the time 
live by habit rather than by conscious choice.  Even when faced with a conscious 
decision, people tend to rely on their existing commitments or convictions, even to the 
point where some choices are not choices at all but simply habitual.  As creatures of 
habit, it is our character rather than our choices that is most indicative of how we act.  
As Wells and Quash point out, “Character is a kind of power that is developed and 
strengthened by certain kinds of activities and commitments, and leaves one far from 
impregnable but certainly not defenseless in the face of inevitable sin, abiding 
temptation, and agonizing decision.”39   
 
This return to an emphasis on character and virtue highlights the impossibility of 
doing ethics for everyone in a comprehensive way.  From the perspective of an ethics 
of character it becomes important to interpret actions in light of an agent’s 
convictions, history, and hopes, as well as the rituals and practices that have formed 
him or her.  All of these contribute to a much thicker, more complex description of 
moral agency.  
 
Among ecclesial ethicists, Stanley Hauerwas has been at the forefront of using notions 
of character and virtue for developing a distinctively Christian ethic.40  He has been 
particularly concerned to “provide conceptual categories for understanding and 
articulating the kind of moral development appropriate” to Christian convictions.41  
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Drawing on the notion of virtue developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, he teases out the 
connection between the “form of an act” and the “form of the agent.”42   
 
In the Aristotelian framework, an agent acquires a particular character through 
habituation to a set of virtues or vices, so that an agent’s virtuous action is correlative 
to how well that virtue has become habit.  Good action comes not just from having the 
right set of ideas, but from being schooled in the right set of virtues, and virtues by 
their nature require practice.  From this perspective, Hauerwas proposes that the 
church is a “school for virtue,” forming Christians in the particular virtues of patience 
and hope.  Aristotle also argued that it is by external actions that the interior state of a 
person becomes formed, and that at times an agent may be called upon to act in ways 
contrary to their interior disposition.43  The external world where we act and are acted 
upon is therefore centrally important to the development of our character.  This 
insight, which has no place in the Kantian moral universe, is essential for viewing the 
church as a site for character formation.   
 
While character has become a central theme in Christian ethics more generally, the 
validity of virtue theory is more disputed, especially as it is mediated through Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s social theory.  MacIntyre’s influence on ecclesial ethics is considerable 
and therefore needs to be considered here, although his polemical tone is perhaps the 
most sweeping of all.  We have noted how virtues are meant to become habits of 
character through practice.  MacIntyre observes how certain traditions elevate some 
practices while suppressing others.  He defines a practice as, 
 
… any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.44 
 
The practices that are encouraged by a given society, or more specifically, by a 
tradition, are intended to form a character that reflects the convictions of that 
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tradition.  Two crucial points are made here – traditions are sustained by their 
practices, and different traditions order practices differently.  A living tradition is one 
where the practices are practiced and argued over in order that the true telos of that 
tradition may be realized.  Yet it is by a tradition’s telos that specific practices become 
ordered, such that some are encouraged while others are suppressed.   
 
MacIntyre also makes the point that the telos of a tradition has an irreducibly narrative 
dimension.  Action itself has a basically historical character.  “It is because we all live 
out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the 
narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding 
the actions of others.”45  What all this means for ethics is that an agent’s actions must 
be understood in light of their character, which has been formed in relation to the 
practices fostered by their community.  This in turn is part of a wider tradition with a 
narrative that explains the purpose of the good life.  
 
In light of this, MacIntyre insists, “it is no longer possible to speak except out of one 
particular tradition in a way which will involve conflict with rival traditions.”46  Since 
every form of rational inquiry is embodied in a particular tradition, a level of conflict 
becomes inevitable between members of different traditions.  This was, of course, the 
problem that Kant sought to overcome by proposing a conception of rationality that 
was independent of all cultural and social traditions.  According to MacIntyre, Kant 
relied on a conception of “universality and impersonality” that was meant to deliver a 
“neutral set of criteria by means of which the claims of rival and contending traditions 
could be adjudicated.”47  The problem, however, is that no such criteria have achieved 
anything resembling a consensus.  This has meant that Kant’s liberal notion of 
“tradition-free individuals” has in itself become a particular tradition, one that is 
concerned with being free from all external constraints.  Liberalism is a tradition 
because the “overriding good of liberalism is no more and no less than the continued 
sustenance of the liberal social and political order.”48  Debates are not pursued in a 
neutral way, independent of tradition, but rather always assume a liberal starting 
point, its own tradition.   
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Instead of trying to overcome our situatedness as a means of overcoming conflict, 
MacIntyre argues that intellectual enquiry between traditions should take place as 
“acts of empathetic conceptual imagination.”  This involves placing oneself 
imaginatively within the world as perceived by the alien culture, speaking in a 
“secondary mode” from one’s first order language.49  This imaginative act, and the 
possibility of entering into dialogue with other rationalities, is only possible for the 
person who inhabits a “particular tradition-informed community of discourse.”  It is 
not possible for the person who, claiming to stand above all traditions, expects a 
standard of rationality that no tradition possesses.  Needless to say, MacIntyre’s sets 
the bar high for genuine dialogue between traditions to occur. 
 
Ecclesial ethics is not tied to the kind of sweeping social theory of rival traditions put 
forward by MacIntyre, but it is sensitive to the difference that tradition, narrative, 
practice, and language make.  Hauerwas in particular argues that the truthfulness of 
any story, including the Christian story, is dependent on how well it produces people 
of character.  He suggests, “the church is finally known by the character of the people 
who constitute it, and if we lack that character, the world rightly draws the conclusion 
that the God we worship is in fact a false God.”50  Such claims have led Hauerwas to 
be accused of “ecclesiocentrism,” that is, of making the truth of the gospel dependent 
solely on the witness of the church.  We will evaluate this charge later.  For now, what 
is vital to note is the way ecclesial ethics makes the concrete life of the church 
indispensable to its theological truth claims.  This means that the meaning and 
practice of the justice of God cannot be abstracted from its particular ecclesiological 
expression. 
 
Hauerwas also considers it significant that the Christian claim to truth is not based on 
abstract principles or ideas, but comes in the form of a narrative.  “Jesus did not have 
a social ethic,” Hauerwas maintains, in the sense of advocating some idea or system 
beyond himself, rather “his story is a social ethic.”51  While MacIntyre pointed to the 
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centrality of narratives more generally, Hauerwas concentrates on the specific story of 
Jesus as being most vital to the church. 
 
Hauerwas has often made the provocative claim that the church’s primary task is to be 
the church.  By this he does not mean it should live for its own sake.  Quite the 
opposite.  The claim presupposes the idea that “the church is the place where the story 
of God is enacted, told, and heard,”52 which means that the church’s first task is to be 
“a community capable of hearing the story of God we find in Scripture and living in a 
manner that is faithful to that story.”53  Since it is the story of Jesus that stands at the 
center of the church, the church ought to become the “organized form of Jesus’ 
story.”54  In Hauerwas’ account there is no clear separation between christology and 
ecclesiology.  By looking at Jesus’ story we can discern the vocation of the church, 
which is to imitate through its practices “the life of the man whom God made his 
representative.”55  The theme of imitation, combined with a focus on narrative and 
practices, was especially prominent in Hauerwas’ earlier work, which was driven by 
the desire to recover the visible difference the church ought to make to the ethical 
task.    
 
Another prominent feature of Hauerwas’ writing is his disavowal of the individualism 
that has pervaded modern ethics.  This can observed in the way he treats the subjects 
of discipleship, salvation, Scripture, and evangelism.  The imitation of discipleship is 
not a matter of isolated individuals copying in an external manner the actions of Jesus.  
Rather, it involves becoming part of a discipleship community.  “[T]o be like Jesus is 
to join him in the journey through which we are trained to be a people capable of 
claiming citizenship in God’s kingdom.”56  The task of this discipleship community is 
to initiate others into the story of Jesus, so that this story becomes their own.  
Salvation, on this account, is understood as individuals relinquishing their own story 
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and moving towards the reinterpretation of who they are, in the light of Jesus’ story 
being made known through the church.57    
 
However, the task of being initiated into Jesus’ story does not simply happen by 
retelling the gospel narratives, since this would continue to place the emphasis on 
individuals.  In order to avoid individualistic readings of Scripture, Hauerwas argues 
that the bible must be reinstated as the sacred text for instructing the gathered 
community of saints.58  And when the church gathers, it doesn’t come empty handed 
but as possessor of a long tradition of learning how to embody the story rightly.  For 
Hauerwas, the practices of the church, baptism, and eucharist in particular, as well as 
the lives of the saints who inhabit these practices, are of greater significance than 
either Scripture or the creeds, for understanding the meaning of Jesus’ story.59  They 
are, in Hauerwas’ opinion, “our most important social witness … They set the 
standard, as we try to bring every aspect of our lives under their sway.”60  When these 
particular practices are marginalized or their meaning is forgotten, the church 
effectively loses its evangelical identity.  If evangelism is solely concerned with 
individual salvation, fostered by individual testimony, the church cannot but appear as 
of secondary importance.  
 
Having begun his career with an emphasis on character formation and the role of 
socially established practices in the performance of a narrative, Hauerwas’ more 
mature work has concentrated more and more on the significance of worship as the 
activity that combines all of these various threads.  This interest in worship led Wells 
and Hauerwas to co-edit the Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics by arranging 
each contribution according to its liturgical function.61  The volume treats the 
Eucharist and the liturgy as “an ordered series of specific practices.”  By doing so, the 
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editors claim, “detailed attention may be given to these particular practices, and 
concentrated emphasis may rest on how the performance of these practices shapes the 
character of Christians and the mind of the Church as a whole.”62   
 
This emphasis on the church’s worship as the site for ethical reflection represents the 
final break from the tradition of modern ethics.  The distinctions that prevail in 
modern ethics – between the immanent world of tangible human experience and the 
ideal and intangible world of divine aspiration, between a subjective perspective on 
worth and an objective stance on truth, between private internal activity and public 
political activity – all such distinctions disappear when worship is viewed as the arena 
of ethical formation.  Worship can no longer be understood as a solitary activity 
where one leaves the cares of the world behind while being basked in ethereal 
splendour; it is where people ascribe worth-ship to what is true and good.  And it is 
because the church ascribes its worth-ship in a very particular way that ethical 
deliberation can no longer be done for everybody.  For the church, worship is the 
activity that connects its communal practices to the story of how God meets humanity 
in Jesus Christ.  In doing so, the church forms its character so as to be responsive to 




For ecclesial ethics, then, worship is moral formation.  Greg Beale makes this point 
provocatively in the title of his book, We Become What We Worship.63  Beale’s thesis 
is that God has made humans to reflect him, but if they do not commit themselves to 
him, they will not reflect him but something else in creation.  At the core of our 
beings we are imaging creatures.  It is not possible to be neutral on this issue: we 
either reflect the Creator or something in creation.”  This has obvious implications for 
character formation.  “What people revere, they resemble, either for ruin or 
restoration.”64  Accordingly, the secular age is not, as William Cavanaugh notes, “a 
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disenchanted world,” a world cleared of God, but is rather “a world full of idols.”65  
The category of worship is far from being a retreat to a pseudo-private experience, 
since it evokes a world where spiritual forces compete for human obedience.   
 
Cavanaugh is helpful at this point.  He argues that liturgy is a universal category for 
understanding human participation in political community.  “In a basic sense,” 
Cavanaugh writes, “liturgy enacts and maintains community by the ritual 
remembering or re-presentation of foundational narratives, thereby helping to 
construct the perceived reality in which each member of the community lives.”66  
Here again we see how communities are narrative-dependent, and this is reflected 
through the visible liturgical practices that sustain communities in their foundational 
narrative.  Cavanaugh also points to how liturgical practices call forth an imagined 
community.  By this he means a community that is no less real yet exists in the 
imagination of those who live liturgically, as a means of participating in something 
beyond themselves.67  In other words, liturgy serves to capture our imagination by 
evoking a communal reality that gives meaning and order to our individual lives.  
Liturgy is grounded in and presents the foundational narrative of Christian faith.  
Baptism and Eucharist are not just a means of remembering Jesus’ story; they are 
ways Christians re-enact and live out Jesus’ sacrifice by dying with him and feeding 
off him (cf. John 6:53-58; Rom. 6:3).   
 
Cavanaugh notes how different liturgical forms of life compete for our imaginations, 
depending upon what political community we see ourselves belonging to.  By 
implication, “if the Christian liturgy is to reclaim its centrality to the imagination of a 
redeemed world, we must look with a critical eye on liturgies that compete for 
allegiance.”68   
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Cavanaugh is aware that he is using the term “liturgy” in a far broader sense than its 
usual designation as the public worship of the church.  His argument might be better 
served by use of the generic term “ritual,” which is more identifiable with secular 
political gatherings.  However, he is reluctant to limit liturgy to the “sacred” as 
opposed to “secular” spheres.  Such an understanding would fail to reckon with the 
“eschatological import of the Church’s liturgy, because it reinforces the status quo of 
worldly order.”69  Rather than make such categorical distinctions, Cavanaugh thinks it 
is more helpful to understand the ritualism of politics and of the Eucharistic liturgy as 
ordered towards the same goal: the organizing of “bodies in public space” so as to 
create a “communal body.”70  Politics is all about the formation and activity of 
collective bodies, hence the significance of “public ritual actions through which the 
roles and boundaries and goals and allegiances of the body are enacted and 
reinforced.”71  None of this would happen, according to Cavanaugh, unless 
individuals subscribe to the given narrative that is told about the body/political 
community.  This way of understanding politics requires moving beyond the usual 
state-centric models, to include the everyday bodies of civil society. 
 
While Cavanaugh has not developed his argument in relation to the understanding and 
practice of justice, it is not difficult to see the connections.  The context most often 
associated with the dispensing of justice is the courtroom, and the modern courtroom 
operates as a public theatre with its own liturgical process.  There are carefully 
scripted roles (judges, lawyers, court staff), each of whom speaks a jurisprudential 
language that requires moral and technical training.  This liturgical process is aimed at 
construing one body (the offender) in particular ways (as guilty or innocent), so that 
the norms of the political community might be reinforced.   
 
It might be objected that while state politics does use rituals as a way of giving 
expression to its body, such rituals are merely symbolic and do not have sacral 
importance.  It would be a category mistake to treat statecraft as a religious ritual that 
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exercises liturgical formation over its citizens.  Cavanaugh, however, warns against 
“the notion that political rituals are made up of mere symbols, as if the symbols could 
be discarded but the reality would remain.  The symbols in fact are part of a larger 
ritual action that scripts bodies into a performance.”72  For example, in America, 
 
Soldiers march in the street while people applaud and wave flags.  
Elaborate rituals surround the flag as it is saluted and people pledge their 
allegiance to it.  High national holidays (or “holy days”) are observed.  
Those fallen in battle on behalf of the body politic are commemorated in 
reverent tones and in monuments that dominate public spaces.  Relics of 
the founding fathers are venerated in temples dedicated to the memory of 
the republic.73 
 
Indeed, it is usually through these ritualistic practices that people become conscious of 
citizenship.  This is exactly the purpose of the rituals.  According to Cavanaugh, 
patriotic liturgical practices were invented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as a means to “stoke a nascent sense of exclusive national loyalty, 
supplanting previously diffuse loyalties owed to region, ethnic group, class and 
church.”74  The rise of the nation state should thus be seen not as the overcoming of 
religious authority in public life but rather as its displacement by a power that trades 





By now it should be clear that Cavanaugh’s purpose in directing attention to the 
liturgy is to reinvigorate the sense of the church as a visible political community in its 
own right.  Just as modern ethics suppressed the role of the Christian community in 
forming people of moral character, so the modern era has also displaced the church as 
a fully public body that claims our allegiance in matters political as well as personal.  
Cavanaugh locates the problem in the specifically modern bifurcation of reality into 
sacred and secular, private and public.  Here the church and its liturgy are restricted to 
the former while politics and public reason are identified with the latter.  Cavanaugh, 
and all those associated with the ecclesial turn, object to both of these claims.  They 
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argue that the political bodies usually regarded as secular are no less religious or 
dependent on the sacred than is the church.  Nor are Christians any less concerned 
with everyday secular matters than are the most political of animals. 
 
Politics does not occupy some autonomous sphere tightly cordoned off from the 
church, because there can be no sphere that lies outside of God’s activity in the world.  
Ecclesial ethicists are adamant that salvation is not a flight from the world, because 
salvation in the biblical tradition is a fully public historical event that takes place in 
the context of kings and empires and before watching nations.  It embraces all of 
creation.  This requires that the “political” be reimagined as a direct response to God’s 
activity in the world.  “Central to this reimagining,” Cavanaugh writes, “is the 
conviction that the church is at the heart of God’s plan of salvation.”75  The church is 
directly political because of God’s election of a particular people to bear witness to 
salvation in the world.  “God calls a community of people to be a foretaste of 
salvation, one concrete community called to live differently so that others may taste 
and see God’s peaceful revolution and be blessed, too.”76 
 
Social actions that take place beyond the altar represent a counter-politics to what is 
usually thought possible in the world.  Such actions are Eucharistic in that those who 
perform them take “the social action envisioned in the action of the altar out into the 
streets and invite others to participate.”77  To participate in the Eucharist is an 
“invitation to participate in God’s reconciliation of the world,” which “opens up new 
possibilities undreamed of in a merely worldly politics.”78   
 
Such a framework presents a way of imaging the life of the church that involves a 
much thicker understanding of justice, in several ways.  First, it underscores how the 
human operation of justice ought to be read as a response to how God and his justice 
are active in human history, as attested in the biblical narrative.  The biblical notion of 
justice is more relational, merciful, and transformative than are more conventional 
concepts of justice.  Second, it also draws attention to how the justice of God is active 
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in the creation of a particular people who bear witness to his redemptive and 
restorative justice to the world.  Third, it enables Christians to see their gatherings, 
where the peace is shared and reconciliation is practiced in table fellowship, as 
normative for what it means to extend God’s justice in the world. 
 
Cavanaugh points out that while this political understanding of the church may sound 
novel to modern ears, it was already a view expressed in the nascent church of the 
New Testament. 
 
In adopting the term ekklesia, the church was making a claim to being 
more than a mere koinon: it was not a mere part of a whole, but was itself a 
whole, its interests being not particular but catholic, embracing the fate of 
the entire world.  The church saw itself as the eschatological fulfillment of 
Israel, and hence as the witness and embodiment of salvation to the world.  
The church was not polis, and yet it used the language of the kingdom of 
God to describe the very concrete and visible fulfillment of Israel that was 
“at hand” in the event of Jesus Christ (Mark 1:15).  The church was not 
polis, and yet it used the language of citizenship to describe membership in 
it (Eph. 2:19; Phil 3:20).  In the church, citizenship was available through 
baptism to those excluded from such status in the polis, namely, women, 
children, and slaves.79 
 
The reason why the early church did not speak of itself as polis is because the Greek 
notion of polis involved boundaries that did not apply to the church.  Much like the 
modern nation state, a Greek polis was more particularistic than the church, with a 
more limited vision of who should benefit from the goods inherent to its political 
community. 
 
Even so, the church had a political vocation, which incidentally helps to explain the 
rise of Christendom.  As Cavanaugh points out, Christendom was not the “unfortunate 
intermingling of two essentially distinct things – theology and politics, church and 
state – that we enlightened people of modernity have finally managed to sort out and 
separate.  What is lumped together under the term “Christendom” is in fact a very 
complex series of attempts to take seriously the inherently political nature of the 
church and its instrumental role in the salvation of the world, in Jesus Christ.80  While 
there are many troubling features with Christendom, it is not its political character that 
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is the problem, for the kingdom established by Jesus is no less a political reality than 
Caesar’s Pax Romana.   
 
What is disputed, however, is the way in which Jesus’ kingship is manifest between 
the now and the not yet of redemption.  Scholars like Oliver O’Donovan place more 
of an emphasis on the “already” of Christ’s victory, which implies God has made the 
state subservient to the church.81  “If the mission of the church needs a certain social 
space, for men and women of every nation to be drawn into the governed community 
of God’s Kingdom, then secular authority is authorized to provide and ensure that 
space.”82  For O’Donovan, the high point of the church’s political theology lies in the 
period from 1100 to 1650 AD, and is probably best seen through the work of Hugo 
Grotius.  O’Donovan thus tends to privilege the language of rule, judgment, and order 
in speaking about the church’s relationship to the world. 
 
Hauerwas, on the other hand, while no less unequivocal that God’s reign will triumph, 
is wary about equating Christ’s lordship with the ways in which the state exercises its 
rule.  According to Hauerwas, Christ’s victory is made apparent in the way of the 
cross, the way of suffering faithfulness that refuses to transform the world through 
violence and falsehood.  The church is the bearer of an alternative politics, a people 
who cultivate the virtues of patience and hope where injustice and threats of violence 
seem to dominate.83  The Christian community must not seek to control national or 
world history, particularly when violence is required to secure justice.  It must remain 
faithful to Jesus’ peaceable kingdom without acquiescing to injustice.  In speaking of 
the church’s role, Hauerwas prefers the more reticent language of wandering, 
pilgrimage, exile, and resident alien status, and tends to privilege those times when 
the church endured martyrdom. 
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According to Wells and Quash, “perhaps the most significant question posed by 
ecclesial ethics of other approaches (and of itself) is this.  Is Jesus, in the example of 
his life and death, really the foundation of Christian ethics?”84  Everything converges 
on this question.  The unique events of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection constitute 
the foundational narrative forming the Christian imagination.  This in turn has 
produced a tradition of communal practices that have been honed through the 
church’s worship.  Against the modern tendency in ethical thinking, for Christian 
ethics there is no getting away from the fact that God became human in Jesus Christ.  
There is no more basic truth than the one who is truth, no religious principle for 
making decisions other than being encountered by the one who decides to be for us.  
There is no norm or value or sphere of reality, secular or otherwise, that supersedes 
the church’s obedience to the lordship of Jesus, and to the way of the cross in 
particular.  
 
Expressed this way, ecclesial ethics represents the recovery of the church’s 
distinctiveness as it witnesses to the way of life made possible by Jesus.  One feature 
of this distinctiveness is singled out to be of primary importance.  The test of the 
church’s faithfulness to the way of Jesus, and the first casualty when the church’s 
witness is rendered invisible, is its commitment to the nonviolent love of the enemy.  
For ecclesial ethics, what God has made possible through Jesus is a life of 
reconciliation, a peacemaking that heals the world of violence.   
 
While there is good reason for ecclesial ethics to see peace as the primary witness of 
the church, a witness that has suffered as a result of the interiorization and 
spiritualization of the concept, curiously it has paid little attention to the place of 
justice in this vocation.  Biblically there is a close relationship between the church as 
the embodiment of God’s peace and the embodiment of God’s justice.  However, this 
insight has not been prominent in ecclesial ethics.  Its treatment of the church’s 
relationship to justice has been slim at best, and often written for the purpose of 
combating problematic conceptions of justice rather than developing the church’s own 
distinctive way of understanding and enacting justice.  Our concern in what follows is 
                                                




to address this lacuna by extending the insights of ecclesial ethics into a more 




It was John H. Yoder who most provocatively asserted the political character of Jesus’ 
life and death as normative for the church’s way of life.  In his magisterial work, The 
Politics of Jesus, arguably the foundational text for ecclesial ethics, Yoder protested 
against the way Jesus’ life and death had been marginalized in Christian social 
ethics.85  There were several reasons for this marginalization.  Some maintained that 
Jesus had proclaimed only an “interim ethic” based on the mistaken belief that the 
social order would soon pass away.  It therefore had little value for guiding society 
today.  Others construed Jesus as a “simple rural figure” who could not possibly have 
anything substantive to say to the complex problems of contemporary society.  He and 
his followers did not have to exercise the kind of social responsibility that has since 
been expected of Christians.  Moreover, his teaching dealt with spiritual and 
existential concerns and had no interest in political matters.  As a “radical monotheist” 
Jesus directed attention solely to the worship of the one sovereign God, in the light of 
which all ethical values were relativized.  Ultimately he came to deal with the 
problem of sin and justification that transcends the parameters of ordinary ethics.   
 
Once Jesus has been deemed irrelevant for Christian social ethics, ethical inquiry 
becomes measured according to what appears as “realistic” or “responsible.”  This 
turn is based on an epistemology where the “natural” – whether as law, as situation, or 
as nature itself – is directly perceived and understood.  Such an epistemological move 
denies the normativity of Jesus as the basis for the church’s ethics, and particularly for 
the church’s witness to Jesus as God’s peace.  In the previous chapter, we saw this 
same tendency to focus on the “realistic” and the “responsible” as paving the way for 
the church’s witness to God’s justice to be controlled by concerns that were in 
contrast with Jesus’ life and ministry.  
 
                                                





According to Yoder, underlying the many ways in which Jesus is rendered irrelevant 
for social ethics is the refusal to take seriously the full implications of either Jesus’ 
humanity or his divinity.  Jesus is viewed either through ebionitic eyes, as a radical 
rabbi whose relevance remains firmly fixed in his first-century Palestinian context, or 
through docetic eyes, as the eternal Word whose relevance is fixed to some truth that 
transcends his human life.  Yoder seeks to avoid reductionist views of Jesus that do 
not take seriously his relevance to social problems, precisely as the “Word of the 
Father, as true God and true Human.”86   
 
Yoder singles out one aspect of Jesus’ life that rises above all others as normative for 
discipleship.  He writes,  
 
There is but one realm in which the concept of imitation holds – but there 
it holds in every strand of the New Testament literature and all the more 
strikingly by virtue of the absence of parallels in other realms.  This is at 
the point of the concrete social meaning of the cross in relation to enmity 
and power.  Servanthood replaces dominion, forgiveness absorbs hostility.  
Thus – and only thus – are we bound by New Testament thought to “be 
like Jesus.”87   
 
According to New Testament thought, it is on the cross that Jesus breaks the 
sovereignty of the “principalities and powers” by making “a public example of them,” 
and having “triumphed over them” he has decisively “disarmed” them (Col. 2:13-15).  
The “powers” here refer to all those features of creaturely existence we cannot live 
without – the state, family, economy, religion, morality – and yet it is these powers or 
structures that hold us captive to their totalizing pretentiousness.  By living a 
genuinely human existence, Jesus submitted to the powers while living completely 
free of their totalizing claims.  He was thus able to expose how they keep humanity in 
slavery.  As Yoder puts it,  
 
his cross is a victory, the confirmation that he was free from the rebellious 
pretensions of the creaturely condition … His very obedience unto death is 
in itself not only the sign but also the first fruits of an authentic restored 
humanity.  Here we have for the first time to do with someone who is not 
the slave of any power, of any law or custom, community or institution, 
value or theory.88   
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It is by imitating Jesus in the way of his cross that the community of believers live a 
crucified existence, in a freedom that is no longer ruled by the necessities of “realism” 
or “responsibility.”  It no longer has to ensure its own survival or the survival of king 
or country; it is no longer enslaved to categorical imperatives or the imperiled 
decisions of crisis moments.  This was “the original revolution,” as Yoder 
characterizes it.  By living in obedience to the cross, the church is the new humanity 
set free from the powers and thus able to be “the most powerful tool of social 
change.”89  It is by reference to this freedom that the Christian community is able to 
point to where structures in society no longer serve humanity or God, but operate in 
defiance of their proper created order.  “The church’s calling is to be the conscience 
and the servant within society … we are called to contribute to the creation of 
structures more worthy of human society.”90  The Christian community is called to 
exemplify forms of human relating “whose only goal is to be faithful to that love 
which puts one at the mercy of one’s neighbor, which abandons claims to justice for 
oneself and for one’s own in an overriding concern for the reconciling of the 
adversary and the estranged.”91  In so doing, it lives in obedience not to an ideology or 
set of values but to Jesus as the human embodiment of God’s peace.92   
 
Where Yoder becomes more contentious is in his rejection of all forms of strategic or 
efficacious thinking that would seek to move history and society towards any goal or 
meaning other than the cross.  Yoder detects the desire to ensure that the world comes 
out right, as lurking behind every kind of reasoning which ends up justifying the use 
of force, or of sacrificing life to ensure the preservation of some higher good.93  
Against this tendency Yoder writes: 
 
“The lamb that was slain is worthy to receive power!”  John is here saying, 
not as an inscrutable paradox but as a meaningful affirmation, that the 
cross and not the sword, suffering and not brute power determines the 
meaning of history.  The key to the obedience of God’s people is not their 
effectiveness but their patience (13:10).  The triumph of the right is assured 
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not by the might that comes to the aid of the right, which is of course the 
justification of the use of violence and other kinds of power in every 
human conflict.  The triumph of the right, although it is assured, is sure 
because of the power of the resurrection and not because of any calculation 
of causes and effects, nor because of the inherently greater strength of the 
good guys.  The relationship between the obedience of God’s people and 
the triumph of God’s cause is not a relationship of cause and effect but one 
of cross and resurrection.94 
 
What Jesus renounced was not violence per se, but all those ways of being the 
sovereign lord of history that involve sacrificing human life, except his own.  He 
redefined the role of king, judge, and messiah.  This was in order that no one would 
be ruled except through his powerlessness, no one would be judged except through 
the judgment he took upon himself, and no one would be saved except through his 





While Yoder rejects the focus on decisions in modern ethics and its underlying 
Enlightenment paradigm of the autonomous individual, he would question whether 
recovery of the virtue tradition can serve as an adequate basis of a Christian 
alternative.  The problem is not just that virtue theory has its origins in the pagan 
Hellenistic rather than in the Judeo-Christian world.  It is that for writers like 
Aristotle, the paradigm of virtue is the soldier, who is not only courageous in battle 
but also exercises an indifferent attitude towards those below him.95  Such a viewpoint 
cannot comprehend the way of nonresistant love, meekness, humility, and a 
preparedness to sacrifice one’s own life rather than wielding the sword in defending a 
just cause.  This begs the question whether the more generic usage of virtue theory, 
such as that found in MacIntyre’s account, actually serves to mask the primacy of the 
politics of Jesus and his exemplary path of nonviolence. 
 
This highlights the much-needed difference that narrative and community make to the 
kind of virtues that ought to be formed.  In sparking a recovery of virtue ethics, 
Hauerwas is sometimes mistakenly associated with the republican tradition of civic 
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virtue and of fuelling the hope that the church might acquire public prominence as an 
exemplary community of virtue.96  This would be problematic for Hauerwas because 
civic virtue in the United States is premised on a citizenship that is ready for war and 
battle.97  In such a social order, the church is construed as the institution that forms 
virtuous citizens who are ready to die for the American way of life.  The American 
tradition of civic virtue, in other words, shares in common with Aristotle the 
presumption that violence is normative and unavoidable in order to maintain a 
political community.   
 
In place of this presumption, Hauerwas follows Yoder in making non-violence the 
central presupposition of a specifically Christian ethic.  As Wells and Quash explain, 
 
non-violence requires the kind of disciplined training and constant practice 
that only a committed community can foster.  For Hauerwas and Yoder, 
pacifism creates politics, because it is constantly shaping and searching for 
practices that enable the resolution of conflicts that avoid the resort to 
violence.98   
 
According to Hauerwas, this transformation of violence within virtue theory was 
already underway when Aquinas made the martyr and not the soldier the paradigm of 
virtue.  By so doing, the virtue of courage was no longer formed in the “noble acts of 
war” but required the prior disposition of fortitude and patience to always do what is 
just, even when faced with imminent death.99  This disposition was believed to be 
exemplified most perfectly in the martyr.  But Hauerwas seeks to go much further 
than Aquinas by selecting peacemaking rather than justice as the chief virtue of the 
Christian community.  
 
For both Yoder and Hauerwas, the church is an exemplary community only insofar as 
it witnesses to Jesus’ reign of peace.  To render the church invisible, as modern ethics 
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tends to do, or to diminish its exemplary quality, as some Christian ethicists are prone 
to do, would be to disavow the church’s high calling to witness to the gospel of peace.  
Such a disavowal would be a problem not just for the church but also for wider 
society.  This is because it is through the church that “the world” can acknowledge 
itself as such, and so be transformed.  This does not depend on the church’s moral 
superiority or sinlessness, but quite the opposite.  As a community of forgiven 
sinners, the church is the one place where violence, untruth, and distrust between its 
members can be openly acknowledged for what it really is: sin.  Yet as a community 
of forgiven sinners, such sinfulness can be confronted without threatening to destroy 
the very fabric of the community, because this community has been formed by the 
virtue of peacemaking.  The visibility of the church is therefore central to the witness 
of the church, which, as Yoder writes, “always includes and may sometimes center 
upon the quality of personal relationships that even the outsider may observe.”100  
Where believers interact with each other in reconciling love, Yoder continues, “the 
tool is at hand for changing both societies and personalities.”101 
3. The	Critique	of	Ecclesiocentricism?		
 
In prioritizing the importance of the church for a distinctively Christian ethic, the 
question arises as to whether such an emphasis risks stripping Christian ethics of its 
theocentric character, and in so doing unwittingly perpetuates the methodological 
programme of liberal Protestantism.  Such a criticism has been advanced in its most 
systematic form by Nicholas Healy.  Over the course of nearly two decades he has 
argued that modern ecclesiology is both insufficiently concrete and insufficiently 
theocentric.  Healy’s argument is pertinent for any consideration of how the church 
should live out its convictions, not least its convictions about the justice of God.  In 
what follows, we will assess Healy’s critique of modern ecclesiology to see whether 
the church can sustain the kind of visible witness that ecclesial ethics claims for it. 
 
In Healy’s assessment, ecclesiology in the late modern period has become distorted as 
a result of taking on a more apologetic task.  As belief in God has become more a 
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matter of personal preference, many Christians have adopted the attitude that 
“membership in a church is merely optional, even for them.  It is no longer self-
evident that weekly churchgoing and submission to the church’s teachings has any 
particular salvific significance.”102  In response to this, ecclesiologies have been 
fashioned to explain why participation in church is not just necessary but essential for 
salvation.  This has been accompanied by a concerning tendency to construe 
ecclesiology in highly theoretical and ideal terms, rather than as the practical 
discipline it ought to be.  
 
Healy draws attention to Paul’s Rule in Gal. 6:14: “Far be it from me to glory in 
anything except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.”  This rule is partly proscriptive 
(we should not glory in anything apart from Christ crucified), and partly prescriptive 
(we should boast in Jesus Christ crucified).  The prescriptive element concerns the 
church’s distinctiveness, that is, in being orientated to the Father through Jesus Christ, 
in the power of the Spirit.  Healy considers this distinctive because of its apologetic 
claim to be “orientated” towards ultimate rather than just penultimate truth.  
Traditional theology was characterized by this theocentric orientation; it was 
primarily concerned with “God and things in relation to God,” as Aquinas would 
say.103  In Healy’s judgment, this was why the church traditionally was never “the 
primary object of a theological discussion, as if it could be a theological locus in its 
own right.”104  This is not to say that the church was considered to be unimportant but 
rather that it was mentioned only insofar as it was dependent on God.   
 
The proscriptive element in Paul’s Rule concerns another aspect of the church’s 
witness.  It is not called to boast in itself but rather to acknowledge its sinfulness and 
weakness as part of its proclamation that salvation only comes from the triune God.  
Healy goes so far as to suggest that “acknowledgement of ecclesial sinfulness is an 
essential part of Christian witness to the Cross and Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” and 
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should therefore be integral to the way in which ecclesiology is done.105  Ecclesiology 
should deflect attention away from the church, lest it give the impression that there is 
something in the church that is worth at least a little bit of glorifying, thus implying it 
is a shade better than the rest of humanity.106  Healy’s concern here is, it should be 
said, apologetic.  Acknowledgment of ecclesial sin opens the church to a hearing from 
“religious and non-religious bodies” in a genuinely humble way.  In the absence of 
such acknowledgment, the church will only confirm Western society’s worst view of 
the church as arrogant and irrational.107 
 
In ascribing a new sense of significance to the church, Healy believes that modern 
ecclesiology has failed to uphold both features of Paul’s Rule.  It has been plagued by 
two besetting sins – it has failed to reckon with the church’s sinfulness and it has 
become more about us than about God.  Healy singles out Karl Rahner, Karl Barth, 
and Jean-Marie Tillard as representative of this misplaced ecclesiological 
perfectionism.  While none would ascribe perfection to the church’s outward 
empirical manifestation, they consider the church’s inward invisible nature to be 
perfect, not as a result of human effort but because of the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit, who is perfect. 
 
Such perfectionism produces what Healy calls a “blueprint ecclesiology” which 
construes the church as having a bipartite structure.  The primary aspect is inward and 
hidden and is said to “realize” or “manifest” itself in the church’s everyday life 
through its institutions and practices.108  This dualistic structure serves as a useful 
heuristic device.  The church’s obvious sinfulness is explained away as a distortion of 
its true inner character, which is perfect and more basic.109   
 
Such idealized conceptions of the church may apply to the church eschatological but 
they do not represent the church in its pilgrim state, argues Healy.110  Moreover, given 
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the insufficient attention to the church in its empirical state, it suggests that these 
“theologians believe it is necessary to get our thinking about the church right first, 
after which we can go on to put our theory into practice.”111  This is reflective of the 
modern epistemology that values the theoretical over the practical. 
 
While Healy criticizes “blueprint ecclesiologies” for not being concrete enough, thus 
betraying the church’s penitential task, he criticizes the more recent work in ecclesial 
ethics as becoming too centered on the embodied life of the church and so failing to 
be sufficiently theocentric.  Conscious of how ideas always have their corresponding 
social form, which means that theological beliefs always imply a certain ecclesiology, 
ethicists like Hauerwas obscure the theological task of describing what the church is 
or how it is related to the other doctrines.  He insists that the truth of the gospel is only 
to be seen in the church’s way of living the gospel.  As Healy writes, “the emphasis 
falls heavily upon us, and upon the church’s practices, for they display and constitute 
our identities as Christians, and our witness by way of an alternative way of living.”112  
This results in a “sharp turn” to the church, and specifically to the church’s practices 
as displaying what has traditionally been expressed through systematic doctrine.  
Hauerwas’ dominant focus is on “living the Christian life well, and on the benefits of 
church life over all alternatives.”  In Healy’s opinion this “deflects his attention from 
what we must say about the triune God who makes any of it possible …  Hauerwas’s 
ecclesiocentric thinking distorts to the extent that is fails to be sufficiently 
theocentric.”113  In turning theology into a discourse primarily about us rather than 
about God, the “structure and development” of Hauerwas’ thought aligns more with 
the tradition of Schleiermacher than with traditional theology.114 
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From this perspective, Healy detects a certain “anxiety” in Hauerwas’ work towards 
statements about what God accomplishes in spite of us and yet for us.  Everything, it 
seems, depends on the church and our efforts at living fully within it.  There is little 
mention in his writings of God’s grace, the role of the Holy Spirit, and what 
justification by Christ’s work has objectively and materially achieved for us.  The 
only thing Christ appears to have provided for us is the story of Jesus, which we now 
live out through our practices.  “There is little sense in Hauerwas’ work that thinking 
carefully through our beliefs or teachings about God has any benefit.  It is a redundant 
exercise, he seems to say, because they are already worked out sufficiently and 
embodied in the church’s practices.”115  To avoid such distortions, Hauerwas needs to 
write more systematically about the logic of belief – “what God has actually and 
already done for us in Jesus Christ, and to what God still does among us and 
independently of us now.”116 
 
To the extent that Hauerwas refuses to make explicit what the church believes, he falls 
into the same trap as blueprint ecclesiologies, in offering an idealized and theoretical 
view of the church.  In the same way they make inner perfection the normative 
description of the church, so Hauerwas makes the embodiment of the church in the 
lives of exemplary disciples the normative account.  Healy’s problem with this is that 
the empirical church is a more mixed reality than Hauerwas allows.  “Within the 
church are saints and disciples, as well as the more unsatisfactory: admirers, hangers-
on, and those barely there …  The very fact of this very mixed membership raises 
questions about Hauerwas’s argument.”117  Put simply, “Hauerwas’s church is the one 
he worships in, but he seems to prefer, and talk more about, the one he constructs for 
himself.”118   
 
According to Healy, the church cannot perform the missionary role that Hauerwas 
ascribes it, in terms of displaying the kind of character, virtue, and practices that 
would constitute a truthful performance of the gospel story.  For this to be true, the 
church would need to consist “only of the dedicated,” and be “formally comparable to 
the communities of those in religious orders, where obedience is a key virtue on the 
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road to acquiring other virtues.”119  Healy accuses Hauerwas of a misplaced 
acceptance of Methodist perfectionism which, when combined with his broad 
acceptance of MacIntyre’s theory of traditions, results in a view of Christianity as a 
means for extending “human powers to achieve excellence,” and therefore has little 
place for a “theological understanding of failure and mediocrity.”120 
 
To counter this “highly systematic and theoretical” approach, Healy argues that 
ecclesiology should serve a more practical and prophetic task.  Its focus must always 
be on the “living, rather messy, confused and confusing body that the church actually 
is,” while seeking to move this body towards its task of witnessing to the gospel of 
salvation in Jesus Christ through the pastoral formation of disciples.121  Included in 
this task is the church’s witness to the ways in which “Jesus is followable,” within 
what Healy calls its “ecclesiological context.”122  The task of ecclesiology, then, is to 
reflect theologically upon this context – which includes much that is non-Christian or 
anti-Christian – in a way that describes the present shape and activity of the church 
within this setting.  This descriptive task will include utilizing the disciplines of 
philosophy, history, the social sciences, hard sciences and, perhaps most importantly, 
ethnography, in order to understand the backdrop against which the strengths and 
weaknesses of any proposed ecclesiology should be assessed.   
 
For Healy, all ecclesiology constitutes a response to a given context, as it reflects on 
what the “‘Christian thing’ is fundamentally about.”123  No two theologians will 
exercise the same theological judgment in every respect, because theologians occupy 
different ecclesiological contexts.  They are thus constantly shaping their 
ecclesiological agenda “in order to bring about an appropriate change in the 
community’s concrete identity,” especially when there is a discordance between 
practice and “the Christian thing.”124  In order to make possible a proper analysis of 
such an ecclesiology’s helpfulness, theologians should make explicit their contextual 
landscape.  Rather than trying to promote a model of the church that best encapsulates 
its essence, as modern ecclesiology tends to do, they should engage not the model 
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itself but rather the “construals that govern its use.”125  This would involve 
questioning the ecclesiological agenda that animates every theologian, and making 
their implicit judgments and construals explicit, so that their proposals may serve the 
practical and prophetic tasks inherent to the discipline. 
 
Healy’s emphasis on describing the church and its context in all its specificity differs 
in important respects from Hauerwas’ proposal.  Rather than using such descriptions 
to show how the church is the embodied form of Jesus’ story, Healy scrutinizes the 
church as a social entity, in order to show how the church can best muddle through as 
it lives in dependence on God’s grace.  Healy is not interested so much in describing 
the church as it ought to be, rather, his interest is in the many complicated ways in 
which the church takes actual form.   
 
Healy is not the first to express concern over Hauerwas’ apparent lack of regard for 
the ambiguities that surround Christian identity.  For example, James Gustafson long 
ago argued that Hauerwas represents the temptation of “isolating Christianity from 
taking seriously the wider world of science and culture and limits the participation of 
Christians in the ambiguities of moral and social life in the patterns of 
interdependence in the world.”126  For Healy, this more complicated view of the 
church is not necessarily a deficiency, because it points to how we are “dependent on 
God’s invisible action throughout, working in created things,” and so “it follows that 
our identities, who we truly are as God sees us, are fundamentally mystery, formed in 
the Holy Spirit and hidden in Christ, and thus only partially visible at best.”127  We 
can at most hope and trust that the Spirit is at work forming us to be more like Christ, 
it would be a mistake however to claim anything more for the church.  Moreover, any 
hint that the church is morally more exemplary than the world would betray the 
widely held perception that “Jesus is always more appealing and truthful than the very 
best church,” for only he “displays the truth of the gospel sufficiently to cover all the 
inadequacies of the church’s attempts to follow him.”128  In the end, the good news is 
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that the “truth of the gospel and the effectiveness of witness to it do not depend upon 
what we look like or upon our being trained and disciplined and formed properly.”129  
 
What are we to make of Healy’s arguments?  Do they discredit the concern of 
ecclesial ethicists to make the church more visible?  In my view, the main problem 
with Healy’s argument is that it fails to be sufficiently christological, both in its 
understanding of sin and the role of the church.  But first there is an issue of nuance to 
be noted within Healy’s own account of the ecclesial task.  While Healy’s emphasis 
on the need to view the church in all its specificity as a social entity within a given 
context is valid, at times Healy’s emphasis on the “practical” task of ecclesiology 
displaces its “prophetic” task.  He seems to foreclose on the possibility of a given 
ecclesiology having important things to say to contexts other than its own.   
 
For example, Healy notes in passing how Matthew developed his ecclesiology for his 
particular ecclesiological context, and that this differs from the context of, say, Paul or 
Luke.  This shows why no one ecclesiology can be normative for the church.  Yet, as 
Richard Bauckham has argued, it may well be the case that Matthew writes not just 
for one intended audience but for a multitude of audiences.130  Surely we can still 
learn from the ecclesiology developed by say Augustine or Aquinas, or even Barth, 
even though their ecclesiological contexts differed so significantly from our own.  It 
would seem that in Healy’s enthusiasm to be more concrete and practical, he 
paradoxically places more constraints on how ecclesiology can function to inform the 
church in whatever context it may find itself. 
 
A more problematic feature of Healy’s argument can be seen in his account of 
ecclesial sin, which he believes cancels out any emphasis on the church’s visible 
holiness.  Healy is surely correct that the church has all too frequently failed to 
embody the kind of witness it ought to, and that therefore all theology must be done in 
a penitential key.  However his emphasis on the church still being gripped by the 
intractable power of sin runs the risk of spiritualizing the church, such that we can say 
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nothing about what the church really is by looking at what the church actually does.  
The church, in Healy’s account, could never be “a light to the nations,” or “a city on a 
hill,” because what the church really comprises is essentially “mystery.”   
 
This indicates the problematic way in which Healy understands the church as 
constituted by sin in separation from its identity in Christ.  For example, Healy 
asserts, “God is the solution to the problems of the world, not the church.  The church, 
although orientated to, and governed by, the solution, still remains part of the 
problem.”131  There is no sense in Healy’s account that the church partakes in God’s 
solution, that a new social reality has been inaugurated that corporately exists in the 
new Adam.  Healy appears to make this explicit when he argues that the church in via 
participates in Christ’s passion, but not his resurrection. 
 
But the church, as sinful as it remains, is not just “orientated to” God’s healing of the 
world; it actively participates in it through its participation in Christ.132  Instead of the 
church’s sinfulness detracting from its participation in redemption, we must come to 
see how the church makes visible, as Cavanaugh writes, “the whole dynamic drama of 
sin and salvation, not only the end result of a humanity purified and unified.  In the 
drama, the church plays the part of sinful humanity … But the church also plays the 
part of that humanity that lives in the hope of redemption.”133  To identify the church 
only with sinful humanity would be to fall into an ecclesiological Nestorianism.  
Ironically this would leave us with an entirely non-concrete church, a church that 
remains essentially disembodied and cut off from God’s saving work in Christ.  But 
Christ came not simply to vanquish sin, but rather to assume sin so that he might 
redeem the human life that lives in sin.  This means that the importance of the 
church’s visible holiness is not negated by its sinful existence, but rather that its 
visibility expresses its identity as the body of Christ.  This is to say that the church’s 
distinctiveness lies in its embodiment of Jesus in his “kenotic movement of 
repentance.”134 
                                                
131 Healy, Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology, 12. 
132 According to Healy, what makes the church unique and therefore superior to all other religious and 
non-religious bodies it its “Spirit-empowered orientation to Jesus Christ and through him, to the triune 
God,” ibid., 17. The language of “orientation,” however, is not strong enough in describing the 
hypostatic union between Christ and His body. 
133 Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy, 162. 





This final point perhaps indicates why Healy fails to fully appreciate Hauerwas’ 
reasons for viewing the church as a community of disciples.  While Healy’s emphasis 
on the need to view the church as a social entity in all its specificity would appear to 
support Hauerwas’ proposal, Healy and Hauerwas have differing views about what 
constitutes the social reality of the church.  For Healy, the church is social because of 
its situatedness in the world, a world that is deeply sinful.  Hence as an empirical 
entity the church reflects all the confused and confusing aspects of worldly existence.  
Hauerwas, on the other hand, while not denying the church’s sinful existence, situates 
this existence within the life of Jesus Christ, which is never less than fully social, 
cultural, and political.  Hauerwas consciously avoids elevating any understanding of 
the social or the political except insofar as it finds expression in the very particular 
person in whom God makes himself known.  This is why Healy is mistaken in 
thinking his empirical observations have trumped Hauerwas’ more theological 
proposals.  His reading leaves us with a church that, far from being liberated, is but a 
reflection of the “principalities and powers” of this age.   
4. An	Ecclesial	Ethic	of	Justice-Making?	
 
For ecclesial ethics, the church is called to embody through its teaching and practice 
the conviction that Jesus is the definitive disclosure of God’s very nature.  In 
discharging this call special emphasis falls on the task of peacemaking.  This raises 
the issue of the role of justice and justice-making in the church’s vocation.  Ecclesial 
ethicists have given surprisingly little attention to this question, especially compared 
to the space devoted to the related concerns of peace, nonviolence, and war.   
 
Take, for example, the frequently referenced essay by Daniel Bell Jr. on an ethics of 
justice.  This appears in the edited book on Christian ethics by Hauerwas and Wells, 
as well as being featured as an example of an ecclesial approach to justice in Wells 
and Quash’s introductory volume.135  Hauerwas concedes that he himself “should 
have written more about justice,” but with the appearance of Bell’s contribution he no 
longer needs to because Bell has said everything he would want to say on the 
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subject.136  What is interesting, however, is that Bell’s writing on justice is largely 
restricted to one essay.  Furthermore, this essay is more concerned with how different 
contexts affect the church’s reading of Scripture.137  As Bell puts it, 
 
… what follows in the broadest strokes is an effort to suggest that the 
task of reclaiming a properly ecclesial reading of Scripture entails 
recognizing the way the political context and ends of modernity distort 
the reading of Scripture.  The theological interpretation of Scripture 
thereby necessitates a recovery of the political vocation of the church.  
This broad argument is set within a narrower argument concerning the 
nature of justice in Scripture.138  
 
This is not to disparage Bell’s insights.  It is simply to point out that there remains no 
substantial treatment of justice from the perspective of ecclesial ethics.   
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that ecclesial ethics has no concern for 
justice-making.  Rather, this concern is expressed without explicit use of the 
vocabulary of justice.139  The reason for this evasive manoeuvre is the fear that 
prevailing notions of justice will lead to a distortion of the church’s witness.  For 
example, in a provocative essay subtitled, “Why Justice Is a Bad Idea for Christians,” 
Hauerwas begins by pointing out that the one thing Christians agree about today is 
that “our faith is one that does justice.”140  The extent to which this claim is 
universally shared is a sign of the extent to which Christians have adopted 
conceptions of justice that are equally as universal.  Yet by adopting universalizing 
concepts like “rights” and “justice,” Christians have colluded with an individualistic 
account of humanity, which has very little to do with the particular truth claims of the 
Christian faith.  
 
                                                
136 Hauerwas, “Jesus, the Justice of God,” 99. 
137 I do not include here Bell’s analysis of “social justice” as it has appeared in Catholic social teaching, 
and in liberation theology in particular, see, Bell Jr., Liberation Theology. Bell’s contribution in this 
work focuses largely on economic and distributive justice, and while insightful it does not extend to a 
complete ecclesial perspective on justice as a whole. Bell’s essay in the Blackwell Companion is 
largely reflective of the comments he made in “Jesus, the Jews, and the Politics of God’s Justice.”  
138 Bell, ‘Politics of God’s Justice,’ 88. 
139 Neville agrees with this assessment of Hauerwas, “it is somewhat surprising that he has devoted 
comparatively little effort to articulating a distinctively Christian conception of justice and the practices 
that sustain such a conception … My own sense is that although justice per se has not been a major 
theme in Hauerwas’s writings, it has nevertheless been a significant practical concern for him at an 
existential level,” David J. Neville, “The Bible, Justice and Public Theology: An Introductory Essay,” 
in Bible, Justice, and Public Theology (Sheffield: Phoenix Press, 2014), 17. 




Hauerwas, in particular, has been highly critical of the assumptions behind secular 
liberal notions of justice.  His main concern is that such conceptions fail to have a 
telos beyond that of securing private goods for individuals.  By advocating for justice, 
Christians have the “ironic effect of reinforcing state power,” since in the liberal 
social order it is the state that distributes society’s limited goods amongst its 
citizens.141  To the extent that the state’s role as the provider of social goods is 
enlarged, the church’s role diminishes.  At the same time, it disavows its own 
particular language with which to challenge such arrangements.  Bell’s concern is 
very similar.  He thinks Christians too easily adopt conceptions of justice that are 
extrinsic to the person of Jesus.  This contributes to a view of the church that is 
“consigned to the role of cultural custodian of values tightly cordoned off from 
political practice, which finds its highest expression and guarantor in the nation-
state.”142 
 
Bell is equally critical of more theologically sounding conceptions of justice; what he 
calls “justice as justification.”  What really matters in this conception is the 
“individual entering into a saving relationship with Jesus Christ,” which means that 
justice is ultimately concerned with how individuals are justified.143  The problem 
with such an approach is fourfold.  First, its focus is distinctly individualistic, which 
means the church continues to occupy a marginal, and often irrelevant, space.  
Second, Jesus is rendered instrumental in this account since he is “cast as the victim of 
divine justice,” which means that justice “remains extrinsic to his being and 
person.”144  Bell points out that this conception of justice borrows more from pagan 
notions of suum cuique, which tend to reinforce modern secular accounts that are 
particularly retributivist.  Third, this account is thoroughly ahistorical, as shown by its 
lack of relation to God’s election of Israel and the church.  Fourth, it remains 
atemporal, by focusing on a spiritual victory while handing over temporal matters to 
the state and its exercise of justice.145 
                                                
141 Ibid., 58. Or, as Hauerwas later writes, “In the interest of working for justice, Christians allow their 
imaginations to be captured by concepts of justice determined by the presuppositions of liberal 
societies, and as a result, contribute to the development of societies that make substantive accounts of 
justice less likely,” ibid., 68. 
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Bell’s more positive appraisal of justice, and where his account lends itself to 
ecclesial ethics, follows the now familiar method of a christocentric ecclesiology.  He 
writes,  
 
justice is not extrinsic to Christian confessions and practices; it is not 
extrinsic to Jesus.  Justice is not something that happens to Jesus or to 
which he submits.  Jesus does not point to justice nor motivates us to go 
out and do some version of secular justice.  Rather, Jesus in his person is 
the justice of God.146   
 
Justice, therefore, is about being incorporated into Christ’s body, being made just in 
the sense of “being immersed in the life of the ecclesial community; to do justice is to 
be part of the community whose life is centered in and ordered by Jesus, God’s 
justice.”147   
 
In developing the marks of this community in its doing of justice, Bell draws 
specifically on the church’s traditional works of mercy (cf. Matt 25:31-45).  These 
practices, honed through the church’s tradition, encapsulate the ways in which the 
“church embodies Jesus as the justice of God.” 
 
The corporal works include feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, 
clothing the naked, harboring the stranger, visiting the sick, ministering to 
prisoners, and burying the dead.  The spiritual works include admonishing 
the sinner, instructing the ignorant, counseling the doubtful, comforting the 
afflicted, bearing wrongs patiently, forgiving injuries, and praying for the 
living and the dead.148 
 
That these marks do not rest on any particular theory of justice is, for Bell, precisely 
what makes them conducive to the church’s embodiment of God’s justice.  Or, as 
Hauerwas remarks, 
 
Rather than a theory, God has called into the world a people capable of 
transgressing the borders of the nation-state to seek the welfare of the 
downtrodden … What we have is a people learning again to live in 
diaspora … through which it becomes a blessing to all people.149 
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The way in which Bell draws on ecclesial ethics to highlight the particularity of the 
church’s witness to the justice of God confirms the value of locating our quest to 
understand the meaning and practice God’s justice within this strand of theological 
discourse.  Its emphasis on the visibility of the church as an alternative community of 
practice and peacemaking provides a natural home for explorations of the church’s 
distinctive apprehension of the justice of God made present in Jesus Christ, as Bell’s 
work shows.  
 
Yet Bell’s contribution remains suggestive at best, and its brevity leaves many 
unanswered questions about how such a justice might be enacted.  Much more needs 
to be said in order to recover the concrete difference that the church’s witness to 
justice might make, especially in view of the wealth of justice related material in its 
Scriptures.   
 
In what follows, we will focus attention on one distinctive way in which justice could 
be developed in the life of the church, namely through the practices of restorative 
justice.  We will consider how restorative justice may function as an ecclesial 
outworking of the justice of God, in a way that coheres with the church’s calling to be 











We observed in the previous chapter why it is so essential for Christian ethics to 
recover a vision of the church as an alternative community witnessing to the life made 
possible in Christ.  By virtue of its participation in the story of how God has made 
known his kingdom of peace and justice through Jesus, the church has been given all 
that it needs to imagine an alternative to the practices of violence and retribution.  
However, while ecclesial ethics has had much to say on the subject of peacemaking, 
its contribution to explicating the church’s witness to justice-making remains 
relatively modest.  Our goal is to address this gap.   
 
One ecclesial tradition that has reflected deeply on justice is the Mennonite-
Anabaptist tradition, from which restorative justice first emerged in the early 1970s.  
There are a number of reasons why the advent of restorative justice in this tradition is 
worthy of theological reflection.  First, it emerged largely in response to the growing 
punitiveness of the North American criminal justice system, with its early advocates 
sharing a similar reading of the problematic features of justice that were discussed in 
the first chapter.   
 
Second, this response was informed by an ecclesial tradition renowned for its 
commitment to reconciliation and peacemaking, something ecclesial ethics has 
singled out as the primary witness of the church.  Restorative justice arose out the 
peacemaking convictions of the Mennonite tradition as an expression of “peace-
making justice.”1    
 
Third, in its early inception restorative justice was believed to offer a “contrast 
model” to the mainstream justice system precisely by being grounded in the particular 
                                                




convictions of the church.  Unlike the distinctly modern approach that begins with 
some universal theory of justice, restorative justice aspired to give expression to a 
distinctively Christian vision of reality, sustained by a community of discipleship.   
 
Fourth, the way in which the restorative justice vision has been attractive to public 
justice systems around the world and has become a core element in many of them 
attests to the social and political relevance of attending to the church’s creative 
witness.  At the same time, as the practice of restorative justice has been 
mainstreamed and reformulated in secular categories, several changes – not all of 
them positive – have occurred to its ecclesial formation.   
 
There is one further reason why theological attention should be given to restorative 
justice as an ecclesial expression of justice.  Although it was initially advocated as 
central to the church’s ministry of reconciliation, little has been done to extend this 
restorative vision through the life of the church.  While a handful of theological 
contributions have explored restorative justice in light of the biblical story, none have 
treated restorative justice expressly from an ecclesiological perspective.2  This is a 
serious omission, bearing in mind how important the early pioneers of restorative 
justice considered the church to be for the continued embodiment of the vision.3  Our 
aim here is to seek to extend the application of restorative justice to the life of the 
church by drawing on the insights of ecclesial ethics, thereby offering a new 
perspective for ecclesial ethics itself and for the practice of restorative justice.  
 
The contemporary field of restorative justice scholarship is incredibly diverse, and 
many of its leading theoreticians and practitioners do not share the theological 
convictions we will be exploring.  As Johnstone and Van Ness observe, restorative 
justice has become a “deeply contested concept,” no longer sharing a common 
language or unifying vision.4  Our first task then is to give a coherent account of the 
emergence and early formulation of restorative justice.  We will see that the practices 
                                                
2 We will cover some of these biblical perspectives in the following chapter, and seek to draw out their 
ecclesiological implications. 
3 As Zehr writes in the afterword of his seminal work, “I continue to have faith the community of 
God’s people can lead in this [restorative] direction. Certainly we will often fail, as those in the biblical 
record did. But just as certainly God will forgive and restore us,” Zehr, Changing Lenses, 228. 
4 Gerry and Daniel W. Van Ness Johnstone, “The Meaning of Restorative Justice,” in Handbook of 




of a living ecclesial tradition were far from incidental to its origins, even though most 
of the standard origin stories are much more reticent about probing into the 
theological and ecclesiological rationale that gave rise to this innovative practice.5 
 
Our discussion will be ordered as follows.  First, we will connect the emergence of 
restorative justice to some of the changes occurring in Mennonite theology and 
ecclesial witness at the time.  Second, we will examine the underlying and largely 
implicit ecclesial identity informing the restorative justice vision.  Third, we will track 
how, as restorative justice became more mainstream, it became progressively more 
distant from the grammar, practices, and convictions of the ecclesial community that 
gave it birth.  Together, these observations will enable us later in the thesis to explore 
how restorative justice might be pursued in ways that are clearly continuous with its 





On 28 May 1974, two intoxicated teenagers went on a vandalism spree in the small 
town of Elmira, Ontario, and were charged with 22 counts of willful damage.  The 
“Elmira Case,” as it came to be known, attracted significant attention due to its 
devastating impact on the close-knit community.  Several days before the two young 
men were due to appear in court, a small group of Mennonite Christians held a 
meeting.  Frustrated by the usual punishment paradigm, they were seeking to develop 
practices in the criminal justice system more in line with their Christian peacemaking 
tradition.  Among their number was Mark Yantzi, a probation officer working in 
partnership with Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) on exploring community-
orientated alternatives.  He asked, “Wouldn’t it be neat for these offenders to meet the 
victims?”6  Knowing the idea was futile, Yantzi dropped the suggestion, only to be 
challenged by another person present, Dave Worth, who was the coordinator of 
Voluntary Service workers for MCC in Kitchener.  Despite it having no legal 
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precedent, Yantzi and Worth agreed to look into whether such an alternative might be 
possible. 
 
When Yantzi prepared his pre-sentence report for the presiding judge, Gordon 
McConnell, he enclosed a letter outlining a proposal for the young offenders to meet 
and offer reparation to their victims.  Unsurprisingly, the judge dismissed their idea as 
impossible.  However, when he came to sentence the young men some time later, with 
a smile on his face he ordered a one-month remand to allow time for them to meet 
with their victims and assess their losses, as long as it was done “with the assistance 
of Dave Worth and Mark Yantzi.”  Everyone in the courtroom was either astonished 
or confused and, in in the case of Worth and Yantzi, unprepared.  With no idea of 
what they were doing, they accompanied the two young offenders to each of the 
victims’ homes.  Of the 22 victims, 20 could be contacted.   
 
As the young men went house-to-house, Worth and Yantzi stood back with notepads 
in hand.  After visiting two churches, a beer store and all the private homes they had 
vandalized, they tallied up the damage at $2189.04.  Over the next three months the 
young men personally handed cheques to each of the victims for their losses, minus 
what had been covered by insurance.7  The victims expressed a wide variety of 
responses, but in the minds of Worth and Yantzi the experiment had been a success.  
From this initiative sprung the beginnings of the Victim-Offender-Reconciliation-
Project (VORP), which is widely heralded as the beginning of the modern restorative 
justice movement. 
 
While the Elmira Case is frequently described as the “origin story” of the modern 
movement, it contains three theological features that often go unnoticed.  The first 
relates to why Yantzi and his fellow Mennonites were even located in their respective 
positions.  In keeping with their Anabaptist two-kingdoms theology, Mennonites had 
traditionally maintained a principled separation from political affairs and legal 
systems.8  The co-operative arrangement between MCC and the Probation Service in 
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Peachey, “The Kitchener Experiment,” in Mediation and Criminal Justice (London: SAGE 
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Kitchener marked a significant theological shift among Mennonites.  This shift 
heralded a more expansive understanding of Christ’s lordship, with the state as much 
as the church being under the reign of God’s justice.9  Mennonites influenced by this 
new theology developed a new attentiveness to issues of power and justice in society, 
and a different understanding of the relationship between the church and the world. 
 
Yantzi’s role in the Probation Service was the result of an MCC initiative in 1968 to 
pursue what it saw as a “Christian witness to the State.”  This involved creating 
“listening posts” close to sites of governmental power, like the court services.10  
Yantzi was strategically placed to be a witness to the alternative “politics of Jesus.”  
Early drafts of John H. Yoder’s The Politics of Jesus were appearing as a resource for 
a generation of Mennonites seeking a biblically informed model of radical political 
action.11   
 
The second feature relates to another theological shift among Mennonites.  Not long 
after Yantzi joined Probation, the Mennonite Church adopted the statement The Way 
of Peace, which included a subsection declaring, “The Way of Peace is the Way of 
Justice.”12  Rather than defining peace as “nonresistance,” which was the conventional 
Mennonite interpretation, this statement combined what Mennonites had traditionally 
held apart – peace and justice.  There was also a growing sensitivity to “structural 
sins,” with the statement calling on Christians to “identify with the oppressed and 
participate in ministries of love and service in their behalf.”13  
 
The Director for MCC Ontario, Ray Schlegel, argued that the calling of the church 
had to do with applying “Christian principles to the areas that affect society’s weak, 
                                                                                                                                       
of working as part of the criminal justice system it was clear, “In law enforcement the state does not 
and cannot operate on the nonresistant principles of Christ’s kingdom. Therefore, nonresistant 
Christians cannot undertake any service in the state or in society which would violate the principles of 
love and holiness as taught by Christ and His inspired apostles,” “Mennonite Confession of Faith,” 
Adopted by Mennonite General Conference (Scottdale, Penn.: Herald Press, 1963), Article 18 and 19. 
9 Dreidger and Kraybill argue that as a consequence of this shift the agencies of the state came to be 
viewed in a more theological light as agents of the principalities and powers that, while arraigned in 
opposition to Christ’s lordship, were potentially redeemable, Leo and Donald B. Kraybill Dreidger, 
Mennonite Peacemaking: From Quietism to Activism (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1994), 120-24.  
10 Ibid., 117-18. 
11 The first edition of The Politics of Jesus was published in 1972, John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972), 12. 
12 Dreidger, Mennonite Peacemaking, 150-51. 




broken and maladjusted.  In North America, that brokenness shows up in courtrooms 
and prisons.”14  Mennonites had a mandate, therefore, to bring the intellectual and 
practical resources of their peace church tradition to bear on criminal justice 
practice.15  For Yantzi, the idea of offenders meeting with their victims encapsulated 
the desire for a better justice to emerge, a justice pursued in the interests of peace.  As 
Bender’s record of this experiment explains, Yantzi thought such an idea would only 
work if it involved a hands-on approach from a church that held together the twin 
goals of peace and justice.16 
 
The third little acknowledged feature of the Elmira story relates to what in the 
previous chapter we called the telos of justice, which was here identified as 
reconciliation.  Unlike similar alternatives being developed within critical 
criminology, the Kitchener experiment developed out of an intuitive belief in the 
power of reconciliation, rather than from a “defined set of objectives.”17  As Yantzi 
and Worth explained: “We see ourselves as being continually involved in a process of 
refining our purpose and function.  The project was not begun with a definitive plan 
…  We are learning by our mistakes and successes …”18  As a result, the VORP 
project came to view reconciliation between victims and offenders as the primary 
goal.  Such a goal was not only unusual, it was also in conflict with the dominant 
retributive goals of the criminal justice system.19   
 
By making reconciliation the primary purpose of VORP, its advocates were 
interpreting crime in light of a more relational and unified conception of justice.  
Justice, in other words, was understood in relation to its proper theological purpose as 
the righting of distorted relationships.  McCold puts it succinctly: “In VORP, 
reconciliation – the healing of injuries and restoring of right relationship – is the 
                                                
14 Bender, ‘Reconciliation Begins in Canada,’ 2. 
15 The phrase “restorative justice” was not widely used of processes like the Kitchener experiment until 
the 1980s. As McCold rightly points out that in “the evolution of restorative justice, practice has 
preceded history,” Paul McCold, “The Recent History of Restorative Justice: Mediation, Circles, and 
Conferencing,” in Restorative Justice, Vol. 1: The Rise of Restorative Justice, 137. 
16 Bender, ‘Reconciliation Begins in Canada,’ 1-2. 
17 See, Peachey, “The Kitchener Experiment,” 17. As we will see below, Scandinavian initiatives in 
mediation were being experimented following the influence of Nils Christie. 
18 Mark and Dave Worth Yantzi, The Developmental Steps of the Victim/Offender Reconciliation 
Project (Kitchener, Ontario: on file with authors, 1977). 




purpose.  Direct mediation between victim and offender is the process wherever 
‘relationships have been broken’ by the criminal act.”20   
 
Such a goal was difficult for others to comprehend, and equally difficult to quantify.  
Peachey remarks on how, despite the emergence of nearly 20 VORP programmes by 
the early 1980s, there was still no formal evaluation of the programme because of the 
continual refrain, “How do you measure reconciliation?”21  This resistance to quantify 
the goal of reconciliation, together with its religious nature, meant the programme 
received a mixed reception from criminal justice professionals.  However, by resisting 
pressures to secularize and institutionalize it, this experiment in reconciliation yielded 
many fruitful insights into the many relational dimensions of justice.22 
 
As well as growing in conceptual depth, VORP also spawned several other initiatives 
supported by MCC.  For example, Mennonite Conciliation Service was started in 
1979 to deal with conflict resolution in the context of social disasters.  In 1980, MCC 
established the Community Mediation Service to deal with neighbourhood and 
interpersonal disputes that could effectively be dealt with outside of the usual legal 
process.  This move to operating outside of the criminal justice system precipitated a 
number of changes to the early VORP model, particularly with the discontinuation of 
the co-operative arrangement between MCC and the probation department.  When in 
1982 Mark Yantzi went on to initiate a programme under MCC for victims of crime, 
specifically for cases involving sexual offenders, VORP Kitchener established its own 
operating structure independent of support from MCC.23  The new organizational 
name – “Community Justice Initiatives” – reflected a conscious separation from 
operating under the auspices of criminal justice services, placing more emphasis on 
community-led justice initiatives.   
 
In his seminal work, Changing Lenses, Howard Zehr describes VORP Kitchener as a 
“demonstration plot.”  He borrowed this analogy from Clarence Jordan, who had 
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called his racially mixed farm in 1940’s segregated South Georgia a “demonstration 
plot for the kingdom of God.”24  What eventually developed into the Victim-
Offender-Reconciliation-Project was birthed as an experiment in enacting God’s 
peaceable kingdom in the midst of the criminal justice system.  
 
In 1976, Mark Yantzi went to the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary (AMBS) 
in Elkhart, Indiana to do further study.  There he met Earl Sears, a Mennonite pastor 
who quickly connected Yantzi with other like-minded Mennonites, like Steve Miller 
and Edgar Epp.  Through such collaborations, VORP Elkhart began in 1978, under 
the auspices of the Probation Department and staffed by many Mennonites.  At the 
same time, Zehr began reading Yoder’s Original Revolution while at Talladega 
College and felt called to move to Elkhart to be part of a more radical Anabaptist 
ecclesiology.  Within a short space of time, Zehr found himself working at both a 
halfway house sponsored by the Indiana-Michigan Mennonite Conference and as the 
Director for Offender Ministries responsible for the newly established VORP 
project.25   
 
The appointment of Zehr reflected wider shifts underway in the Mennonite Church.  
Zehr was specifically charged with engaging the criminal justice system in a more 
theologically informed way; the abolitionist position was no longer central.26  Zehr 
began his involvement with VORP as a self-professed pessimist, believing that most 
systems-based alternatives to incarceration eventually get co-opted and end up as a 
new system of punishment.27  However, once he saw the tangible transformation that 
could occur when victims and offenders met face-to-face, he was convinced that 
VORP not only stood for a radically new way of dealing with offenders, it also 
pointed to a fundamentally different understanding of justice itself.   
 
                                                
24 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 173.  
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Jackson Beck, “The Elkhart County Victim Offender Reconciliation Program: A Story of Witness, 
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Zehr has earned the title of “grandfather of restorative justice” due to his visionary 
leadership and innovative thinking.  Soon after taking on the director’s role, Zehr led 
the project through an extensive period of evaluation, helping to place the intuitive 
insights of practitioners within a clearer theoretical and theological framework.  An 
internal evaluation highlighted two goals for VORP, both of which matched the three 
features discussed in relation to the Kitchener experiment, as well as the mission 
mandate of the Mennonite Church.  The first goal was to pursue shalom through the 
work of reconciliation.  The second was to provide a prophetic witness to the 




In the first edition of Mediating the Victim-Offender Conflict (1980), Zehr argues that 
the rationale behind VORP arises out of the realization that the criminal justice 
process usually fails to address the real needs of victims, offenders, and the 
community.  It also emerges from the belief that a biblical response to crime points 
away from retribution and punishment.  The key to understanding this biblical 
response is the Old Testament concept of shalom, which Zehr defines as “peace 
combined with justice, harmony, and right relationships.”28  Hebrew justice had an 
“emphasis on making things right, upon doing justice by preserving or restoring right 
relationships within the community.”29  The essence of crime is that it upsets shalom; 
it is the wounding of right relationship.  Moreover, the Hebrew word for restitution 
(shillem) derives from the same root as shalom, indicating that restitution also has the 
concrete meaning of “making peace, ‘giving back’ in order to restore health to 
persons and relationships.”30  Justice, in the context of crime, therefore means 
bringing victims and offenders together with the aim of reconciliation.   
 
Zehr was heavily influenced by the theological ferment in the Mennonite world 
around the connection between peace, nonviolence, and justice.  He drew directly on 
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Perry Yoder’s Shalom: The Bible’s Word for Salvation, Justice, and Peace,31 Ron 
Kraybill’s Repairing the Breach: Ministering in Community Conflict,32 Millard Lind’s 
Yahweh is a Warrior: The Theology of Warfare in Ancient Israel,33 and the extensive 
work of his friend, John H. Yoder.34  Perry Yoder argued that the English word 
“peace” had become narrowly associated with personal opposition to war, which for 
Mennonites had meant a withdrawal from social responsibility.  This needed to be 
distinguished from the biblical concept of shalom, which possesses a far broader and 
more positive association with the existence of right relationships.35  According to 
Yoder, the presence of shalom within the community is possible only if justice is 
properly upheld, both judicially and socially.  In the bible, it is particularly the duty of 
kings to uphold this sense of justice.  This led Yoder to reach the disturbing 
conclusion that in the Old Testament the “state was seen as an instrument of 
shalom!”36   
 
What emerged from this ferment was the development of a biblical theology of 
shalom, in which the pursuit of justice as shalom was integral to the church’s peace 
witness.  The joint statement agreed to by both major Mennonite denominations in 
1983, “Justice and the Christian Witness,” called for an enlarged “understanding of 
peace with the dimension of biblical justice.”37  Dreiger and Kraybill sought to show 
how the shalom concept of peacemaking was not only a significant linguistic tool for 
uniting Mennonites, it also reflected a major paradigm shift in Mennonite 
consciousness, towards an activist nonviolent witness that took justice seriously.38 
 
Biblical peacemaking, therefore, required Mennonites to turn away from their 
sectarian tendency to withdrawal and begin working as “shalom agents” by promoting 
a justice in the world focused on restoring relationships.  
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For many Mennonites, the relevance of VORP lay in its ability to provide an 
alternative to the “tough-on-crime” policies that were producing an exponential rise in 
incarceration within the United States.  In searching for viable alternatives, Zehr 
invited two figures to a “palaver” that subsequently formed the original material for 
the Occasional Paper Series intended to extend the Mennonite Church’s imagination 
in the sphere of criminal justice.39   
 
The first was Herman Bianchi, a criminologist at the Free University of Amsterdam, 
who delivered a paper to Victim Offender Ministries in 1982 entitled, “A Biblical 
Vision of Justice.”40  Bianchi highlighted the many inadequacies of biblical 
translation when it came to words like “peace,” “justice,” “law,” and “repentance.”  In 
addition to a discussion of shalom, Bianchi argued that biblical law ought to be 
interpreted, not as a list of negative injunctions enforced by the threat of punishment, 
but rather as “wise indications” for those who follow God.  Drawing on Martin 
Buber’s translation of Hebrew Scripture, Bianchi pointed out that biblical law served 
to describe how people ought to live in light of the God’s promises.  Justifying 
modern criminal law based on the Hebrew concept of torah amounts to a historical 
and categorical fallacy, Bianchi argued.  Criminal law was an invention of the 
fourteenth century, and should not be read back into the bible.  Likewise, Bianchi 
observed that the concept of t’sedeka, often rendered as righteousness or justice, is not 
something that is done by applying the rules of law, but is rather a lived commitment 
to the way of truth.  Justice is measured primarily by the fruit it produces – 
truthfulness – rather than by the Roman measure of following due process.41  
 
Zehr would later write that due to this emphasis on procedure over outcome, 
transfixed in the image of a blindfolded goddess balancing the scales of justice by 
applying the impartial rule of law, the criminal justice system actually perpetuates 
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inequality and injustice by ignoring the important social and political outcomes of 
such a system.42  An “impartial” justice system aimed at preserving order ends up 
serving the current order of things, the status quo, however unjust it may be.43  On the 
other hand, the justice of t’sedeka looks to the future, and is not content until justice 
causes all those it affects to flourish.  As an attribute of God, the justice of t’sedeka is 
partial towards addressing those in need, as it seeks their shalom.  Bianchi’s 
recommendation to Mennonites was that they call the criminal justice system to 
t’shuvah, to repentance – literally, to “stop” its destructive ways.44 
 
The second figure Zehr sought out was the Norwegian academic, Nils Christie, who 
was invited to Conrad Grebel College in Canada the year after Bianchi’s visit.  
Christie provided much needed scrutiny of the language used for describing what 
usually transpires in criminal justice.  Basic to Christie’s argument is that the concept 
of crime is an abstraction, which oversimplifies complex situational realities, at the 
same time as creating the need for highly specialized experts to take care of localized 
conflicts.  Christie rejects the basic neo-classicist premise of grading criminal acts 
according to the evil perpetrated in order that a like evil can be meted out to the 
criminal.  Defining something as a crime so that it can be treated as a commodity, 
which is then regulated through the infliction of pain, amounts to a moral absurdity.45   
 
The idea that punishment is essentially the infliction of intentional pain was 
particularly influential on Zehr’s thinking.  Penal law, writes Zehr, should thus be 
more accurately described as “‘pain law’ … an elaborate mechanism for 
administering ‘just’ doses of pain.”46  Zehr was pushing for society to question the 
assumption informing the criminal justice system that pain is the antidote to our 
human conflicts. 
   
Christie proposed that instead of using the abstract category of crime, such events 
should be defined as conflicts.  These conflicts, moreover, should be seen as the 
property of the parties between whom the conflict originated.  Christie’s aim in 
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defining conflicts as property was to reinvigorate the participation of victims, 
neighbourhoods, and offenders, as agents in their own right.  When this happens, a 
multitude of benefits await: victims are empowered, offenders are given the 
opportunity to regain responsibility for their actions, neighbourhoods once again 
become sites of political engagement, and society at large has the opportunity to 
clarify what it considers to be relevant and of value.47  In addition, Christie postulates 
that the stereotypes necessary to sustain the abstract category of crime – i.e., a passive 
victim unable to represent himself or herself and a pitiless criminal resembling a non-
human being – will begin to break down in the context of a personal encounter.48   
 
While Zehr retained the category of crime, he construed crime as essentially a conflict 
between persons.49  Zehr could see that Christian peacemakers offered a more 
grounded response than Christie’s rather abstract and theoretical ideas.  Indeed, 
Christie admitted that a major challenge to his idea of a neighbourhood court was the 
lack of what he called “healers” – restorative mediators – in society, as well as the 
dearth of thick communities that could enact such repair.50  Zehr, however, saw the 
church as capable of embodying this approach to resolving conflict. 
 
Through the influence of criminologists like Bianchi and Christie, and drawing on his 
own doctoral work, Zehr began to trace the root problem of the punitive justice 
system to its underlying concepts of crime and justice.  In 1985 he published the 
article, “Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice,” in which he advanced the thesis that 
the current retributive paradigm of justice ought to give way to a restorative 
paradigm.51  He argued that when a conflict is defined as a crime, as opposed to a civil 
dispute, a different set of assumptions takes over that shapes our perception of what 
has transpired and what the appropriate response should be.  Under the retributive 
paradigm, when something is criminalized, the action becomes defined as an offence 
against the state instead of the victim.  It is resolved through punishment instead of 
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restitution, responsibility for the crime is defined as guilt instead of as obligation, and 
the process for dealing with it is imposed rather than negotiated.  In short, the 
“retributive paradigm of justice is one particular way of organizing reality.”52  But it is 
in perpetual need of reform due to its many inner dysfunctions, and as a way of 
organizing reality, it has ceased to be viable.53  
 
Zehr claimed that prior to the retributive paradigm assuming dominance in the West, 
there existed a community-based system of justice centered on negotiation and 
reparation.  This system gradually eroded due to the rise of centralized political 
authorities asserting their power by claiming a legal monopoly over local conflicts.54  
The sovereign supplanted the place of victims, with criminal penalties being 
prescribed by and owed to the state.  Interestingly, Zehr did not advance a modified 
form of community justice as an antidote to the contemporary problem.  Instead, he 
advocated for an entirely new paradigm, informed explicitly by the biblical 
understanding of “covenant justice.”55  Zehr’s interest was in formulating a way for 
the church to embody an alternative understanding of justice shaped by its own 
particular convictions, which he understood as restorative justice. 
 
Focusing almost exclusively on the Old Testament, Zehr argued that the central theme 
in Scripture is a “theology of restoration.”  God’s vision for humankind is 
encapsulated in the idea of shalom.  Covenant justice is primarily about shalom, 
“making things right, finding a settlement … restoration to right relationships.”56  
While Israel drew on sources of law and justice from surrounding nations, such as the 
Hammurabi code, these came to be transformed under the covenantal concept.57  God, 
not the king, was seen to be the source of all authority, including law and justice, 
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which were focused on his relationship to Israel as the covenant partner.  Covenant 
justice was concerned to preserve or restore relationships, and even punishment was 
oriented to this restorative goal.58   
 
As an aside, the term “restorative justice” first appeared in the context of criminal 
justice with Albert Eglash’s work on creative restitution during 1958 and 1959.  Ann 
Skelton traces Eglash’s use of the term to a 1955 book titled The Biblical Doctrine of 
Justice and Law, which describes this “restorative dimension” as fully disclosed to the 
church of Jesus Christ:  
 
Restorative justice alone can do what law as such can never do: it can heal 
the fundamental wound from which all mankind suffers and which turns 
the best human justice constantly into injustice, the wound of sin … 
Restorative justice, as it is revealed in the Bible, alone has positive power 
for overcoming sin.59   
 
Upon Zehr’s use of the term, Eglash once left him a message to say that he did not 




Through Zehr’s efforts, the emerging new paradigm of justice became consolidated 
around a theology of restoration.  In the VORP Organizers Handbook, Zehr makes it 
clear that, “our program arises directly from a Christian understanding of crime and 
the role of reconciliation; it draws directly on Biblical models and principles.”61  For 
this reason, new VORP programmes predominantly emerged among church 
congregations, and, revealingly, when non-faith based community groups adopted 
VORP, they would often leave out words like “reconciliation.”  Yet according to 
Zehr, the concept of reconciliation “has a number of important implications for 
program design and operation: the style of mediation, the way we follow up on cases, 
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even how we define a case, are all shaped by that goal.”62  At the time Zehr clearly 
felt that church-based reconciliation was somehow distinct from more secular 
community-based mediation models, although the difference was potentially difficult 
for everyone to grasp.   
 
The growing popularity of victim offender dialogues did, however, lead to the 
restorative concept being adopted in a more secularized form by other organizations.  
Paul McCold argues that the “faith-based concepts underlying VORP were 
secularized by developing training techniques that encompassed both community 
mediation and VORP and in recognition of VORP’s dependence on secular justice for 
cases.”63  McCold is alluding here to the gradual demise of reconciliation as the core 
goal of restorative justice, which was largely a result of the victim movement having 
an increased role in the restorative justice movement.  Multiple “humanistic” goals, 
such as victim satisfaction, offender accountability, and reparation of losses, replaced 
the single goal of reconciliation. 
 
By the mid-1980s the baton of restorative justice passed from VORP to a more 
humanistic model of mediation, housed under what was called Victim Offender 
Mediation (VOM).  It was this VOM model that was endorsed by the American Bar 
Association in 1994, propelling restorative justice into the mainstream.  According to 
Umbreit and Armour, “VOM was similar to VORP but used language to describe the 
restorative justice process that was secular and closer to conflict resolution or civil 
dispute resolution rather than faith-based, for example, shalom, atonement, and 
forgiveness.”64   
 
Another feature that distinguished VOM from the earlier VORP models was the 
greater emphasis it placed on the role of the neutral facilitator, as opposed to the faith 
communities.  Coming from a “humanistic social work” perspective, VOM, according 
to McCold, will “expect the facilitator to provide active counseling and place great 
emphasis on the interpersonal skills and training of the facilitator … creating an 
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‘expert model’ approach.”65  By contrast, VORP actively promoted the role of church 
volunteers, because the “volunteer role gives the community a renewed participation 
in the criminal justice system.  VORP is intended as an attempt not only to empower 
the offender and the victim, but the entire community as well.”66  
 
While these developments were to some extent welcomed by Mennonites, because 
they represented a mainstreaming of Christian peacemaking values within the 
criminal justice system, they also came with the new challenge of relating the church 
to the VORP initiative.  Ron Classen, who started the VORP programme in Fresno, 
California, wrote to Zehr to ask: “Is the faith element and church involvement 
essential to the integrity of VORP?”67  This issue was at the forefront of many minds 
during the first annual VORP gathering in 1984.  Due to Zehr’s busy schedule, the 
organizing of the conference fell to the Prisoners and Communities Together Institute 
of Justice, a key partner with VORP since the early eighties.  Despite 11 of the 17 
VORP programmes being Mennonite sponsored, the formal organizers of the 
conference failed to provide any space for reflection on church-related or faith-related 
concerns.   
 
These matters were raised instead at a pre-conference gathering where Zehr 
articulated his distinction between the retributive and restorative paradigms and led a 
conversation on viewing VORP from an Anabaptist perspective.  Also included was a 
meditation by Perry Yoder.68  It is significant to note that Zehr’s widely referenced 
distinction between retributive and restorative justice was first delivered to a small 
gathering of those who were exploring VORP from an Anabaptist position.69  
Disillusionment was nevertheless beginning to grow among some members of the 
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Mennonite constituency, as they were forced to rethink their relationship to the VORP 
model, which by this time had begun to spread around the world.70 
 
Mark Chupp, who had taken over Zehr’s role as Director for Elkhart VORP, 
acknowledged the growing difficulty facing Christian involvement in VORP.  He 
argued the tension was more a result of resisting the pressure of co-option by the 
criminal justice system.  Mennonites who wanted VORP to retain a strong Christian 
identity did so because they thought this was the only way to protect one of the 
primary goals of VORP, which was to model a prophetic and humane alternative to 
the adversarial system.71  This concern about co-option, notes Chupp, is not unique to 
the Christian community; it is faced by any initiative seeking a more community-
based alternative to state centered models of justice.  Chupp issued a challenge to 
Mennonites to cease characterizing the tension as a Christian/non-Christian tension, 
and “affirm that which is of God regardless of its origin and focus less attention on 
ownership and control of VORP.”72   
 
While Chupp was right to suggest that Christians ought not to focus on ownership and 
control, he minimizes the distinctiveness of the faith dimension.  Perhaps for 
pragmatic and conciliatory reasons, his position risks reducing the church to a mere 
community organization that, for pragmatic reasons, is opposed to state intervention.  
Such a perspective, however, fails to account for the recognizably Christian narrative 
informing the work of VORP.  For example, the interest in VORP from non-Christian 
groups was due in no small part to the growing influence of the victims’ rights 
movement.  Yet when Zehr asserted that VORP was a victim driven process, he did so 
not for ideological or political reasons, but because he believed God stands in 
solidarity with victims, in virtue of the Incarnation.  Zehr’s reasoning is not informed 
by any community in general but rather by a very particular community constituted by 
the claim that God has disclosed himself in Jesus. 
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In 1984 Zehr wrote a brief pamphlet titled Who is my Neighbor?, a resource for 
churches to support those who have been victims of crime.  He points out that 
Scripture is no less emphatic about the responsibility of “God’s people to care for and 
identify with the oppressed, the powerless, the wounded – those without support and 
without a voice” than it is in directing us to minister to those who have wronged us. 73  
The church of the New Testament has a special duty not only to support victims in 
their struggle, but also to understand the very nature of victimization.  Central to the 
New Testament proclamation is that “God became a victim with us through Christ.”74  
Christians must continually hold out the truth that God not only became victorious 
over all evil, but that God did this by suffering as a victim, and will thereby never 
abandon victims in their time of greatest need.75  
 
In a tone distinctly different from the usual victims rights message, Zehr speaks 
openly about the need for victims to experience forgiveness, both of themselves and 
of their offenders.  On the one hand, victims need to be absolved of feelings of blame, 
whether self-inflicted or based in the belief that God caused their ordeal for some 
unknown reason.76  On the other hand, while victims have a need to express strong 
emotions, including anger, fear, and even revenge, this should not lead them to pursue 
a course of suffering for their offenders, as this is not “consistent with God’s love.”77  
Forgiveness will likely be difficult and it may take some time for it to be fully 
expressed, which is why “real forgiveness is possible only through the work of the 
Spirit.”78   
 
This example makes it clear that while Zehr is not at all opposed to groups practicing 
community mediation for reasons other than the Christian faith, VORP had been 
clearly established on the Christian narrative.  In 1989 Zehr and Classen published 
VORP Organizing: A Foundation in the Church, partly as a means of addressing the 
faith-and-VORP question.  This publication reiterates that while VORP can be 
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appropriately transplanted across a variety of organizations, the church has a special 
responsibility to implement VORP as an expression of its “mission of reconciliation 
and its mandate to seek justice.”79  For Zehr, “VORP not only provides an opportunity 
for the church to be involved in justice-making outside itself, but also offers a 
concrete model for addressing conflict within.”80  Just as the restorative vision of 
justice is essential to the church’s witness, so is the church essential to the integrity of 
programmes like VORP, which express an alternative to the world’s violence.   
 
Given that the central concepts of reconciliation and restoration are not generally 
valued by the legal system, Zehr argues that the restorative vision is especially prone 
to the pressures of “diversion and subversion.”81  If it is to survive within the 
precarious environment of the criminal justice system, it will require “an independent 
value base and an independent institutional base” from that system, and such a base 
will need to be genuinely “committed to the values and vision underlying VORP.”82  
For Zehr and Classen, “VORP’s best hope is a base in the church.”83  The church is 
not just any community organization; it is the only community that can lay claim to 
being the bearer of God’s reconciliation in Jesus Christ, which means it is obligated to 
a mission higher than its own financial or operational survival.84  Restoration is part of 
this community’s raison d’etre.85  
3. Uncovering	the	Ecclesial	Footprint	
 
So far we have charted the developing rationale and practice of the restorative justice 
movement as it emerged in the Mennonite peace church tradition.  As Tom Yoder 
Neufeld puts it,  
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The paradigm of Restorative Justice took shape within a womb of 
biblically informed piety and ethics.  It emerged in the attempt to answer a 
biblically informed and urged set of questions: how can persons committed 
to peace, reconciliation, and restoration, inject that set of convictions and 
reflexes into the public arena of responses to crime?86   
 
More specifically, restorative justice emerged as a vision for how the church could 
respond to the present criminal justice system, in light of the witness of Scripture and 
its own peacemaking practices.   
 
It would be easy to overlook the importance of the church for what transpired in the 
VORP initiative, focusing instead on the individual actors involved and treating their 
ideas and practices as disembodied from ecclesial and ethical traditions.  Such a 
reading, however, would be unfaithful to the history of restorative justice as it 
originated in Christian praxis.  The two central goals that animated the work of VORP 
– the pursuit of shalom through the work of reconciliation and the providing of an 
alternative prophetic witness to the punitive criminal justice system – were in large 
part the result of changes in ecclesial practice and identity among North American 
Mennonites.  In this sense, restorative justice depended on the existence of a concrete 
ecclesial witness seeking to practice an understanding of justice in continuity with its 
own tradition and convictions. 
 
In the afterword of Changing Lenses, Zehr admits his proposal of a restorative vision 
of justice might well be considered utopian by wider society.  Writing in 1990, he did 
not expect restorative justice to amount to anything other than a modest alternative 
operating at the margins of the criminal justice system.  North American penal policy 
was fast approaching the nadir of an era of “populist punitiveness.”87  Zehr thought it 
more likely that change would occur through the development of interim strategies 
and approaches that would seek to embed the “key elements” of the restorative vision 
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in the hope of sensitizing the criminal justice system of its more punitive tendencies.88  
For this to happen,  
 
the Church is essential to restorative justice.  This is very much the 
Church’s business.  Christians are called to be ministers of reconciliation, 
to help create shalom.  Victim-offender reconciliation is one of the best 
opportunities available for the Church to carry out this essential mission in 
our world today.89   
 
 
In the last few pages of Changing Lenses Zehr makes a brief reference to the work of 
John H. Yoder who proposed that Jesus’ social strategy had been “to create a new 
society (the church) with new operating principles and assumptions which would 
operate in the midst of – and serve as an example and challenge to – the old.”90  This 
new society would exemplify, in its life together and in the giving of its life to the 
world, a way of dealing with harm and conflict that transcends retributive logic by 
enacting the healing and restorative justice made possible by Christ.  Due to the 
pervasiveness of the old aeon of retribution, Zehr says this alternative society needs to 
develop an entirely new “grammar” and a new “physics,” reflecting the creation a 
new politics of peace.  These comments are full of promise, but constitute only two 
brief paragraphs at the very end of the book.  However, the importance of Yoder’s 
work on Zehr’s thinking should not be underestimated.  When it comes to Zehr’s 





Yoder’s influence on Zehr was extensive.  Yoder was instrumental in Zehr’s move 
back to Elkhart in the hope of reconnecting with his radical Anabaptist roots and 
living in a community formed by the vision articulated in Yoder’s work.91  Especially 
formative on Zehr was one of Yoder’s earlier books, The Original Revolution, which 
seeks to connect the shifting social landscape of Mennonites after the Second World 
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War with Jesus’ vision of social revolution in the Gospels.  The major need of our day 
to which the gospel must speak, Yoder argues, is the condition of “unrighteousness, 
injustice.”92  The heart of Jesus’ message was “the judgment of God upon the present 
order and the imminent promise of another one.”93  However, Jesus’s strategy for 
social change differed radically from conventional approaches. 
 
On the one hand, Jesus rejected the way of the Herodians, who thought that change 
could only come through collaboration and compromise with the Establishment.  This 
was hardly an option for Jesus, since it was the Establishment that sought to kill him, 
first as a baby and then as a messianic pretender.  At the other extreme, Jesus also 
rejected the option of the Zealots, who demanded an “immediate social remodeling” 
through violent revolution, but offered little in the way of concrete alternatives to the 
prevailing system.94  Infused with the belief in its own righteous cause, this strategy 
impatiently attempts to achieve a social outcome without the remaking of a different 
kind of people.  This was the option most readily available to Jesus, but he decisively 
rejected it because it did not offer enough of an alternative, a social order that is not 
reliant on violence to achieve its aims.  
 
Tellingly, the VORP model Zehr promoted avoided both of these options.  In an 
article about the “values and visions in the reform process,” Zehr warned against the 
temptations of “co-option and diversion” as alternative visions become 
accommodated to the rationality of the hierarchal and punitive paradigm.95  If that 
happened to restorative justice it would then serve to maintain rather than change that 
which is known to be broken.  He cites as an example the Quaker innovation of the 
penitentiary in which, through reflection and solitude, offenders could become 
penitent.  Despite its good intentions, the penitentiary soon became a tool for 
institutional and psychological oppression that attempted to make inmates more docile 
than contemplative.96    
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According to Yoder, two other options were available to Jesus, which more closely 
resemble approaches taken by the contemporary church in relation to social issues.  
One was the “outward emigration” of the Essenes, who withdrew from urban life in 
order to preserve the purity or faithfulness of a select few.  The other option was the 
“inward emigration” of the Pharisees, who stressed the rigid observance of ritual law 
over socio-political involvement.  Jesus rejected both these options, seriously 
challenging the common “position of noninvolvement.”97   
 
The Mennonite world has traditionally favoured these latter two options.  The Old 
Order Mennonites, who predominantly live in rural farming communities, had little 
concern for the punitive direction being taken by criminal justice policy.  Their 
primary concern was to preserve their own separate way of life.  Urban Mennonites, 
on the other hand, tended to exhibit the same dualism between private faith and public 
life inherent in mainstream American evangelicalism, a dualism that left criminal 
justice policy unchallenged. 
 
The revolution brought about by Jesus, Yoder argued, differed significantly from all 
available options – “the creation of a distinct community with its own deviant set of 
values and its coherent way of incarnating them.”98  In other words, Jesus called into 
existence a new society, a new expression of humanity, one which derives its 
existence, not from the old aeon, where rulers and subversives struggle violently over 
who will control the path of history, but rather from the new aeon, where God’s future 
kingdom is breaking into the present.  
 
Jesus did not bring to faithful Israel any corrected ritual or any new 
theories about the being of God.  He brought them a new peoplehood and a 
new way of living together.  The very existence of such a group is itself a 
deep social change.  Its very presence was such a threat that He had to be 
crucified.  But such a group is not only by its existence a novelty on the 
social scene; if it lives faithfully, it is also the most powerful tool of social 
change.99 
 
This is the vision that animated the early expression of VORP, and the many other 
Christian experiments in restorative justice.  Restorative justice was viewed as the 
                                                
97 Yoder, Original Revolution, 27. 
98 Ibid., 28. 




realization of a new way of relating to one another, a new way of being in the world, 
which arises from a vision of what human community ought to look like in light of the 
“original revolution.”  The hope for social change manifest in the restorative vision of 
justice rests, to a significant degree, on faith that the Spirit of God is continuing to 
bring into being a human community patterned on Jesus as the justice of God. 
4. Mainstreaming	Restorative	Justice	
 
The release of Changing Lenses in 1990 marked in some sense the beginnings of an 
international restorative justice social movement, and with it the rise of new 
conceptual challenges.100  In the ensuing decade, numerous other developments on the 
edges of the criminal justice system began to coalesce into a concerted move away 
from reliance on a state-centered, punitive retributive system and towards a more 
community-centered, informal, and relational approach to justice.101  While not all 
were rallying under the banner of restorative justice, Zehr’s articulation of a new 
paradigm, or a new “lens” for viewing crime and justice, resonated deeply with a 
broad constituency of criminologists, legal professionals, academics, and community 
agencies seeking reform. 
 
Alongside the growing critiques of the punitive criminal justice system there also 
arose a number of experiments that resembled a restorative approach.102  We have 
already mentioned the community mediation model developed by VOM.  A similar 
initiative was being experimented with in Scandinavian countries influenced by the 
criminological theories of Christie and Hulsman.103  In Australia, John Braithwaite, 
published Crime, Shame and Reintegration in 1989, which many criminologists 
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herald as the key conceptual framework for understanding restorative justice.104  
Braithwaite, however, only made the connection between his idea of “reintegrative 
shaming” and restorative justice, after later discovering the family group conferencing 
experiment run by police in Wagga Wagga, New South Wales.  The “Wagga Wagga” 
initiative was mirrored off the New Zealand conferencing model instituted by the 
1989 Child, Young Persons and their Families Act.  This is widely regarded as the 
most comprehensive reform of a juvenile justice system in a restorative direction ever 
undertaken.  Family Group Conferencing was proposed partly as a way of addressing 
the concerns of Maori, who hold to a more collectivist understanding of personal 
identity.  Indigenous people were also responsible for the first use of “circle 
processes” in criminal justice – developed in the Yukon Territory of Canada, and 
subsequently by the Hollow Water Community in North America.105  
 
It should be noted that much of this international spread of restorative justice was as a 
result of its reception by well-placed Christians.  One significant example of this is 
Aotearoa/New Zealand.  Following the advent of Family Group Conferences in 1989, 
Youth Court Judge Fred McElrea, an Anglican layman, encountered Zehr’s book 
during a period of study leave in England.  He saw the connection between Zehr’s 
restorative philosophy and independent developments in youth justice in New 
Zealand.  Meanwhile, the New Zealand Christian journal Stimulus had published a 
review of Zehr’s book, which led to Zehr being invited in 1994 to speak at a “Making 
Crime Pay” conference that involved considerable theological reflection on restorative 
justice.106  McElrea frequently referred to Zehr as “a modern prophet of justice,” who 
was bringing about a “revolution” in how justice is understood.107  Many of the 
leading figures in New Zealand advocating for reform in a restorative direction were 
people of faith, including prominent figures in the judiciary, politics, academia, the 
church, prison chaplaincy, and the theological fraternity.108 
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In May 1994, Judge McElrea made a request of Rev. Douglas Mansill, of Saint Giles 
Presbyterian Church in Auckland, to facilitate the first adult restorative justice 
conference in New Zealand.  The trial was a success in Mansill’s opinion, and in order 
to continue its success he went on to enlist other church ministers who would actively 
work for the “reconciliation, restitution and restoration of normal community 
relationships after these have been broken down through offending.”109   
 
McElrea also judged the church’s involvement in restorative justice to be an important 
aspect of this work.  Speaking at a conference, he proposed that the involvement of 
local churches in restorative justice processes provided a “gospel based ministry,” 
which  
 
put creative outcomes in the place of punitive ones, consensus in the place 
of imposed outcomes, inclusiveness and community in the place of 
professional capture, mutual obligations in the place of the clash of rights, 
and cultural sensitivity in the place of mono-cultural rigidity.110   
 
In New Zealand, then, as elsewhere in the world, restorative justice was actively 
promoted by those who saw in it the outworking of Christian notions of repentance, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation. 
 
Van Ness and Strong observe that by the end of the 1980’s and throughout much of 
the 1990’s, restorative justice moved from being a “community-based alternative” to 
the criminal justice system, to being not only a “source of public policy” but also a 
“viable part of the criminal justice system.”111  Accordingly, as Hoyle comments, “It 
is certainly the case that over the last two decades there has been more written about 
restorative justice than almost any other criminological topic.” 112  At the same time, 
she claims that much of this work has been “evangelical, rather than academic and 
critical.  Quantity rather than quality has prevailed.”  To remedy this problem, several 
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criminologists have sought to provide conceptual categories for explaining the genius 
behind restorative justice, with John Braithwaite being the leading voice in the 
field.113  In addition, restorative justice has been scrutinized by theoreticians operating 
within the frameworks of postmodern theory,114 political theory,115 and postcolonial 
theory,116 among others. 
 
As it has moved into the twenty-first century, restorative justice has become a “deeply 
contested” concept, involving considerably different conceptions of what constitutes 
its essence.117  Walgrave warns of the danger of restorative justice becoming vacuous 
as it fast becomes “a label for many different practices, beliefs, values and even states 
of mind.”118  It is now commonplace for the first section of any textbook on 
restorative justice to grapple with matters of definition, as well as with who and what 
should be included in the restorative justice tent.119  Gerry Johnstone observes that at 
its beginning as a social movement, numerous “internal tensions” stemming from 
fundamental differences of opinion and worldview, were submerged.  However, as 
restorative justice moves from the margins to the mainstream, these internal tensions 
are fast becoming threats to the coherence and unity of the movement.120 
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Having established the theological and ecclesial wellsprings that helped to feed the 
emerging conceptuality of restorative justice, it is now time to consider how the 
church and its language have fared as restorative justice has become increasingly 
mainstream.  As it has been accommodated to secular modes of thought and practice, 
to what extent has restorative justice grown distant from the practice and reasoning of 
the church? 
 
The first thing to emphasize is that the mainstreaming of restorative justice, despite all 
its associated pitfalls, represents precisely what the church is called to do.  It is called, 
as Yoder puts it, “to contribute to the creation of structures more worthy of human 
society.”121  That other constituencies in society have taken up this “peacemaking” 
approach to justice is a reason for the church to rejoice, even if the reasoning that 
informed this understanding of justice is not shared.122  Even though the church has 
distinctly theological reasons for promoting restorative conceptions of justice in the 
public sphere, that does not preclude it from continuing to support restorative justice 
initiatives where that theological reasoning is not present.  This does however present 
new challenges for the church. 
 
One such challenge is the degree to which distinctively Christian approaches will be 
welcome in the secular public arena.  In the previous chapter we saw how modern 
ethical theory tends to elide the role of local tradition and communities of practice in 
favour of allegedly universal precepts.  As the restorative justice movement has been 
mainstreamed, it has begun to show this same tendency of displacing particular 
traditions in place of universal theories.   
 
This may be seen, for example, in the four-volume compilation of essays on 
restorative justice – by far the largest collection to date – edited by Carolyn Hoyle.  In 
her introduction, Hoyle explains that the aim of the first volume is to acquaint “the 
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reader to the early development of restorative thinking and the justifications for this 
new approach, as well as some of the arguments against restorative aims and 
processes.”123  One would expect, therefore, some mention of the early pioneering 
work of Mennonites and of their peace-making approach to crime.  Yet, with one 
exception, this is largely omitted from the discussion.124  Instead, the origins of 
restorative justice are made to appear as arising predominantly from criminological 
academics well accustomed to secular modes of reasoning.  Similar omissions are 
found in other discussions of the early theoretical development of restorative 
justice.125  A related tendency is to place the insights of indigenous and religious 
traditions under the nebulous category of “spirituality,” which makes it possible to 
avoid attending to the theological reasoning within such traditions.126  
 
One disappointing consequence of the recent penchant for a systematic theory of 
restorative justice is that some of those writing in Christian ethics no longer see its 
inherent connection to real relationships in actual communities.  For example, 
Anthony Bash, drawing on the work of restorative justice scholar Gavrielides, 
mistakenly concludes,  
 
… there is an important difference between the conceptual underpinning of 
theories of restorative justice and what the New Testament says about 
justice and restoration: on the whole, secular theories relating to restorative 
justice confine themselves to being “theor[ies] of Justice Systems and not 
… theor[ies] of life” and do “not imply that we need to take steps towards 
a transformation of our relationships or lives.”127  
  
Bash is right to point out that the biblical understanding of justice calls for 
“transformed relationships and lives, and also for transformed communities,” and that 
the “kingdom of God is about more than transformed systems of criminal justice.”128  
But his characterisation of restorative justice as being uninterested in such things 
shows how easily secular restorative justice theory can be misread.  This shows how 
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far recent portrayals of restorative justice have moved away from living traditions and 
communities, like the church, which helped ground restorative justice as an embodied 
communal practice.129 
 
In 2002, Zehr offered an analogy for understanding the relationship between tradition-
dependent reasoning and restorative justice, as a warning against this universalizing 
tendency.  He likened restorative justice to a river that is fed by numerous tributaries, 
each contributing their own particular cultural and societal traditions for expressing 
justice in response to wrongdoing.130  He explained that his own understanding of 
restorative justice emerged from his belonging to a Mennonite community, but he 
acknowledged historical antecedents in other religious and cultural traditions as well.  
By implication, no one tradition should claim to be the source of restorative justice, 
including the modern secular tradition.  Restorative justice is made better, not worse, 
by recognizing its connection to tradition-dependent and context-driven practices.131   
 
In its pursuit of a unifying theoretical framework, it is not uncommon today for 
restorative justice to be conceived in terms that would have made its development 
within Christian theology virtually impossible.  The perspective of Walgrave is 
typical.  In advancing a theory of the “socio-ethical drive toward restorative justice,” 
he relegates the ethical importance of theological claims to the sphere of individual 
belief, clearly segregated from the interests of public society.  
 
Moral judgment is partially a personal affair based on personal criteria.  
But socially, the only touchstone is common self-interest … [Those who 
observe religious practices] do so because of personal religious beliefs.  A 
good society must facilitate religious activities out of respect for plurality, 
but it cannot impose religious obligations on those who do not believe …  
The public rule is not pleasing God but participating constructively in 
social life.  The quality of social life is the ultimate value in the quest for 
socio-ethics.132   
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According to Walgrave, it is on the basis of self-interest that individuals invest in 
society, as anything else threatens their autonomy as citizens.  Such a concept of 
society as an assemblage of individual self-interest bears little resemblance to the 
Christian understanding of community out of which restorative justice arose.133  
Walgrave’s theory fails entirely to comprehend the ecclesial and theological values 
underlying the early drive towards restorative justice.  In stark contrast to Walgrave’s 
theory, Marshall argues, “restorative justice may be characterized, from a Gospel 
perspective, as a compassionate justice.  It is a justice that is enriched, informed, and 
empowered by the space it gives to compassion.”134  Defined in this way, restorative 
justice points to a more relational conception of human personhood, where it is the 
good of the other and, by extension, of the wider community that orientates the 
practice of justice. 
 
Another example of how restorative justice has been redefined in liberal categories is 
Susan Sharpe’s chapter, “How Large Should the Restorative Justice ‘Tent’ Be?”  In 
her opinion, there is “little in the restorative justice literature regarding the nature of 
justice,” and where such discussions do occur they usually only cover the historical 
context rather than the content of restorative justice.135  Sharpe includes Zehr’s work 
in this assessment.  While this may be true for Zehr’s description of community 
justice, in which he challenges the historical inevitability of a state-centered 
retributive conception of justice, the same cannot be said of his analysis of covenantal 
justice.  Sharpe fails to see that covenant justice and the pursuit of shalom were 
essential to Zehr’s very definition of restorative justice.  Discarding his theological 
formulation, she turns to social contract theory and Rawls’s liberal definition of 
“justice as fairness.”  Referring to Zehr’s definition of crime as a violation of a 
relationship, which he drew from the biblical narrative of God’s covenantal 
relationship with Israel, Sharpe redefines crime as a violation of a social contract.136 
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The difference, however, between a covenant and a contract is substantial, not least 
when they are violated.  Zehr drew on the biblical tradition, which understands justice 
as the active upholding of covenantal relationships and as a commitment to restoration 
when relationships are damaged or under threat.  In social contract theory, justice 
involves adhering to the mutually binding conditions of the contract.  If those 
conditions are violated by crime, on the principle of fairness, the obligation of justice 
is to punish the violator, not restore him.  This explains why Sharpe repeatedly speaks 
of the need for “justice to be restored” – i.e., reinstating the conditions of the contract 
– whereas Zehr speaks of justice-making as restoration, due to the unconditional 
nature of covenant relationships.  Moreover, Sharpe unwittingly accepts Rawls’ 
liberal political project that seeks to secure justice by emphasizing procedures that are 
independent of any “comprehensive doctrine.”137  Zehr’s approach, by contrast, seeks 
to go beyond any procedural account of justice and towards a more substantive 
relational notion of justice.  
 
Perhaps most indicative of the shift away from its ecclesial roots has been the eliding 
of theologically grounded concepts from the vocabulary of restorative justice.  The 
early vernacular of the VORP initiative employed the language of grace, repentance, 
forgiveness, and love.  However, the contemporary secular milieu has developed 
something of an allergy to such terms.  Zehr’s language of healing and repair has 
proved more palatable for secular discourse than has his theological grammar of 
forgiveness and reconciliation.138  He has even rescinded on his earlier emphasis by 
stating that “forgiveness and reconciliation is not a primary principle or focus of 
restorative justice,” even if it may well provide a context “where either or both might 
happen.”139  
 
                                                
137 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Laws of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 172-73. 
138 Marshall points out that this has further siloed other theologians from engaging with restorative 
justice, Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 255ff. 




A parallel dynamic can be observed in the field of transitional justice, widely 
considered to be an application of restorative justice ideas.140  The most prominent 
example is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which, in 
the words of its Chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, tried to forestall “the cycle 
of reprisal and counter-reprisal” by going “beyond retributive justice to restorative 
justice, to move on to forgiveness, because without [forgiveness] there is no 
future.”141  Tutu explicitly framed the work of the Commission in theological terms, 
placing great emphasis on the theme of reconciliation, which he saw as synonymous 
with restorative justice.142  In the words of Antjie Krog, Tutu “unambiguously 
mantled the commission in Christian language,” leading a procession of rituals of 
confession and absolution that, in the opinion of Moosa, amounted to a “secular 
Eucharist.”143   
 
The success of the TRC in avoiding mass bloodshed projected the new field of 
“transitional justice” onto the world stage.  Yet as it became increasingly 
institutionalized, the concept of reconciliation – with its intimations of confession and 
forgiveness – soon became tantamount to what VanAntwerpen calls a “heresy” within 
the secular orthodoxy of transitional justice.144  Tutu’s vision of reconciliation, so 
entwined with his theological reading of a post-apartheid future, never sat 
comfortably with secularists, who preferred the secular vernacular of human rights 
and international law.  Where the concept of reconciliation remained, it became a 
secular cipher for civic trust, shorn of its spiritual evocations in the South African 
experience.145 
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This shift reflects a more chastened attitude toward the potential for the actual 
resolution of conflict, which in turn reflects a considerable flattening of the restorative 
vision.  Conflict, in this account, is something that must be managed through careful 
planning and clear procedures rather than something than can be transcended.  This 
prevailing skepticism reflects, as Brian Brock argues, a flight from living under the 
certainty that God’s Word has decisively spoken into humanity bringing about 
genuine reconciliation.146  The preoccupation with the management of conflict rather 
than its genuine resolution through the practices of repentance and forgiveness reflects 
a modern narrowing of the possibilities open to humanity, and with it the eclipse of 
any eschatological horizon infusing the present horizon with hope. 
 
The notion of reconciliation animating the early restorative vision wasn’t just naïve 
optimism on the part of some enthusiasts; it was integral to the reality of God’s future 
kingdom breaking into present experience.147  The movement of repentance and 
forgiveness leading to reconciliation reflected the heart of reality.  “[B]y placing a 
concern for the healing of hurts, the renewal of relationships, and the re-creation of 
community at the heart of its agenda,” Marshall writes, restorative justice “makes 
room for the miracle of forgiveness to occur and for a new future to dawn.”148  It was 
this eschatological realism of restorative justice that distinguished it from the 
dominant concerns of the criminal justice system. 
5. A	Way	Forward	for	Restorative	Justice	and	the	Church	
 
Mennonite theologian Tom Yoder Neufeld, notes that, “Restorative Justice has 
become a concept, a paradigm, an identifiable set of principles and practices which 
can be argued for in the public arena, indeed, which have garnered the adherence of a 
diverse community of practitioners far greater than the early pioneers could have 
imagined.”149  However such developments, he suspects, have “sometimes outpaced 
biblical reflection and testing.”  The rapid ascendency of restorative justice in 
mainstream public discourse has been accompanied by a notable lack of continued 
theological engagement with it in the church.  By and large, the church has reneged on 
                                                
146 Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, cf. 173. 
147 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 18. 
148 Ibid., 284. 




the role Zehr called it to, with the result that many of the pressures of 
“institutionalization” and “routinization,” along with secularization, have often gone 
unchallenged from a theological perspective.150   
 
While the mainstreaming of a peacemaking approach to justice is desirable and has 
helped to hold in check the punitive impulses of the dominant system, it has also 
brought new challenges for Christians seeking to develop restorative justice in a more 
theological direction.  The nature of these challenges are multiple: the contested role 
of tradition-dependent communities in secular society; the way justice practices are 
subordinated to political arrangements; the lack of emphasis on the lived reality of 
people and communities; and the disputed legitimacy of religious convictions and 
language to sustain a specific social vision.  
 
All this raises the question of how the church might continue to contribute to the 
rapidly evolving field of restorative justice in ways that are congruent with its own 
practice and reasoning.  There are at least two dimensions to this question: first, how 
can the distinctly theological reasoning informing restorative justice be safeguarded, 
and second, how may restorative justice be practiced by the church in ways that are 
reflective of its own commitments?  
 
One way of answering this question is to prioritize the role of particular values.  
However, while this approach is of some use, it also has significant theological 
limitations.  In what follows, I will outline the weaknesses of a values-based approach 
to articulating a Christian voice on restorative justice.  This will be in order to clarify 
the need for a more ecclesially-based and biblically-engaged alternative, as developed 
in the following chapters. 
 
In her essay titled “Restorative Values,” Kay Pranis makes the observation that 
restorative justice is a field that “flows back and forth between practice that informs 
philosophy and philosophy that informs practice.”151  This insight confirms what has 
been argued in this thesis, which is that any concept of justice both emerges from the 
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practices of a community, as well as acts to shape the social form of that community.  
Theory and practice are not two separate phenomena that can be clearly distinguished 
from one another; rather, they are mutually interpreting activities.  Following this 
insight, Pranis suggests that restorative justice requires some “unifying concept” that 
can ground its theory while guiding its practice.152   
 
In restorative justice literature, the language of “restorative values” is fast becoming 
the kind of “unifying concept” that addresses this need.  Pranis goes on to list a range 
of values that are frequently mentioned, such as respect, honesty, accountability, 
humility, equality, inclusion, and mutual care.  She cites Zehr and Toews, who write, 
“Restorative values can be distilled to two key underlying values – humility and 
respect.  Furthermore, we should approach our work with wonder.”153  Pranis suggests 
that restorative values can be divided into two groups – process values and individual 
values.  Process values, like respect, should encourage and enable individual values to 
emerge, while it is through individual values, like honesty, that restorative processes 
can achieve transformative outcomes. 
 
Values are not easily distinguished from principles, ideals, or convictions, but for 
Pranis restorative values are “those things that feel deeply important to the essence of 
the restorative impulse and are carried in the spirit of what we do and how we do 
it.”154  Drawing on her extensive experience and her beliefs about human nature, 
Pranis proposes that every person values those qualities that promote good 
relationships with others and with oneself.155  “It appears that awareness of and desire 
for the values that support healthy relationships are profoundly embedded in human 
nature.  It makes sense; humans are communal.  Our DNA should carry the 
information necessary to be successful in community.”156  It is this interconnected and 
relational view of human nature that is the “deep inner truth” behind the restorative 
values, and the values are one way of describing what it means to live in the light of 
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this truth, especially in situations where relationships have become dismembered and 
destructive.157   
 
As Pranis’ comments reveal, the “deep inner truth” of restorative justice lies not in the 
values themselves, but in their depiction of how humans ought to live in light of 
reality as it is perceived to be.  This explains why restorative justice is not a neutral, 
value-free process, as it privileges those values that point to a worldview 
characterized by “wholeness, unity, and connectedness.”158  This interconnected and 
relational worldview is not unique to any single cultural perspective, though its 
features are more noticeable in indigenous and collectivist cultures.  Pranis is 
convinced that there is a significant consensus among humans on what values ought to 
be affirmed, even when there exists a dissonance between what people value and what 
they practice.  
 
For Pranis, values function in much the same way that language does for 
Wittgenstein, except that Pranis gives no account of how the language of values 
reposes on a particular political community.  In her essay, values act in a conciliatory 
way, bringing about understanding between those held apart by their differences.  
They help foster practices to resolve difficult problems, often by addressing human 
needs for acceptance and belonging.  In fact, values can provide a way of assessing 
and guiding practice simply by asking whether existing practices are congruent with 
the stated values of participants.  Values are not static, but instead function in a 
visionary way to describe where current reality needs to move.  Perhaps most 
importantly, however, is the way in which values emerge from people’s core 
convictions, thus enabling a more integrated and holistic way of uniting the personal 
and the political.159  
 
It is no surprise that values language often features in Christian discourse, especially 
when speaking in forums where a shared theological reasoning cannot be presumed.  
For example, Marshall writes, “what is most crucial as restorative justice continues to 
grow and diversify, and especially as it becomes more integrated into mainstream 
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justice systems, is that its undergirding values are safeguarded.”160  Values language 
helps to name the fundamental commitments and convictions of a practice like 
restorative justice, without having to describe where those commitments came from.  
In a pluralistic context, values help to foster shared agreements that would otherwise 
prove difficult on account of underlying differences.  In this sense, values language 
functions in much the same way as middle-axioms do in the approach made popular 
by William Temple.  Yet herein lies their limitation for the task being pursued in this 
thesis.161  
 
While values language is useful when seeking common ground in a pluralistic 
context, it is not in itself a sufficient category for describing the particular ways in 
which ethical commitments are expressed.  In other words, for values to have any 
ethical substance they need to be embodied in the particular practices and character of 
real people, as they live out their daily existence in real contexts.  Marshall recognizes 
this when he writes, “Values do not exist in a vacuum, of course; they are held by 
flesh-and-blood people belonging to particular historical communities.”162  Pranis 
indirectly acknowledges it too when she illustrates each of the ten values underlying 
restorative justice by referring to actual people as they grapple with their professional 
roles, their history with the criminal justice institution, their commitment to a 
particular reintegrative programme, their memory of a youth’s place in the village 
culture, and so on.163  The values that people affirm as important are only 
understandable within the culture and institutions that give such values their concrete 
meaning.   
 
Ecclesial ethicists emphasize that the convictions underlying why people do what they 
do, and even how they do it, are best explored under the rubric of character.  
Character is a category that connects a person’s core convictions with how they live; 
it also points to the stories and traditions that have formed these convictions and 
practices.  While the language of character avoids the abstract, individualistic, and 
universalizing mode of inquiry rendering communities like the church invisible in 
modern ethics, it is not clear whether the same can be said of values language.   
                                                
160 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 6 (italics mine). 
161 See, Temple, Christianity and Social Order. 
162 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 7. 





At its worst, values language can function as a trope for the same universalizing 
tendency that displaces the reasoning and practice of particular, tradition-dependent 
communities.  At their best, however, the “Restorative Values” identified by Pranis 
encourage recognition of the institutions and traditions within which these values 
acquire meaning.  For ecclesial ethics, the most obvious candidate is the church.164  
For the church to continue contributing to the rapidly evolving field of restorative 
justice, it must recover its identity as a distinctive eschatological community that 
bears witness to all the ways in which the justice of God impinges on human life, thus 
opening up new vistas in the theological exploration of restorative justice.   
6. In	Summary	
 
Following the method outlined in the Introduction, this chapter has achieved the 
descriptive task by providing a concrete example of one significant way in which the 
church has sought to embody God’s justice, as an outworking of ecclesial ethics.  In 
the chapters that follow, we will turn to the prescriptive and suggestive aspects of our 
task, beginning with an exploration of a biblical paradigm of restorative justice.  
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We have seen how restorative justice emerged in the context of a living faith 
community seeking to respond faithfully to the needs of those affected by 
wrongdoing.  This was an attempt by some Christians to bring their ecclesial 
formation in the Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition in the practices of peacemaking to 
bear on criminal justice policy and practice.  Undergirding it was a way of reading the 
overarching narrative of Scripture as a “theology of restoration.”1  As Tom Yoder 
Neufeld observes,  
 
the paradigm of Restorative Justice took shape within the womb of 
biblically informed piety and ethics.  It emerged in the attempt to answer a 
biblically informed and urged set of questions: how can persons committed 
to peace, reconciliation, and restoration, inject that set of convictions and 
reflexes into the public arena of responses to crime?2   
 
 
According to ecclesial ethics, the central task of the church is to be, as Hauerwas puts 
it, “a community capable of hearing the story of God we find in the Scripture and 
living in a manner that is faithful to that story.”3  The church is not just any 
community, but one in which the Scriptural story is embodied in the common life of a 
people.  The development of restorative justice reflects this attempt to embody the 
story of God’s justice, which means that in restorative justice the distinctive contours 
of the church’s story may be discerned. 
 
Consequently, any attempt to expand the place of restorative justice in the life of the 
church must begin with a consideration of the church’s relationship to Scripture.  As 
Stephen Fowl explains, Scripture “provides a normative standard for the faith, 
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practice, and worship of Christian communities.”4  The bible provides the grammar 
and language for understanding the space within which the church lives faithfully 
before God.  A theological commitment to restorative justice must therefore proceed 
from bringing the insights of Scripture to bear on this practice.  More specifically, this 
requires a three-way interaction between the convictions, practices, and character of 
the church, the theological interpretation of Scripture, and the theory and practice of 
restorative justice.   
 
This chapter will begin by clarifying what is meant by the theological interpretation of 
Scripture, particularly in relation to how two prominent ecclesial ethicists have 
approached the text of Matthew 18:15-22.  This text deals with the restorative justice 
themes of discipline, confrontation, forgiveness, and reconciliation, all in the presence 
of wrongdoers and their victims.  However, as we will see, there is a striking absence 
of justice language in the way these two ecclesial scholars deal with the unit, a text 
that has much to teach the church about the doing of justice.  
 
The second part of the chapter will consider how the language of justice in the biblical 
material has often been misconstrued by interpreters.  The trajectory in Christian 
history towards an abstract, retributive, and interiorized understanding of justice (as 
discussed earlier), stemmed in part from a problematic interpretation of Scripture, 
leading to its distorted practice in the church.  Instead of viewing justice in a 
covenantal or christological context, the tendency has been to read it in a more strictly 
judicial (and Roman) context.  This has resulted in a construal of justice in terms of 
desert, punishment, and abstract law, which has then been read back into the divine 
nature.  The translation of key biblical terms for justice has contributed to this 
truncated and distorted understanding of biblical justice.  The chapter will end with a 
proposal for conceptualizing God’s justice in the biblical story as a predominantly 





                                                






Ecclesial ethics represents an attempt to recover the distinctive witness of the ecclesial 
community as it participates in the life made possible by Jesus Christ.  A dominant 
concern has been to describe the character appropriate to disciples of Jesus.  But 
character is not a self-sufficient category for understanding the vocation of Christians.  
For this we must turn to the relationship Christians have to Scripture, and in particular 
to their embodiment of Scripture in the various contexts in which they find 
themselves.5 
 
The interpretation of the bible in the modern period has been dominated by the use of 
critical methods unrelated to the interests of the confessing community.  According to 
Fowl and Jones, the church has been displaced due to the pursuit of a mode of biblical 
interpretation that is independent of “socially-embodied traditions” and of context-
specific situations.6  The characteristic modern emphasis on decisions made by 
isolated individuals produced a method of interpretation aimed at arriving at the 
“objective” meaning of a text by means of universally accepted criteria.  Such an 
approach consciously ignores the role of character, social situation, and circumstance 
in the interpretive process, while also severely limiting the pedagogic purposes for 
which interpreters might engage with the text.  The church, as a community formed 
by Scripture for living faithfully before God, has little place in this mode of 
interpretation.   
 
The preoccupation of the modern approach is with comprehending the meaning of the 
biblical text rather than its lived implications.7  This reflects the subordination of 
social and relational realities to the assertion of facts and principles believed to be 
universally true.  Even as the modernist assumption that a text possesses an objective 
stable meaning has come under critical scrutiny in the late modern era, it has still not 
often issued in a renewed interest in the lived application of biblical interpretation.  
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Ecclesial ethicists argue that post-modern “anti-determinist” readings, as Fowl terms 
them, are no more helpful for clarifying the church’s relationship to Scripture than 
earlier objectivist readings were.  This is because in their effort to expose the 
colonizing ideology of the text, they further undermine any attempt to shape a 
common life in obedience to it.8  Its deep suspicion towards any claim of authority by 
the text or by any single interpretation of it, ensures the interpreter always stands over 
against the text rather than under its sway.  The methodological acceptance of a 
plurality of interpretations serves to problematize and paralyze any attempt to derive a 
common life from the story of Scripture.  
 
While agreeing that hermeneutics is a “‘political’ discipline”9 that unavoidably 
involves bringing convictions, dispositions, and character to the interpretive process, 
ecclesial ethicists attempt to make “constructive use of the interaction.”10  Rather than 
trying to approach the bible in a neutral or objective way, Christian communities 
stand in a particular relationship to the bible as Scripture.11  “Christian communities 
interpret Scripture, then, so that believers might live faithfully before God in the light 
of Jesus Christ.”12  Scripture, in other words, is to be “socially embodied in 
communities of people committed to ordering their worship, their doctrines, and their 
lives in a manner consistent with faithful interpretation.”13 
 
This move to a theological interpretation of Scripture is bound up with the recovery of 
the centrality of the ecclesia.  The preaching and liturgy of the church is where 
Christians have their characters formed and transformed so that they can adequately 
perform the story of Scripture.  As Fodor suggests, “repeated exposure to and 
immersion in liturgical readings of the Bible,” leads the church into “a peculiar kind 
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of scriptural competence, which is but another way of describing ‘faithful living.’”14  
As well as being formed by Scripture, the church is also engaged in the “formation of 
virtuous interpreters of Scripture,” as Fowl argues, so that “Christian communities 
can combat the temptation to read Scripture in ways that underwrite sinful 
practices.”15  Accordingly, church and Scripture exist in a dynamic relationship, and it 
is on the grounds of this relationship that the biblical people of God “stand as an 
alternative to the world and its values while at the same time living their lives for the 
sake of that world in its brokenness.”16  
 
In viewing biblical interpretation as a performance, ecclesial ethics does not intend to 
be overly prescriptive about its meaning.  What matters is that the church is forming 
wise readers of Scripture so as to embody it in life, rather than prescribing in detail 
what that embodiment should look like.  As Wells argues, Scripture is not so much a 
“script” that simply needs rehearsing, it is more like a “training manual” that schools 
its members to improvise in ever changing situations while taking the right things for 
granted.17  Certainly the bible is authoritative, but this authority does not stand in 
independence of the community that considers it as Scripture.  “[A]uthority is not 
something that has been inserted into the Bible which can then later be found, 
abstracted, analyzed and either followed or ignored,” as Fowl argues.18  Rather, 
Scripture has authority in relationship to the ecclesial community that reads and lives 
out the biblical story in the specific contexts in which it finds itself.  This will at times 
include reading Scripture over against the ecclesial community, but never in 
detachment from it. 
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Hauerwas and Yoder both use Matthew 18:15-22 to describe what an ecclesial ethic 
looks like in practice, albeit in distinctly different ways.  Significantly, despite the fact 
this text deals specifically with wrongdoing and the need for reconciliation, neither 
author makes any reference to justice, let alone restorative justice.  
 
“If another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the 
fault when the two of you are alone.  If the member listens to you, you 
have regained that one.  But if you are not listened to, take one or two 
others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the 
evidence of two or three witnesses.  If the member refuses to listen to them, 
tell it to the church; and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, 
let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.  Truly I tell you, 
whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you 
loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.  Again, truly I tell you, if two of 
you agree on earth about anything you ask, it will be done for you by my 
Father in heaven.  For where two or three are gathered in my name, I am 
there among them.”  Then Peter came and said to him, “Lord, if another 
member of the church sins against me, how often should I forgive?  As 
many as seven times?”  Jesus said to him, “Not seven times, but, I tell you, 
seventy-seven times.”  
 
 
What has often been interpreted as a rudimentary process for church discipline, or as 
an example of the personalism of the primitive church, is interpreted by Yoder and 
Hauerwas as demonstrative of how the church embodies Jesus’ politics of peace.  
 
The process outlined in Matthew 18 for admonishing a wrongdoer is clearly an 
important feature of what it means to be the church in Matthew’s Gospel.  It is solely 
in connection with the function of “binding and loosing,” what Yoder likens to 
“conflict resolution,” that the word ekklesia is mentioned.19  Both Yoder and 
Hauerwas make much of this observation, and both draw the same conclusion that 
peacemaking lies at the heart of what it means to be the church.  Yoder offers a fine-
grained reading of the relational and sociological dynamics at work in this, while 
Hauerwas interprets it with his typical language of virtue, habits, narrative, and the 
grammar of a community, all of which serve as a counter-example to the world’s 
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violence.20  The church serves as a training ground for the formation of a truthful 
people who refuse to compromise with the violence of the age.  
  
We know that as God’s creatures we are not naturally violent nor are our 
institutions unavoidably violent.  As God’s people we have been created 
for peace.  Rather, what we must do is to help the world find the habits of 
peace whose absence so often makes violence seem like the only 
alternative.  Peacemaking as a virtue is an act of the imagination built on 
long habits of the resolution of differences.  The great problem in the 
world is that our imagination has been stilled, since it has not made a 
practice of confronting wrongs so that violence might be avoided.  In truth, 
we must say that the church has too often failed the world by its failure to 
witness in our own life the kind of conflict necessary to be a community of 
peace.  Without an example of a peacemaking community, the world has 
no alternative but to use violence as the means to settle disputes.21 
 
 
The first thing to note about Hauerwas’ reading is his avoidance of any technical-
exegetical remarks that would situate the church at some critical distance from the 
text.  He simply takes it for granted that Matthew 18 is addressed to the church, 
although he never makes clear what church he has in mind.  By implication, 
Hauerwas never poses the question of what the church should do with this primitive 
process, as if the problem were with some “historical discontinuity” that could be 
answered in relative independence of the text.  Rather, his question is with how this 
text describes the church whose members are capable of confronting one another with 
their sins.  Hauerwas allows the historical distance between the text and the church to 
be eschewed, supplanted by the greater problem of our contemporary failure to 
embody faithful living in ongoing Christian communities.  That means, as Fowl and 
Jones argue, “the discontinuities are not so much historical as moral and 
theological.”22    
 
The second observation about Hauerwas’ reading is the way he allows Matt. 18 to 
define the distinctive character of the church as peacemaking.  He draws on an 
Aristotelian reference, whereby some virtues are “correlative to certain kinds of 
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relations and cannot exist without those relations being valued by a community.”23  In 
particular, relationships based on peace and truth are valued by the church in such a 
way that peacemaking can rightly be considered an ecclesial virtue.  By introducing 
the language of virtue, Hauerwas makes repeated appeals to the “habits of 
peacekeeping” and the practice of being “truthful” so that the church might be trained 
to confront the “false peace of the world.”24   
 
By describing peacemaking as a virtue of the church, Hauerwas offers a substantial 
corrective to traditional understandings of virtue.  He moves away from the 
Aristotlian tendency to speak of “heroic individuals” and instead makes clear that 
Scripture speaks to a distinctive community.25  According to Wells, whereas writers 
like Aristotle were primarily concerned to inspire their readers to be heroes, the 
concern of the biblical writers is to inspire them to be “saints in communion.”  The 
differences between the two designations are noticeable in the kind of stories they tell.  
The hero is always at the centre of their story, whereas saints remain on the periphery 
of a story that is really about God.  The hero’s story is all about their virtuous 
qualities, whereas the saint has but one quality of faithfulness.  The story of the hero 
presumes a world of violence that sets the stage for a great reckoning, whereas the 
saint knows that such a reckoning has already been accomplished, setting the stage for 
great acts of love.  The fate of the world lies on the success of heroes, whereas saints 
are able to rejoice even in their failures; and finally, heroes stand alone, whereas 
saints “assume, demand, require … the communion of saints.”26  This difference in 
characterisation is noticeable in Hauerwas’ approach to Scripture, where he is 
concerned to produce witnesses (“martyrs”) who have been trained to embody the 
story of Scripture through the life of the church. 
 
This leads to the third observation.  Hauerwas makes it clear that only the community 
that understands its life as defined by Jesus’ story can properly interpret and embody 
this Scripture.  “Our ability to be truthful peacemakers depends on our learning that 
we owe our lives to God’s unrelenting forgiveness.”27  This requires a church that has 
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been trained to interpret its common life in the light of Jesus’ story, and in particular 
how he is the mediator of God’s redemptive forgiveness.28  In order for the church to 
confront sin as the forgiven community, it must also “have a language and correlative 
habit that makes it possible to know what it is to be a sinner.”29  Being formed in the 
language of Scripture and allowing its life to be interpreted by Scripture is 
indispensible to the church’s performance of Scripture.  This is why those who reject 
the church’s efforts to avoid sin must be treated as “Gentiles or tax-collectors” – viz., 
outside the law and grammar of this political community – because they have not 
learnt to see themselves as those who are sinners in constant need of forgiveness.30   
 
The final feature of Hauerwas’ reading highlights the polemical edge of ecclesial 
ethics, as he reads Scripture over against the world’s violence.  Hauerwas frequently 
describes the mission of the church in terms of how its “witness” or “example” serves 
to “confront and challenge the false peace of the world.”31  Accordingly, what the 
world often calls peace is but a mask for untruth, forgetfulness, and even violence, all 
of which need to be exposed by the performed practice of truthful peacemaking.  
Without this witness, the “world has no alternative but to use violence as the means to 
settle disputes,” argues Hauerwas.32  The church’s primary social responsibility is 
therefore to embody texts like Matt. 18 in order to be of service to the world, seeking 
out the “development of processes and institutions that make possible confrontation 
and resolution of differences so that violence can be avoided.”33 
 
Hauerwas’ theological interpretation of Matthew 18:15-22 offers a specific 
description of what it means for the church to be the organized form of Jesus’ story.  
“Peacemaking among Christians,” he writes, “is not simply one activity among others 
but rather is the very form of the church insofar as the church is the form of the one 
who ‘is our peace.’”34  Hauerwas’ reading of this text is specifically concerned with 
the community of faith, although as a final comment he argues that this peacemaking 
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process points to a way of “confronting the wrongdoer with the offer of 
reconciliation” that extends beyond this community.35  This brings us close to what 
we have described as restorative justice, although Hauerwas never connects this text 
with justice-making.  
 
Characteristic of his Anabaptist tradition, Yoder interprets Matt. 18:15-22 as directed 
to “the covenant community” that understands discipleship in terms of a lived 
commitment to mutual correction after the “rule of Christ.”36  Needless to say, this 
commitment has not been consistently practiced in the church’s history.  Yoder is 
concerned to point to a different way of being church, which is why his interpretation 
offers both a more careful reading of the context of Matt. 18 as well as challenging the 
assumptions of other ecclesial traditions. 
   
Yoder initially proceeds from an exposition of the terms “bind” and “loose.”  These 
terms were originally at home in rabbinic Judaism, designating the making of 
interpretive judgments on the Torah.  To “bind”’ was to “enjoin, to forbid or make 
obligatory,” even if that meant withholding fellowship, whereas to “loose” was to 
“leave free, to permit,” or to forgive.37  Together these terms formed a “moral 
tradition,” what the rabbis called halakah, which was intended to guide God’s people 
in faithfulness to the law.  In passing the authority to “bind” and “loose” to the 
church, Jesus simultaneously makes two scandalous claims.  He indirectly claims for 
himself the authority to “forgive sins” – which was the sole prerogative of God – and 
he claims to be able to pass this authority onto ordinary people, like fishermen and tax 
gatherers, in a way that binds God to their decisions.   
 
By implication, the church’s commission to admonish and forgive sins only makes 
sense when it confesses Jesus as God’s Messiah (in Matt. 16 the power to bind and 
loose is given to Peter straight after his confession of Jesus as Messiah), and it can 
only presume to share in the Messiah’s authority as it is empowered by his Spirit 
(Matt 18:19-20; cf. Duet. 17:6; 19:15).38  This presents us with the key concepts for 
understanding Yoder’s ecclesial imagination: a messianic community, empowered by 
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Jesus’ spirit, a voluntary commitment to the way of Jesus, lived out in the practices of 
mutual correction and forgiveness of sin.  Unlike Hauerwas, Yoder locates the 
church’s distinctiveness, not in its exemplary display of some virtue but rather in the 
authority that Jesus extends to it.   
 
Yoder is acutely attentive to the practical and relational needs involved when 
admonishing a wrongdoer.  First, steps must be taken to ensure the process is 
confidential, so as to avoid causing any further injury by erroneous and defamatory 
gossip.  Second, the thoroughly conversational nature of the process ensures that each 
party has the opportunity to listen and so become involved in discovering where they 
have failed one another, and thus also to become involved in each other’s recovery.  
Third, by being bound to its local communal context, the process protects the 
offending party from suffering the consequences of an abstract legalism, as well as 
protecting the victim from bureaucratic neglect.   
 
The entire process is orientated, in Yoder’s assessment, to “a kind of moral solidarity 
linking all the members of the body so that if individuals persist in disobedience 
within the fellowship, their guilt is no longer the moral responsibility of those 
individuals alone but becomes a kind of collective blame shared by the whole 
body.”39  This is what it means concretely to “bear one another’s burdens” (Gal. 6:2).  
It points to the irreducibly relational nature of human beings in both causing offense 
and in taking the necessary steps to repair the damage done.  As Yoder writes, 
“healing, whether from sin or from sickness, is inseparable from the healing of human 
relationships.”40  These insights influenced, and were influenced by, the shifts 
occurring in Mennonite circles during the 1970-80’s, which explains the similar 
sounding language and reasoning noted in the early restorative justice initiatives.  
 
Yoder expands the implications of this text beyond fraternal forgiveness to describe 
“the practical and theological foundation for the centrality of the local 
congregation.”41  He claims that with every revival or renewal movement, like those 
which followed Wesley or Keswick, there was first a “renewed experience of the gift 
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of openness, the capacity given by grace to be transparent with the brother about one’s 
own sins and the brother’s and thereby to make concrete the assurance of 
forgiveness.”42  Yoder first illuminates how to “bind and loose” creates an 
interrelationship between forgiveness and discernment.43  To forgive sins requires the 
prior discernment of some shared moral standards by which sins are knowable, which 
in turn demands a community that actively fosters relationships where enmity and 
injury are being reconciled.  Yoder goes on to identify three features that distinguish 
this kind of community, and he does so by blending together Scriptural mandates with 
his own Believers Church tradition.44   
 
First, following the few descriptions of congregational decision-making found in the 
New Testament, especially 1 Corinthians 12-14, it seems clear to Yoder that “every 
member has a right, perhaps a duty, to share in the process.”45  This highly democratic 
style of meeting is as a result of the Spirit’s presence throughout the whole body of 
believers, bringing them to reach a divinely inspired consensus as they grasp the full 
implications of Jesus’ teaching (John 14:16).  Second, the act of binding and loosing 
gives new significance to the authority of Scripture: its proper context is as it is read 
and embodied by believers seeking guidance on how to respond to concrete situations 
in their witness and obedience.46  Scripture serves the purpose given it by the apostle 
Paul: “it is for teaching, reproof, correction, and instruction in right behavior.”47  
Third, in Believers Church congregations, the “rule of Christ” serves to mark out 
those who have submitted to the covenant community.  Yoder observes that without 
this voluntary commitment to a community of mutual concern there can be no practice 
of fraternal admonition.   
 
An important feature of Yoder’s essay is the way in which he traces the numerous 
misunderstandings, diversions, and detours around this text in other ecclesial 
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traditions.  The church has constantly reneged on its call to enact processes for 
confronting wrongdoing, and has also failed to achieve full reconciliation among its 
members.  While Yoder does not mention the criminal justice system, he was surely 
cognizant of how that system exemplifies the “unreconciled divisions and conflicts” 
which have yet to be transformed by the practices of “openness and forgiveness.”48  
His interpretation beckons for this kind of embodied practice of restorative justice, 
and he is surely correct that in order for any ecclesial practice to be lasting it must 
arise from a recovery of the church as a restorative fellowship. 
 
For both Yoder and Hauerwas, Scripture describes the distinctive character of the 
church, yet it only has authority insofar as the church seeks to embody it in its life 
before God.  The greatest task facing interpreters is not the historical distance between 
the text and its contemporary readers, but the moral and theological distance between 
how Scripture describes the task of the church and the failure of the empirical church 
to embody that task – which, according to Matt. 18 entails embodying Jesus’ reign of 
peace.  The church is an exemplary community only insofar as it visibly witnesses to 
Jesus’ reign of peace.  To fail to do so is a problem not just for the church but also for 
wider society.  This is because it is through the church that “the world” can 
acknowledge itself to be such, and so seek to be transformed.   
 
Yoder and Hauerwas show how the importance of recovering the centrality of the 
church is not because of its superiority or sinlessness, but quite the opposite.  The 
church, as a community of forgiven sinners, is the one place where violence, untruth, 
and distrust between its members can be openly acknowledged for what it really is: 
sin.  Yet as a community of forgiven sinners, such sinfulness can be confronted 
without threatening to destroy the very fabric of this community, because this 
community has been formed by, and trained in, the virtue of peacemaking.  The 
visibility of the church is therefore central to the “witness of the church,” which, as 
Yoder writes, “always includes and may sometimes center upon the quality of 
personal relationships that even the outsider may observe.”49 
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We have presented restorative justice as an example of the ecclesiological 
embodiment of the justice of God, as discerned in Scripture.  But this claim can only 
be substantiated if it can be shown that God’s justice in Scripture is, indeed, a 
restorative justice par excellence.  But this is not how it has been typically understood 
in the history of interpretation. 
 
It was pointed out in the first chapter that, as a result of how justice has been 
understood, the church has through the centuries failed to embody consistently the 
restorative justice of God.  Justice was typically understood in a dual sense: in the 
human realm, it required that evil be repressed through the punishments ordained by 
the state, and in the divine realm it meant the justification of the penitent so that 
individual believers might stand acquitted before God.  Even in its divine form, justice 
understood as justification tended to be interpreted in an abstract, individualistic, and 
oftentimes retributivist sense, thereby failing to generate the social face of justice in 
the lives of believers.   
 
Such perceptions need to be undone if the church is to recover its mandate to “become 
the justice of God” (2 Cor. 5:21).  To achieve this requires a brief examination of the 
presuppositions behind problematic interpretations of justice in Scripture, and a re-
reading of how the justice of God operates in the biblical narrative.  This groundwork 
will pave the way in the following chapters for a more extended consideration of how 
the church might embody the justice of God in light of one of Jesus’ parables and one 




Why have interpreters been able to reach conclusions about the nature of justice in the 
bible in ways far removed from those of restorative justice?  There are two 
contributory factors.  First, translations of the biblical terms into other languages have 
made it difficult to detect all the justice-related connections that occur in Scripture.  
This has resulted in a truncated understanding of justice, limited in the most part to a 




there has been a powerful interpretative framework that brings a set of preconceived 
ideas about the nature of justice to the task.  While appearing to be biblically based, 
this interpretative framework has recast the story of God’s justice revealed in Christ’s 
cross and fulfilled at final judgment as essentially retributive.  Both these factors have 
proved disastrous and deserve fuller comment. 
 
English translations of the Bible have tended to divide justice references into two 
main word groups.  First, from the Latin stem ius we get “justice,” “justification,” and 
“just;” and second, from the Anglo-Saxon riht we get “righteousness”, “righteous” 
and “right.”  The concept of “right” has no cognate verb, and it has made little sense 
to translators to continue with Old English phrases like “to right” or “right-wised.”50  
This has resulted in “righteousness” being understood as a self-contained moral 
attribute of piety or holiness, lacking any active, relational, or dynamic nuance.  This 
has led translators to make recourse to the “just” word group for the verbal notions of 
biblical justice.  However, even the words “justified” and “justification” fail to convey 
the social and relational dynamics of their biblical equivalents.  This is particularly 
evident in contemporary treatments of justification, which, despite the obvious 
linguistic link, fail to observe its connection to justice.51  In the opinion of N.T. 
Wright, the “older English words ‘righteousness’ and ‘justification’ are more or less 
dead metaphors.”52  In short, English translations have tended to reinforce a 
moralistic, static, and individualistic reading of justice in Scripture. 
 
These linguistic problems may have been compounded by the English language, but 
they did not start there.  Translation problems were already evident in the Septuagint, 
which attempted to carry over the meaning of the Hebrew into the Koiné Greek.  The 
Greek word dikaiosuné always ran the risk of being understood in a Hellenistic rather 
than Hebraic sense.  The difference, as McGrath points out, is that dikaiosuné was 
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originally a “fundamentally secular concept incapable of assuming the soteriological 
overtones associated with the Hebrew term.”53  It tended to be restricted to the sphere 
of the human polis, which meant that justice was thought to be immanent in the 
natural order, to which even the gods were subject.  This immanent understanding of 
justice made it possible to interpret the “dikaiosune of God” as some kind of divine 
regulating force that ensured each person received exactly what he or she was due.  
This problem was ameliorated by the predominantly Jewish readership of the 
Septuagint, and in the New Testament writings, by the carefully crafted use of the 
dikaio-word group in ways that subverted its Hellenistic meaning. 
 
The real problem arose with the translation of the justice concept into the Latin ius, 
which distanced the concept even further from its original range of meaning.  It also 
upset the careful construction of the dikaio terms in the New Testament.  Justice, 
translated as iustitia, came to be narrowly defined as rendering to another their moral 
desert, whether as reward or punishment.  Within this definition, justice stands 
opposed to mercy, such that “mercy involves setting aside the demands of justice and 
treating persons contrary to what they justly deserve.”54  Thus, when God is said “to 
justify” (iustificare), it is not understood as God’s prerogative to vindicate those upon 
whom he chooses to have mercy, but rather to reward the one whose cause is just, 
while reserving his punishment for the unjust.55  If God is to remain a God of justice, 
his mercy must give way to the need to satisfy his prior justice, since the two do not 
belong together.  But this not only disrupts the connections preserved in the Hebrew 
meaning, it turns the relationship between the justice of God and the human 
predicament on its head.  Sinful humanity is now required to be saved from God’s 
justice rather than by it.  
 
The context for understanding God’s justice was also affected by the Latin translation.  
As we will see shortly, the biblical context for understanding the justice of God is the 
covenantal relationship between YHWH and Israel.  The Hebrew term for covenant 
(berith, Gk. diathekes) was translated by the Latin term foedus, which, according to 
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James Torrance, carried a more contractual than covenantal meaning.56  This opened 
the door for God’s relationship to humanity to be conceived in terms of a juridical 
contract, with the law (lex) spelling out the conditions of this relationship.  Within this 
context, the iustitia Dei was understood as God’s prerogative to punish those who 
transgressed against the conditions of the divine human contract.  
 
In the Western tradition the Latinized interpretation of the justice of God helped to 
foster an image of God as a “cosmic lawgiver and judge” who upholds strict 
retributive justice, rewarding the righteous and punishing the guilty according to their 
deserts.57  With the spread of natural law thinking, all humanity was thought to be 
accountable to this God and especially those who were criminals.  Prisons came to be 
adorned with images of Christ suffering on the cross as an icon of judicial 
punishment, providing the symbolic logic for a cultural space marked by degradation, 
pain infliction, and death.58  Just as Christ was punished according to God’s justice for 
the sins of the world, so criminals were subjected to harsh and degrading punishments 
for the expiation of their sins.  The judgment executed on Christ was re-enacted on 
prisoners, as exemplary sinners, to wash away their guilt so they could stand ready for 
God’s ultimate judgment.   
 
While translation has contributed to the problem, linguistics alone did not produce the 
reading of the justice of God as retributive, individualistic, and unmerciful.  
Interpreters have also brought with them a set of preconceived ideas about the nature 
of justice that have served as an overarching interpretive grid.  For example, one 
common interpretative framework has recast the story of Scripture around two central 
axioms: justice as retributive and salvation as individualistic.  This framework has 
recently been described by Douglas Campbell as “Justification Theory,” although it 
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may equally be described as a “theory of justice” that has informed the reading of 
justification in the bible.59   
 
According to Campbell, this theory of justification arose in the modern era as a result 
of some distorting dynamics in reading the apostle Paul’s dikaio-texts.  These 
dynamics rest on a foundationalist epistemology that owes more to modern notions of 
the individual, society, and justice, than to the Scriptural story.  The church has, by 
and large, capitulated to this epistemology whenever it construes salvation in 
fundamentally conditional and unmerciful terms, directed primarily to individuals.    
 
In Campbell’s opinion, “few discourses are more prone to subliminal cultural 
projection than judicial ones.”60  This has presented an acute problem for the Christian 
understanding of salvation, which in the Western tradition of interpretation has 
predominantly drawn on Paul’s “forensic” texts (especially, Rom. 1-4; Gal. 3:21-26).  
According to this tradition, the key problem being addressed in these texts is how 
sinful individuals might be saved from the retributive justice of God.  It is assumed 
God cannot simply forgive those who have transgressed his law, since that would be 
contrary to God’s nature as just and holy.  Paul provides a two-step solution to this 
predicament.  First, God sends forth his Son to satisfy the penalty of sinful humanity 
by undergoing the punishment of death, thus requiting God’s punitive justice.  
Justification entails “status declarations,” in terms of guilt or acquittal.61  Second, in 
order to appropriate the benefits of this saved condition, individuals need to exercise 
faith, understood as the rational acceptance of what God has done in Christ.62  The 
Pauline phrase “justification by faith” is assumed to be the condensed form of this 
two-stage salvation scheme. 
 
According to Campbell, this salvation theory begins with a theological interpretation 
of the biblical material, rather than with what the text itself reveals about the nature of 
justice and salvation.  As a theory, it brings to the text a set of preconceived criteria 
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about justice derived from the human situation, which then determines what questions 
get asked of the text, as well as what counts as an answer.  This is what Campbell 
means by a “foundationalist epistemology,” a problem that has plagued Christian 
thought from at least the time of Arianism.63  In particular, this salvation theory 
begins with fundamental “commitments to individualism, to consent, and to the 
practice of regulating human relationships through conditionality and contract.”64  It 
analogizes salvation in terms of a contract – or a series of contracts – in a similar way 
to the sixteenth century doctrine of the Western ordo salutis.  This theory provided a 
reading of the biblical text that owes more to Western notions of the individual, 
society, and justice, than it does to the categories of Scripture.  
 
Campbell’s goal is to expose the master metaphors and analogies shaping this 
justification discourse.  Alongside the analogy of a contract, it presupposes that “the 
justice of God that undergirds the created cosmos is … retributive – bound to reward 
the righteous inevitably and punish the guilty implacably.”65  This presumption also 
works in a foundationalist sense.  God’s character as retributive and legislative is 
known apart from any special revelation; it is by conscience we know ourselves to be 
guilty and deserving of God’s judgment.  “In a very real sense,” as Campbell portrays 
this theory, “ethical legislation based on retributive justice is the fundamental 
structure of the universe, as well as of the divine nature.”66  This model of justification 
offers far more than a reading of Paul’s dikaio-texts; it offers a view of the cosmos 
and of God’s nature understood in fundamentally moralistic and retributive terms.   
 
Clearly then, the terminology used to translate the biblical notion of justice, combined 
with a set of foundational claims about God and his justice, have produced 
interpretations of Scripture that are truncated at best, and the antithesis of Paul’s 
gospel of God’s saving justice, at worst.  These interpretations have had a deleterious 
impact on the realm of criminal justice.  Ecclesial ethics invites a re-reading of 
Scripture that gives priority to the ecclesial rather than the judicial context for 
understanding the justice of God.  It is to this task we now turn. 
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The place to begin is with a fresh consideration of Paul’s “forensic” texts, guided by 
Campbell’s perspective.  However, a prior methodological point first needs to be 
clarified.  Even though Campbell identifies “retributive justice” as the driving 
presupposition behind “Justification Theory,” he does not propose a more restorative 
understanding in its place.67  Instead, he emphasizes the ultimately benevolent 
character of God: “Paul’s root metaphor of God, then, is benevolent, or merciful.  
There is no retributive character to the God revealed to Paul by Christ.”68  Campbell 
still regards God’s justice to be a central concern in Paul’s theology.  However, he is 
cautious about determining the meaning of this term in advance of its disclosure 
through the Christ event.  This was the mistake of the above theory of justification.  It 
determined the nature of God’s justice apart from Christ and then applied this notion 
to his work, thus producing an image of Christ as falling victim to divine justice.   
 
Campbell pursues what might be called a christocentric approach to dikaiosuné tou 
theou, allowing its meaning to be defined in the light of God’s self-disclosure in Jesus 
Christ.  He claims that this was Paul’s own theological approach, as attested in texts 
like Rom. 1:17 and 3:21-26.69  This starting point significantly broadens the content of 
justice, in that it now incorporates all that is known of Christ, as well as what was 
achieved through his life, death, and resurrection.  Dikaiosuné theou thus functions as 
Paul’s shorthand for all God has accomplished through Christ now being made 
available for those who are in Christ.  By implication, Campbell argues that the justice 
of God is best understood as an event more than an attribute, disclosed through the 
particular story of Jesus.  It is, moreover, a saving or a liberating event, in the sense of 
being freed from captivity, as well as being brought into a life giving state.  God’s 
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justice has a direction, moving away from enslavement to the age of sin and death and 
towards the eschatological age of resurrection life.70 
 
By situating Paul’s dikaio language within the wider narrative context of Jesus’ life, 
Campbell reveals how limiting it is to read Paul’s forensic texts in the modern judicial 
sense of declaring a verdict.  Paul’s language is far more flexible than this; it is 
equally capable of speaking about Christ as the disclosure of the justice of God, 
revealing who God truly is, as well as the justice from God, in the sense of pointing us 
towards God.71  This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the cross and 
resurrection of Christ through which the nature of God’s justice as benevolent is 
revealed, and the distorted conceptions of justice represented by those who crucified 
him are overturned.72  At other times, Paul can use dikaio- terms in relation to its 
liberating implications for humanity, since the Spirit is now incorporating people into 
Christ’s death and resurrection as participants in God’s dikaiosuné.73  These textual 
nuances have been obliterated in the translation history noted above.  
 
Campbell proposes that Paul’s use of dikaiosuné theou has deep resonances in the 
ancient discourse of kingship, and in particular texts like Psalm 98:2-3 that speak of 
God as king acting to bring about his victory.  Paul’s purpose in alluding to this 
kingship discourse is to reinforce what has already been said explicitly:  
 
In undertaking this act in Christ, God is operating as the divine King ought 
to, delivering his captive creation from its bondage; he is therefore doing 
the ‘right’ thing, acting as his character and role demand.  And dikaiosuné 
theou is, as a result and in essence, the deliverance of God.74  
  
Paul’s justice language is to be understood as deliverance language, deliverance 
specifically from those powers that are arraigned in opposition to the kingdom 
inaugurated by Christ and his Spirit.   
 
                                                
70 These designations are spelled out much further in ibid., 684-87. 
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account of Paul’s gospel, replete with ethical implications, Douglas Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s 
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Paul’s understanding of justification, therefore, far from being simply declarative, 
functions more in a performative manner.  God justifies in the sense of acting to 
liberate the captives, which, as Israel’s history attests, he does irrespective of whether 
they deserve that liberation.  Paul’s justice language “needs to be read in performative 
terms as a divine act – a judgment or declaration – that effects release for the captives; 
it is a command by God in Christ to set the prisoners free!”75  Jesus’ crucifixion does 
not simply affect a balance on some divine ledger; his entire life is rather the 
consistent enactment of God’s determination to restore humanity to freedom.  The 
benevolent character of God’s justice is thus perfectly encapsulated in the claim that 
“God justifies the ungodly” – a claim that cannot properly be said of the 
foundationalist theory of justification, which inserts a prior ethical and penal criterion 
to which even Christ is subject.76 
 
This reading of dikaiosuné tou theou in Paul parallels many of the same themes 
emphasized by those who interpret the justice of God as a restorative justice.  For 
example, Michael Gorman argues that “the justice of God” has nothing to do with 
retribution, but must rather be understood as “God’s saving, liberating, and restorative 
justice.”77  Paul’s justification language is about the restoration and renewal of human 
relationships made possible by “practices of justice” that are liberative and 
transformative.78  Considering that human dysfunction is profoundly manifest in 
practices of violence towards others, Gorman argues that justification has the specific 
determination of creating a people who embody a just peace.  “In Christ, justice and 
peace embrace, and in Christ God was – and is – making a people into the justice of 
God.”79 
 
Likewise, Christopher Marshall provides an excellent survey on the biblical notion of 
justice, concluding that the “justice of God is not primarily or normatively a 
retributive justice or a distributive justice but a restorative or reconstructive justice, a 
saving action by God that recreates shalom and makes things right.”80  Read in this 
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79 Ibid., 40. 




light, Paul’s gospel is thoroughly concerned with “God’s definitive eschatological 
justice-initiative” through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  Having 
entered into the depths of the human condition, Christ absorbed the full punitive 
power of sin in order that humanity might be absorbed into God’s saving justice.  This 
exchange carries with it the implication that believers are to become “vehicles of 
restorative justice in God’s afflicted world,” pursuing the restoration of relationships 
and the recreation of shalom.81   
 
Other examples could be cited, all showing that a better reading of the justice of God 
is possible.82  Eschewing the demands of retribution and the vindication of an abstract 
law, the justice of God is concerned with the liberation/deliverance/restoration of a 
people from a captive state into a life-giving/restored/peace-orientated state.  This is a 
better reading because it allows justice to be defined by God’s self-disclosure in 
Christ and makes clear that the proper context for the embodiment of God’s justice is 
the church, not the judicial system.   
 
While Paul saw the Christ-event as definitive for understanding the justice of God, he 
still drew on an existing linguistic stock of biblical terms in order to express the 
present eschatological reality of Jesus Christ as the justice of God.  Some appreciation 
of the Hebraic background of these terms is therefore essential to understanding his 
message. 
 
The notion of justice in the Hebrew Scriptures is represented primarily by the mishpat 
(often translated “justice”) and tsedeqah (often rendered “righteousness”) word 
groups.  These two terms are frequently found together as a hendiadys – “justice and 
righteousness” – indicating they are mutually reinforcing.83  Mishpat has tended to be 
translated as “justice” because of its connection to categories of judgment (dîn) and 
equity.  Temba Mafico suggests that there is “strong evidence that attests that 
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originally the substantive mispât referred to the restoration of a situation or 
environment which promoted equity and harmony (sâlôm) in a community.”84  The 
emphasis of mishpat is on the re-establishment or restoration of rightness among 
relationships, an action that takes place in the context of judgment.  It was specifically 
employed in cases where cultural and ritual ordinances were being ignored (Exod 
15:25), or when the unjust treatment of disadvantaged groups prevailed (Deut 16:18-
20, 24:17).  This second theme became particularly prominent in the Prophets and the 
Psalter – especially with respect to the widow, stranger, and orphan – because the 
existence of the oppressed highlighted the lack of justice in Israel (cf. Ps 9:7-12, 82:1-
8; Amos 5:21-24; Mic 6:6-8).85 
 
The term tsedeqah or “righteousness” is a much more complex term to define because 
of the range of other concepts it brings into its service.  Interpreters argue over its 
most fundamental force; some of the candidates are “justice,” “straightness,” 
“integrity,” “deliverance,” or “salvation.”86  What is clear is that the term goes beyond 
the simple definition of “not doing wrong” in the sense of transgressing rules and 
regulations.  Tsedeqah is “comprehensively relational,” as Marshall puts it; it is 
particularly concerned with how one acts towards another for the sake of the 
relationship.87  It is not so much an internal disposition or virtue, such that one could 
possess tsedeqah in isolation from others.  As a concept, it is orientated towards the 
active seeking of relationships that are “right,” in the sense of being whole or at 
peace.88 
 
The relational nature of Hebrew justice explains why it so often appears in connection 
with the concept of covenant (berît), understood as a committed relationship.  Many 
biblical interpreters view the covenantal relationship between Yahweh and the people 
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of Israel as the primary context for understanding tsedeqah.89  According to James 
Torrance, “a covenant is a promise binding two people or two parties to love one 
another unconditionally.”90  There were two basic types of covenant: a bilateral 
covenant between two equals that carried mutual obligations (e.g., a marriage), and a 
unilateral covenant initiated by one party for the sake of another (e.g., a king to his 
subjects).  It was this latter type that formed the relationship between Yahweh and 
Israel.  The covenant was not conditioned by anything Yahweh found in Israel, which 
means that it was freely initiated, an act of grace or love on the part of Yahweh.  A 
relationship based on unconditional grace called for an equally unconditional response 
of devotion to Yahweh, on the part of Israel.91 
 
Within this covenantal relationship, tsedeqah took the form of faithfulness or loyalty.  
On Israel’s part this meant living in accord with torah (“law”), understood as God’s 
gift to Israel to conform the people to the “way” or derek of God.92  Faithfulness to 
law was considered to be liberating, because of its orientation towards shalom, the 
life-giving peace of God.  Law had more of a pedagogical function promoting 
rightness and peace across all areas of Israelite life, rather than a punitive or 
prescriptive function.93  Torah was understood not as a strictly legal obligation in 
terms of conformity to a rule, but rather as a filial obligation to live in a just peace, as 
Yahweh himself is peace and justice.94  The justice expected of Israel was to be found 
in faithfulness to Yahweh, exhibited in social relationships that were just, caring, and 
peaceful, as specified in the law.95   
 
The people of Israel repeatedly failed to reflect the righteousness expected of them.  
They failed, in other words, to be “image bearers” of God’s tsedeqah by being 
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unconditionally faithful to the covenant, and so also to their neighbour as expressed 
through the torah.96  Israel’s failure did not, however, place conditions on God to 
exact retribution in keeping with his justice.  Rather, Israel’s failure called forth 
Yahweh’s tsedeqah as a merciful justice, showing his unconditional faithfulness to 
Israel by restoring the covenantal relationship.  God’s justice was satisfied not by the 
punishment of Israel, though this often occurred, but rather by her rescue and 
salvation, even when it did not deserve to be rescued.  “For Israel, the justice of God 
was not an abstract theological or philosophical axiom; it was something about God’s 
being learned from the concrete experience of God’s actions of claiming, blessing, 
and rescuing Israel.”  Marshall concludes that, “Righteousness language in the 
Hebrew Bible is thus action language as well as relational language.97  It was an 
action expressed, moreover, as mercy.  
 
The justice of God filled Israel with hope more than fear.  For example, Isaiah 
prophesies of the day when the “king will reign in tsedeqah, and princes will rule with 
mishpat,” and how on that day “mishpat will dwell in the wilderness, and tsedeqah 
abide in the fruitful field.  The effect of tsedeqah will be peace (shalom), and the 
result of tsedeqah quietness and trust forever” (Isa. 32:1, 16-17; cf. 9:6, 28:17).  This 
is a vision of justice where the world is restored to rightness or shalom.  The justice of 
God, in essence, is a restorative justice, and one that was to be reflected among God’s 
people.  As recipients of God’s mercy and faithfulness, Israel was called to be “image 
bearers” of God’s restorative justice, conforming its communal life to the word of 
God in torah.   
 
The LXX translation of mishpat and tsedeqah predominantly into dik-terms 
introduced the possibility of misconstruing Hebraic justice/righteousness in 
Hellenistic terms.  In Greek thought, justice defined as dikaiosuné was originally 
concerned with a proper distribution in the political and ethical realm, which does 
have some resonances with the forensic function of mishpat.  This distribution, 
however, was in accord with a norm or standard that is more in line with notions of 
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merit and excellence than with the kinds of relationships specified in the Hebrew 
covenant.  A person was considered dikaios (“just”) if he lived in conformity to duty 
or tradition, which was considered its own reward.98  Hellenistic dikaiosuné was not 
restricted to legal obedience, since it can be found in connection with philanthropy 
and faithfulness in friendship.99  Applying dikaiosuné to God would have been 
understood more in the sense of God’s virtue being displayed in the just distribution 
of rewards and punishment (verb: dikaioun), whereas the Hebrew sense of God’s 
tsedeqah is of a saving and vindicating action towards God’s covenant people.100 
 
The difficulties associated with use of the dik-terms in the LXX were ameliorated by 
its predominantly Jewish audience, which would have transferred Hebraic 
understandings to the Greek terminology.  As a result, the LXX represented a 
significant broadening of the Greek terminology, mostly due to its being subsumed 
under the covenantal framework.101  Dikaiosuné came to be read in conjunction with 
God’s mercy and faithfulness, active in the vindication of God’s covenant partner (cf. 
Deut 32:4; Mic 7:9).  In fact, the Hebrew notion of tsedeqah was sometimes translated 
by eleos-terms (“mercy”) or eusebeia (“pious” or “piety”), in order to retain the strong 
soteriological overtones.  At other times, a new word would be created, dikaiokrisis 
(“just judgment”), to emphasize the role of God as judge.  In other cases dikaiosuné 
would be used to translate the Hebrew emet (“faithfulness” or “truth”), hesed 
(“kindness” or “mercy”), and mishpat.102   
 
This variation of terms may, however, have had the negative effect of flattening the 
meaning of mishpat and tsedeqah by sometimes translating them in terms of justice, 
while at other times construing them as mercy, thus implying a separation between 
God’s justice and his mercy.103  However it was clearly the intention of the Jewish 
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authors to preserve the Hebraic meaning of standing in right relationship, which was 
the controlling idea of the construction dikaiosuné tou theou. 
 
The occurrence of dik-terms in the New Testament stands in continuity with this early 
Jewish interpretation, with one significant development: the dikaiosuné tou theou is 
now said to have come to fulfillment in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.  In the Gospels, the primary theme of Jesus’ proclamation and work centered 
on the arrival of God’s kingdom, which according to Richard Hays should be 
understood as the declaration of “the radical restoration of God’s justice, setting 
things right but bringing judgment and destruction to those who resist God’s will.”104  
It was widely expected that the kingdom would usher in the end-time judgment of 
those who were adikia, while at the same time vindicating those who are dikaioi (cf., 
Luke 15:7; 25:37, 46; Matt 13:49; 5:45).   
 
Contrary to popular expectations, however, both in his teaching and through the 
manner of his life, Jesus was highly critical of those who deemed themselves dikaios 
(Matt 23:28-29; 6:1-3; Luke 18:9-12; 20:20), while choosing himself to associate 
predominantly with the adikia (Matt 9:13; Mark 2:15-17).  The meaning of Jesus’ 
commandment to “strive first for the kingdom of God and his dikaiosuné” (Matt 6:33) 
must therefore be interpreted by the manner of his life oriented towards the 
ingathering of those who were deemed outside of the covenant.105  For this reason, 
God’s justice is “good news to the poor,” “release to the captives,” and “freedom for 
the oppressed,” as Jesus proclaimed in his inaugural sermon (Luke 4:18).  The justice 
of God’s kingdom is concerned, therefore, with the liberation of those who have been 
oppressed or marginalized, and insofar as Jesus enacted this concern through his life, 
he “embodied biblical justice,” as Gorman puts it.106  
 
                                                
104 Hays, Moral Vision, 163; cited in Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 71. 
105 In Neville’s opinion, Jesus’ proclamation and embodiment of divine justice entailed a degree of 
“interpretive innovation.” While divine judgment retains a retributive dimension according to Neville, 
Jesus reconstructed the understanding of judgment through his own mission to the degree that it was 
“neither purely nor even primarily retributive … [rather] scriptural justice in its truest and deepest sense 
may be said to be restorative, rectifying or transformative,” Neville, “Justice and Public Theology,” 8. 




If in the Gospel tradition Jesus is understood as a “prophet of the justice of the reign 
of God,”107 as Herzog argues, then it is quite appropriate to see his ministry as 
bringing to fulfillment the covenantal relationship.  This can be seen in three 
movements.  First, Jesus re-establishes an even stronger filial bond between Israel and 
Yahweh by claiming God as Abba (“Father”).  Moreover, Jesus embodies God’s 
healing and forgiving power by making it personally accessible to the paralytic, 
demon possessed, and adikia.108  Second, Jesus exemplifies the higher dikaiosuné 
expected of God’s covenant people (cf. Matt 5:20ff), especially through his teaching 
and example of non-retaliation, enemy-love, and unlimited forgiveness.  Third, Jesus 
forms a community to be “living witnesses to the transforming character of God’s 
justice,” which it does in part through the practices of peacemaking and 
reconciliation.109  Moreover, Jesus ensures that this community is empowered to be 
dikaios through his example and Spirit.  
 
In the New Testament, Jesus is consistently portrayed as the embodiment of the 
restorative justice of God.  It is through him that God’s deliverance of captive 
humanity is revealed, and it is in him that humanity is restored to a right relationship 
with God and to one another.  It was on account of this experience of God’s justice in 
Christ that the early church “lived out in their faith communities an understanding of 
justice as a power that heals, restores, and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and 
kills,” and, as Marshall argues, “that reality ought to shape and direct a Christian 
contribution to the criminal justice debate today.”110  That the early followers of Jesus 
were known for their forgiveness, fellowship, and relational fidelity, testifies to the 
restorative and relational character of Jesus’s mission.  As they reflected on Jesus’ 
story, the church came to regard this prophet from Nazareth as the one in whom the 
reign of God’s justice had been fulfilled. 
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Our brief survey has confirmed that the justice of God in Scripture is primarily a 
restorative rather than a retributive or punitive justice.  This is not to say that 
retributive features are entirely absent from the biblical material.  However, they are 
subordinate to the conviction that God’s justice is first of all a comprehensively 
liberative, merciful, and redemptive justice.111  For the biblical people of God, justice 
is a relational concept defined by God’s own self-disclosure through the covenant 
initiated with Israel, and definitively through his own Son.  It is on account of this 
covenantal and christological qualification that the justice of God can rightly be 
described as a restorative justice.   
 
The next two chapters will flesh this truth out in relation to one of Jesus’ parables and 
one of Paul’s epistles.  Focusing attention on two specific texts will complement the 
broader description of biblical justice presented in this chapter.  Before moving on, 
however, we need to draw together some of the threads that have emerged in this 
chapter and clarify how the recovery of the theological interpretation of Scripture can 
help to bring about a better practice of justice in the church.  
 
We began this chapter with the claim that restorative justice is a striking example of 
the ecclesial embodiment of the justice of God.  This claim was substantiated, first, by 
an exploration of the church’s identity as the community that embodies the story of 
Scripture so as to live faithfully before God, which itself is part of a broader renewal 
of emphasis on the place of the church as a fully social and political body.  A 
consideration of “binding and loosing” in Matthew 18:15-22 showed that the 
distinctive character of this body is formed in the task of peacemaking and communal 
discernment.   
 
The overriding concern of this thesis is to extend the insights of ecclesial ethics into 
the realm of justice and justice-making, an undertaking that needs to be grounded in 
the theological interpretation of Scripture.  This involves contending with problematic 
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interpretations that have truncated the meaning of biblical justice and brought a set of 
preconceived ideas and interpretive frameworks about the meaning of justice to the 
text.  By contrast, ecclesial ethics invites us to give priority to the ecclesial rather than 
judicial context in the interpretation of the justice of God, which involves interpreting 
justice in the light of the central biblical categories of covenant and Christ.   
 
Conceiving of biblical justice as a covenantal and christological reality produces a 
better reading of Scripture.  It is better because it involves a reading that calls for a 
social and embodied response on the part of the reading community.  Interpreting 
biblical justice in strictly forensic terms has eroded the social face of justice, which 
has made it increasingly difficult for the church to give concrete expression to its own 
distinctive conception of justice.  By contrast, a covenantal and christological 
construal of justice carries definite social obligations.  In particular, it requires 
relational faithfulness, a commitment to restore ruptured relationships to rightness or 
peace, and a bringing of those who are oppressed or held captive into a life-giving 
freedom.   
 
In asking how the people of God might collectively embody the liberative justice of 
God revealed in Scripture, the restorative justice movement has much to offer.  This is 
not to suggest that everything which goes under the banner of restorative justice today 
is synonymous with God’s justice, but there are deep resonances between the two 
streams. 
 
One valuable feature of restorative justice theory and practice is the way it critiques 
the underlying assumptions of the retributive worldview, including its perspective on 
God.  “The concept of retribution or punishment as justice,” as Zehr and Grimsrud 
illustrate with reference to the historical roots of criminal justice, “is an issue shaped 
decisively by beliefs about God and God’s character.”112  This retributive perspective 
tends to view all infractions against law as personal violations of God’s holiness, 
which in turn invokes God’s righteous anger that needs to be satisfied through some 
“violent punishment.”113  Zehr and Grimsrud argue that this interpretation of the 
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biblical text is untenable; it is the result of a selective reading of Scripture and 
obsessively committed to a “basic theology of a retributive God who desires 
violence.”114 
 
After surveying the biblical evidence, Zehr and Grimsrud conclude, “biblical justice 
(and the biblical God) places a high priority on restoring relationships and social 
wholeness in the face of brokenness and alienation (e.g., crime).  Hence, we might 
call it restorative justice.”115  They go further by explaining how this restorative 
perspective on God’s justice is being lived out in the restorative justice movement.  
Through practices like Victim Offender Reconciliation, Family Group Conferencing, 
and Sentencing Circles, a new peacemaking approach to criminal justice is taking 
form that constitutes a vigorous critique of the theological roots of retributivism and 
shows that “the deepest roots of Western theology, found in the Bible, are indeed fully 
compatible with new, peacemaking approaches to criminal justice.”116  With this 
confidence, we turn now to one of the most potent stories of restorative justice ever 
told in the Bible. 
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The previous chapter established that the justice of God is best understood as a 
restorative justice, on account of its disclosure in the Christ event as a saving and 
peacemaking justice.  Recognition of this divine justice by the community of faith 
carries a corresponding obligation to reflect such justice within its own internal life, as 
well as in the wider world.  This in turn requires an ongoing engagement with 
Scripture.  For as ecclesial ethics rightly asserts, the church’s primary vocation is to 
further the story of Scripture by embodying its central convictions and priorities in its 
own life and witness, especially with respect to peacemaking.  Having considered the 
larger restorative dimensions of biblical justice, in the next two chapters we narrow 
our focus to two smaller textual units – a Gospel parable and a Pauline epistle – in 
order to show how a theological reading of Scripture informed by restorative justice 
can furnish significant insights into the ecclesiological dimensions of God’s justice. 
 
First we will focus on one of the best known parables of Jesus, found in the Gospel of 
Luke – the Parable of the Prodigal Son (15:11-32).  It is a story about a young man 
who selfishly disregards the livelihood of his father and fellow kin by taking off to a 
far country with his inheritance.  After some time, he “comes to himself” and returns 
home, only to be greeted by his father with a compassionate embrace instead of the 
expected chastisement.  This parable provides ample resources for exploring 
responses to wrongdoing through the numerous characters involved in this story.1  It 
throws into relief the difference between a restorative understanding of justice, 
fulfilled in the reintegration of offenders through the practices of repentance and 
forgiveness, and a justice that prioritizes the law of just deserts through practices of 
punishment and exclusion.   
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In exploring this story, I will draw on a recent reading of this parable by Christopher 
Marshall, one of the foremost theological interpreters of restorative justice.  
Marshall’s reading takes seriously the proper relational context of justice as well as its 
peaceable ends by bringing a “restorative justice lens to the task of New Testament 
interpretation.”2  His treatment builds on his earlier argument in Beyond Retribution,  
 
the first Christians experience in Christ and lived out in their faith 
communities an understanding of justice as a power that heals, restores, 
and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and kills, and that reality ought 
to shape and direct a Christian contribution to the criminal justice debate 
today.3   
 
This insight accords closely with the argument proposed in this thesis – that just as the 
early Christian communities embodied a restorative understanding of justice, so 
Christian communities today should seek to participate in the working out of divine 
justice, as it is revealed and enacted in Jesus Christ. 
2. Theological	Interpretation	with	a	Restorative	Lens	
 
In the judgment of Geoffrey Broughton, as a result of Marshall’s exegetical work, 
“discourse in the restorative justice movement has not remained superficial (cf. earlier 
vague notions of its ‘spiritual roots’) but has become more biblical!”4  Marshall has 
brought the insights of restorative justice to the reading of Scripture in ways that have 
sharpened and deepened the conviction that God’s justice is fundamentally a 
restorative reality.  “With ‘one foot in the academy’ and ‘one foot in the justice 
system,’” writes Broughton, “Marshall has been attentive to both principle and 
practice … As a scholar-activist, therefore, Marshall demonstrates how biblical 
studies can serve public life by becoming prescient, peaceable and performable.”5 
 
                                                
2 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 3. 
3 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 33. 
4 Geoff Broughton, “Making Public Theology More Biblical or Biblical Theology More Public? 
Christopher Marshall's Interpretation of the Parable of the Prodigal Son in Luke 15,” in The Bible, 
Justice and Public Theology, 75. 
5 Ibid., 76-77. As a point of correction, Broughton’s comments about Marshall as a “scholar-activist” 
are set within the “Australian context,” yet with the greatest respect to the Trans-Tasman relationship 




Drawing on Miroslav Volf, Broughton concurs that the convergence of theological 
and biblical studies in the field of the theological interpretation of Scripture has been 
the “most significant theological development of the last two decades.”6  However, 
such interpretations have often failed to generate the kind of public performance 
desired due to the interpretive task still being bound to the discourse and context of 
the academy.  It has tended to reproduce a mode of analysis that fosters a separation 
between the concerns of Scripture and its contemporary embodiment in the lives of 
believers.   
 
Marshall’s reading of Jesus’ parables demonstrates the kind of interpretation required 
if there is to be a genuine recovery of embodied practice.  According to Broughton, 
his reading is distinguished by being prescient, peaceable, and performable.   
 
A prescient reading includes historical interpretations without becoming 
frozen in another time; a peaceable reading incorporates cultural 
interpretations without being located in some other place; and a 
performable reading integrates practical-theological interpretations within 
concrete, local relationships and community.7   
 
Broughton rightly notes that the story of Scripture calls for a publicly embodied 
response, which means its interpretation must not be constrained by historical, 
cultural, or metaphorical meanings that are inaccessible to contemporary believers.8  
 
Marshall’s approach overcomes these difficulties by employing a “lens of restorative 
justice” in his interpretation of Jesus’ parables.  As Broughton explains:  
 
The reading of Scripture through the lens of restorative justice is prescient 
because it addresses contemporary issues of wrongdoing; it is peaceable 
because it reconciles wrongdoers and victims; and it is performable 
because it transcends the divide between a public debate over “law and 
order” (fixing crime as the responsibility of government) or more private, 
“therapeutic” resolutions (helping victims as therapeutic intervention).9   
                                                
6 Ibid., 75 (italics original); citing Miroslav Volf, Captive to the Word of God: Engaging the Scriptures 
for Contemporary Theological Reflection (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 14. 
7 Broughton, “Public Theology,” 74. 
8 While Broughton’s concern is rightly placed, and one that I share, the argument he mounts to 
highlight this concern is not as convincing. In particular, he claims that the approach to the story of the 
Prodigal Son by Joachim Jeremias, Kenneth Bailey, and Miroslav Volf, all fall short of a “fully public 
social ethic.” While this may be true in part, it is argued in too sweeping a manner to be convincing, see 
ibid., 77-80. 





It will not be necessary to trace all the ways in which Broughton draws these features 
out, although there is one feature that deserves special comment.  It is principally 
Marshall’s emphasis on “restoring of honour to victim, wrongdoer and their 
community” in his reading of the Prodigal Son parable that, in the opinion of 
Broughton, stands out for both its contemporary relevance and for its potential 
offensiveness.  To make wrongdoers an object of honour represents perhaps the most 
striking challenge to contemporary notions of what justice requires.   
 
By bringing attention to the role of honour, which was arguably a dominant theme in 
Anselm’s theory of substitutionary atonement, Broughton uses this to point out a 
serious lacuna in Marshall’s theology.  Broughton is critical of what he perceives to 
be a lack of emphasis on Jesus’ death and resurrection in Marshall’s writing as a 
whole, which he claims has contributed to an incomplete christology in the 
theological literature on restorative justice.10  Following the influence of John Yoder, 
Marshall presents an image of Jesus as a “prophet of compassionate justice” in his 
ministry, but does not accompany this with an image of “Jesus for others” manifested 
in his death and resurrection.11  In this respect, Broughton claims, Marshall resembles 
a weakness in Yoder.   
 
Yoder excludes from his interpretation Jesus’ suffering death for others 
or, on their behalf.  Participation in the cross – something that Yoder 
wants to emphasize along with the related themes of reconciliation, 
discipleship, and subordination – is severed from forgiveness and 
salvation … As an interpretation of Jesus’ death, it is Yoder who can be 
indicted for abandoning theological responsibility.12   
 
Broughton’s rather bold claim is grounded in a distinction between Jesus’ cross and 
his death.  He claims that both Yoder and Marshall have contributed to a significant 
reshaping of traditional atonement debates by emphasizing the explicit connection 
between nonviolence and justice in Jesus’ way of the cross.  In reaction to the 
                                                
10 See in particular Broughton’s thesis, “Restorative Justice and Jesus Christ: Why Restorative Justice 
Requires a Holistic Christology,” PhD thesis (Charles Sturt University, 2011). 
11 “Theological notions of repentance and forgiveness are properly located in an understanding of Jesus’ 
death for others.  At this point my proposal of the restorative Christ necessarily critiques Yoder’s 
nonviolent Jesus, and to a lesser extent, Marshall’s compassionate Jesus,” Broughton, Restorative 
Christ: Jesus, Justice, and Discipleship (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 85. 




spiritualizing and violence-inducing tendencies of “substitutionary” theories of the 
atonement, these theologians have emphasized that the cross is first and foremost a 
symbol for nonviolent discipleship.  Jesus’ rejection of any form of counter-reprisal 
against the Romans is now expected of all those who would bear their own cross as 
disciples of the rebel Jesus (Luke 14:27).13  According to Broughton, this emphasis on 
the cross as a symbol of nonviolent discipleship evades drawing any theological 
implication from Jesus’ death as a death for others.  While he agrees that Jesus’ cross 
was a death by his enemies, thereby requiring disciples to be nonviolent towards 
enemies, Broughton stresses that it was also a death for enemies, which requires a 
more active and sacrificial stance of “enemy-love.”14   
 
Broughton is right in pointing to the danger of interpretations that emphasize the cross 
as a discipleship ethic at the expense of attention to Jesus’ death as a death for others.  
This concern may equally be expressed as a separation between the imitation of Christ 
and participation in Christ, where, theologically speaking, imitation presupposes 
participation and participation demands imitation.  The works of Christ cannot be 
appropriated without having been transformed by the work of Christ.  In fact, 
Broughton could be charged with not taking his insight far enough, since his 
discussion of Jesus’ death for others still remains thoroughly determined by the 
concern to develop a practicable, imitable ethic.  He does not extend his theological 
intuition into providing an account of how through the Spirit people are being grafted 
into the newly created humanity that exists in Christ, and as co-participants in this 
new humanity new forms of relating to one another are made possible.  Broughton’s 
reading, in other words, falls short of describing the full ontic and epistemic reality 
entailed by metanoia en Christou.  This perhaps explains why Broughton’s published 
work lacks a strongly pneumatological dimension.15 
 
While Broughton’s concern might be commended, the target of this concern in the 
work of Marshall and Yoder is not as convincing.  Marshall, for example, writes that 
there is a “substitutionary dimension to Christ’s death,” which is clearly attested in 
                                                
13 Broughton particularly draws this reading of the cross from Yoder’s essay, “Are You The One Who 
is to Come?,” in John H. Yoder, For the Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 199-218. 
14 Broughton, Restorative Christ, 44ff. 
15 There are notes of this “Spirit” christology in Broughton’s doctoral thesis, but it is curiously lacking 




Paul’s reflections as a death “for us” and “for our sins.”16  This is essential to the 
entire logic of Marshall’s understanding of the justice of God as a restorative justice.  
“God’s definitive eschatological justice-initiative takes place in the death and 
resurrection of Christ.”17  It is through the cross and resurrection that God discloses 
himself as a God for others, precisely by delivering people from captivity to the 
powers of sin and death and restoring them to a new humanity in Christ.  
Substitutionary language is here understood in a representative sense, whereby Jesus 
suffers the cost of full solidarity with sinful humanity through his death on their 
behalf, but is then raised to life again by God with liberating implications for all 
humanity.  Neither Marshall nor Yoder are interested in a merely exemplary 
soteriology.  This is because of how seriously they both consider this new life to be, 
which is made possible as a result of God’s restorative justice through the cross and 
resurrection of Christ.  
 
It is true that Marshall’s treatment of the Prodigal Son does not deal with issues of 
atonement and resurrection.  However, this is only because these concerns are alien to 
the purpose of Jesus’ parabolic discourse in general, and this parable in particular.  
According to Marshall, Jesus’ parables offer the church a unique resource for seeking 
to promote a vision of restorative justice in secular society, precisely because of their 
referential or metaphorical function.  The parables were intended to “project an 
entirely new world of perception and experience, and they invited hearers into that 
reconfigured world as active participants, both imaginatively and in terms of 
subsequent behavior.”18  The reality depicted by these stories invites their audience, 
both then and now, to participate in this reality by embodying the message of the story 







                                                
16 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 61. 
17 Ibid., 57. 








Marshall reads the opening line of Jesus’ parable – “A certain man had two sons” (v. 
11) – as an indication that the parable “is all about interpersonal relationships.”19  It is 
a mistake to isolate any individual character in the narrative as the central protagonist.  
Each of the characters in this story plays a representative role – the younger son 
exemplifying the repentant sinner Jesus came to save, the Father’s forgiving embrace 
personifying the benevolent character of God, and the older son’s penchant for legal 
custom serving as a cipher for the scribes and Pharisees.  But the real drama of the 
parable arises precisely because of the bonds of relationality between these characters.  
As Marshall writes, “it is simply not possible to appreciate the significance of the 
actions of any of the characters without taking into account the ties of loyalty and 
identity that bound them together as a household unit and as a local community.”20   
 
This relational context leads Marshall to interpret the actions of the younger son as 
primarily an offence against his filial obligations to his father, and by extension to his 
fellow kin and community.  The boy’s thoroughgoing denial of his obligations to 
family and village make him a potential candidate for the charge of being the 
“stubborn and rebellious son” of Deut 21:18-21, which carried with it the threat of 
public execution.  “His rebellion,” Marshall writes, “consisted in a thoroughgoing 
rejection of his relational connections with, and his responsibilities towards, his 
father, his brother, and his wider village community.”  In short, “he wrecks bedrock 
relationships.”21  
 
Marshall’s emphasis on the prodigal’s sin as a matter of relational rupture exposes 
how deeply ingrained individualism is within the modern liberal psyche and how 
much it has controlled recent biblical interpretation.  The typically modern pursuit of 
an autonomous and unencumbered self leads many readers to see the younger son as, 
in the words of Miroslav Volf, “breaking out of the confines of a patriarchal home in 
                                                
19 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 185. 
20 Ibid., 186. 




order to find his authentic self and become an individual.”22  The failure of the young 
man is that he “fails to make something out of himself;”23 he fails to construct his own 
identity as separate from his culturally-imposed identity as a son.  Such an 
understanding of the “free self” would have been inimical to Jesus’ first-century 
Palestinian hearers, for whom freedom would have been understood in terms of their 
communal and relational networks.24  This parable invites its listeners to recognize the 
fundamentally relational nature of humanity, something that cannot be achieved 
within the bounds of a Western individualistic worldview.  
 
The relational context of this parable exposes another problematic tendency in modern 
thought.  When the son said to his father, “give me a share of the property that will 
belong to me,” the seriousness of the wrongdoing is not immediately obvious to 
modern readers.  This is because the son’s wrongdoing has meaning only when 
interpreted within that specific cultural-linguistic world.  Within the first century 
peasant context, the boy’s actions would have provoked extreme outrage.  The 
demand of an inheritance while his father was still in good health would have been 
considered not only improper – an inheritance can only be given voluntarily, not 
demanded – it would have also communicated the message that he wished his father 
were already dead.  Indeed, his speedy sale of the inheritance leaving his father with 
nothing to sustain him in old age would have been seen as a case of the son “planning 
metaphorically to kill his father.”25  In burning all his bridges behind him, the son 
showed no intention of ever returning; he was “effectively ‘un-sonning’ himself and 
‘de-fathering’ his father.”26   
 
Having dishonored the head of the family and having let the ancestral estate fall into 
the hands of outside opportunists, the son had “set a dangerous precedent that could 
                                                
22 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 157. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Christopher Marshall, “‘I Have Sinned against Heaven and against You’: Sin as Relational Rupture 
in the Teaching of Jesus,” in A Thinker’s Guide to Sin: Talking About Wrongdoing Today (Auckland, 
NZ: Accent Publications, 2010), 72. 
25 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 199. The connection between land, livelihood, and identity in 
agrarian societies was such that on top of the father losing any sense of security in his old age his very 
life (bios) in the world was prematurely taken from him. Under the torah the boy’s actions would have 
been seen as a direct violation of the fifth commandment: “Honour your father and your mother, so that 
your days may be long in the land that the Lord your God is giving you” (Exod 20:12, italics mine). 




imperil the welfare of the whole community.”27  Once resident in foreign lands the 
boy squandered his inheritance in dissolute living.  He was reduced to feeding pigs 
owned by a Gentile master and on Gentile land – a fate that would “effectively require 
him to renounce the regular practice of his religion.”28  Marshall concludes: “He is, in 
short, a serious and serial offender who has so thoroughly covered himself in sin and 
shame that no place remained for him in regular society.  He is utterly unclean, in 
every sense of the word, and utterly alone.”29 
 
By highlighting the relational and culturally specific nature of the son’s wrongdoing, 
Marshall’s interpretation shows how important it is to attend to the particular cultural-
linguistic world of those relationships.  As an ecclesial practice, restorative 
approaches to wrongdoing require this same attentiveness to relationships and to 




One of the consistent themes in this parable is the importance of viewing wrongdoing 
in the context of relationship, not just in the context of law.  If justice were understood 
in purely legal terms, given the nature of the younger son’s actions within his cultural 
context, there would be no hope of him being restored without first being publicly 
condemned and punished for his wrongdoing.  This is the perspective of the older 
brother.  Whether or not the punishment of death in Deut 21:18-21 would have 
applied, the retributive emphasis of reasserting the priority of law would have left 
little hope for the son’s restoration.   
 
On account of the relational perspective of this parable, a different order of justice is 
called for, a thicker or relational justice that strives for the younger son’s 
transformation and the healing of the relationships he has devastated.  Without that, 
the relationships between father and son, brother and brother, village and prodigal, 
                                                
27 Ibid., 202. 
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will continue to suffer loss.30  Whereas a retributive conception of justice would 
require the wrongdoer to suffer swift retribution, thus upholding the disinterested 
rules-based nature of this justice, a restorative conception strives for relational repair.  
It actively involves all the parties to the offence, but with the common determination 
to heal the harm done and to set a new course where relationships can once again 
flourish.  
 
For the younger son, his restoration involves a thorough turning around, not only of 
his moral condition in the far country but also of the relationships he has violated.  
The biblical word for this “thorough turning around” is repentance (teshubah, 
metanoia).  If, as Marshall argues, the prodigal son serves in Luke as the 
representative of the “sinner who repents,” then repentance is clearly a costly 
undertaking that bears witness to a transformation of the whole person.  This 
understanding of repentance involves the distinct practices of contrition, confession, 
and a restitutive life, that together lead to reconciliation or “at-one-ment.”  Marshall 
illuminates what is entailed by these distinct practices on the part of the prodigal son. 
 
The first clue that signals the younger son’s genuine repentance is in the comment that 
“he came to himself” (v.17).  On the edge of starvation, and having discarded every 
marker of self-respect, the boy has a moment of clarity where he recollects his past 
and all that he has forfeited.  The boy’s lament, however, was not simply for his own 
miserable situation.  Marshall points to the boy’s repeated reference to “my father” 
and argues that his contrition was “evinced by his remembering the bonds of 
belonging that grounded him in relationship to his paternal victim, and by his 
realization of the relational damage his behavior had caused.”31  The first step in the 
process of restoration is a truthful assessment of one’s life as a social and relational 
being.  Whilst the boy had failed to abide by the law through honouring his parents, at 
an even deeper level he had failed to abide in the relational bond that made him a son 
in the first place.  It was his “forfeited relationship with his father” that truly grieved 
                                                
30 Marshall cites Richard H. Bell as one example of this thicker conception of justice who urges for a 
“conception of justice as the practice of promoting or restoring human well-being in its totality,” ibid., 
218; Bell, Rethinking Justice. 
31 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 208. Volf argues that this “memory of sonship” is the moment that 
makes repentance possible, but it is not yet an act of repentance. Yet given that the boy’s transgression 
consisted in un-sonning himself, the turning back to the memory of sonship is already to embody the 




the son, argues Marshall, and therefore his restoration must be found in the context of 
a father-son relationship, rather than within the context of law.32 
 
If the first step on the path to restoration involves a contrite heart, the second 
important step is the act of confession.  Marshall argues that the younger son’s 
confession involves three distinct features that are crucial to what in restorative justice 
is described as “offender accountability.”33  The son’s confession, “Father I have 
sinned against heaven and before you; I am no longer worthy to be called your son; 
treat me as one of your hired servants” shows, first, an “acceptance of moral blame,” 
second, a recognition that “his actions have injured others,” and third, an 
acknowledgment this his wrongdoing has “changed the nature of his relationship to 
the victim.”34  While situational and environmental factors may contribute to an 
incident of wrongdoing, for an apology to be genuine it must communicate that the 
offender is now disowning his actions rather than excusing them or justifying what 
happened.   
 
This highlights an important difference between restorative and retributive notions of 
accountability.  Restorativists share a similar concern for personal responsibility as 
retributivists, but this is borne out in quite different ways.  Responsibility, according 
to retributivists, is understood as expiation of guilt by means of facing the 
consequence of deserved punishment.  In other words, responsibility is not fully 
discharged until the punishment has been satisfied, often regardless of whether the 
offender accepts their guilt or not.  So, for example, Antony Duff argues that, “what 
punishment requires of the offender is not actual repentance, but that he undergo the 
ritual of apology and moral reparation.”35  On this account, retributivists are ritualists, 
in the sense that accountability is communicated to offenders by making them 
perform the ritual of apology.  “Criminal punishment is,” as Duff explains, “a species 
                                                
32 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 207. 
33 New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice defines “offender accountability” as, “When a person deliberately 
inflicts wrong on another, the perpetrator has a moral obligation to accept responsibility for having 
done so and for mitigating the consequences that have ensued. Offenders demonstrate acceptance of 
this obligation by expressing remorse for their actions, by making reparation for the losses inflicted, 
and perhaps by seeking forgiveness from those whom they have treated disrespectfully. This response 
by the offender may pave the way for reconciliation to occur,” Ministry of Justice, “Restorative Justice: 
Best Practice in New Zealand,” (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2011), 33.  
34 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 208-10. 





of required apology: the offender is required to go through the motions of apology, 
even if he does not mean it.”36    
 
Restorativists, on the other hand, view responsibility as part of a dialogical process 
where all parties of an offence stand in a more truthful relationship to one another.  
Wenzel et al. argue that a restorative conception of justice is aimed at “gaining a 
shared understanding of the harm the offense has done and the values it violated.  
Justice is restored when the relevant principles and values that have been violated by 
the offense are re-established and re-validated through social consensus.”37  It is not 
enough to simply impose censure on offender extra nos.  Rather, offenders are 
encouraged to take an active part in their own self-censure by communicating to their 
victims an acceptance of responsibility for the harm they have caused and a 
willingness to re-affirm the values of the relationship they have damaged.   
 
The younger son exemplifies this self-censure by acknowledging his injury to others 
through his confession, “I have sinned against heaven and against you” (v. 18).  
Alongside the boy’s father, God is also acknowledged as being injured by the 
behaviour.  God’s solidarity with victims means that in “sinning against his father, the 
boy has spiritually offended against God,” and so, as Marshall continues, “To put 
things right with God, the boy must also put things right with his father.”38  The boy’s 
confession acknowledges that he no longer stands in a truthful relationship, either to 
his natural father or to his heavenly Father. He is no longer worthy to stand as a son or 
as a child of God, which places him in a position of vulnerability, as his worth must 
now be conferred upon him rather than claimed as a matter of right.  “Relational 
renewal,” according to Marshall, “can only ever come as a gift from victim to 
offender,” which, viewed through the lens of this parable, is a divine activity as much 
as an earthly process.39   
 
To depart briefly from Marshall’s commentary, we must consider whether the modern 
mindset would object to the prodigal’s confession.  On what grounds can God be said 
to forgive what happens on the horizontal level between humans?  According to this 
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38 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 210. 




mindset, God may be implicated as a secondary victim, at a more abstract level, but 
God can never take the place of particular victims and do what only they can do.  This 
dilemma has received considerable attention since the publication of Simon 
Wiesenthal’s book The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness.40  
Subjected to the atrocities of a Nazi concentration camp, Wiesenthal was brought to 
the bed of a dying SS soldier, who wanted to confess to him, as a Jew, all that he had 
done, in the hope that Wiesenthal would offer forgiveness.  After some deliberation, 
Wiesenthal left the soldier in silence, since he did not believe he possessed any right 
to forgive what the soldier had done to victims other than himself.  The implication of 
Wiesenthal’s conclusion is that no one, not even God, is in a position to take the place 
of primary victims by forgiving their transgressors.   
 
The prodigal’s confession hints at a possible response to this dilemma by seeing God, 
not as displacing primary victims and thereby dishonoring them, but as being in 
ontological union with all victims.  Alan Torrance explores this through the doctrine 
of the vicarious humanity of Christ.  As humanity’s representative, Christ takes into 
himself the experience of all victims by identifying with and participating in each and 
every pain and suffering by them.41  Consequently, no victim ever stands alone in 
their suffering, since they always have with them an advocate and mediator who has 
absorbed their pain into the very being of God.   
 
Wiesenthal may be right to suggest that he is in no position to forgive what was not 
done to him, but that does not mean no forgiveness is possible.  The God of victims 
revealed in Christ offers forgiveness where humans cannot.42  The uncomfortable and 
costly truth about God’s solidarity with humanity is that offenders do not stand alone 
                                                
40 Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1998). 
41 Torrance emphasises the particularity of Christ’s participation in humanity as more central to the 
Pauline concept than the universalizing of Christ’s humanity, which would tend to displace the 
particular sufferings of particular victims, Alan J. Torrance, “The Theological Grounds for Advocating 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Sociopolitical Realm,” in The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, 
Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
2006), 75. 
42 I am indebted to Murray Rae for this understanding of forgiveness in response to Wiesenthal’s 
dilemma, paper presented at Theology and Church History Seminar, University of Otago, New Zealand, 
2013, n.p. This understanding of divine forgiveness also provides a corrective to Maria Mayo’s concern 
to reserve forgiveness until repentance in wrongdoers is evident, see, Maria Mayo, The Limits of 





either, since God has stooped to become their advocate also.  To extend forgiveness 
therefore, as Torrance points out, “denotes concrete participation by grace in God’s 
unconditional forgiveness of enemies that, to the extent that they are ours, are also his 
but whom he also loves and forgives.”43  It is this reality of God’s commitment to 
both victims and offenders that is evoked in the parable.  
 
Returning to Marshall’s reading, the acknowledgment by the young man that he has 
forfeited his right to be a son raises the question of how he is to present himself before 
his father.  He resolves to throw himself on his mercy, asking him to treat him as a 
“day labourer,” someone who must earn his own place in the household.  While 
Marshall considers it a stretch to interpret this as a means for making full financial 
restitution to the father, there is still a restitutive quality about the boy’s request.44  
Offering to serve as a labourer in service to his father reflects a reversal of his actions 
in squandering the livelihood his father laboured for.  Restitution is a crucial part of 
the restorative justice process, but more because of its “symbolic power” than because 
of the aim of full material compensation.  Marshall draws on Zehr’s explanation,  
 
Restitution symbolizes a restoration of equity, and it states implicitly that 
someone else – not the victim – is responsible.  It is a way of denouncing 
the wrong, absolving the victim, and saying who is responsible.  
Accordingly, restitution is about responsibility and meaning as much as or 
more than actual repayment of losses.45   
 
 
Combined with his change of heart and readiness to confess his sins, the boy’s 
willingness to serve as a labourer at his father’s service illustrates that repentance 
involves all of his mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical faculties, as he seeks to 
be restored.  He recognizes that his sin is not merely against law but against 
relationships; the path back to wholeness is through the difficult and vulnerable 
process of acknowledging the harm he has caused to those around him, and then 
placing himself at their mercy.   
 
                                                
43 Torrance, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” 76. 
44 Marshall considers this interpretation as a “possible inference from the text, not the main point at 
issue,” Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 212, cf. 212 fn. 56.  Manual workers existed at a subsistence 
level, and were thus not likely to be in the position of saving the equivalent of what the young son 
spent on his travels.  




A possible misconception of Marshall’s interpretation of this parable needs to be 
addressed.  By emphasizing the relational nature of the son’s offending, it does not 
follow that the parable is concerned only with a private family matter that has little to 
contribute to public political concerns.  This is a common argument against restorative 
conceptions of justice.  According to Duff, for example, criminal punishment has a 
“reconciliatory aim,” but this is not of the intimate type of restorative justice, which is 
more “apt to reconcile spouses, family members, partners, friends, or neighbors, if 
reconciliation is understood as the restoration of those bonds of affection and close 
mutual concern by which such relationships are structured.”46  The criminal law’s 
reconciliatory aim is “somewhat distant and formal,” as it requires solely that 
“citizens play their proper part.”47  But this parable shows that the path of genuine 
repentance is a thoroughly political process, more so than Duff’s compliance-driven 
understanding of citizenship. 
 
Graham Ward interprets the trajectory of the prodigal son’s wrongdoing as leading 
him into a “state of depoliticization.”48  Having alienated himself from the economy 
and property of his family estate, rebelling against the authority and governance of his 
elders, and entering into another society where he is no citizen at all, the son has 
forfeited his place in the polis.  He had pursued a “solipsistic freedom, a profound 
auto-affection” that placed him, in Ward’s opinion: “Outside human society … 
someone without rights, beyond the law, someone subhuman and therefore to be 
housed with the animals.”49  The real political issue, in view of this parable, is how 
this son might resurrect his citizenship.   
 
The journey of repentance is a political process because it involves restoring the 
relational bonds that make one a citizen in the first place.  Without this relational and 
political repair, the imposition of any retributive ritual of punishment serves simply to 
further depoliticize and disenfranchise offenders.  It would only thwart the movement 
detected in this prodigal, when he said to himself, “I will get up” (anastas, v.18,).  By 
these words he establishes a future direction for his life, and it moves him to imagine 
once again a place for himself within the established order of household and 
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economy.  The sphere of relationships highlighted by Marshall is no less political 
because it is relational.  Rather, as the prodigal’s words suggest, offenders are in need 
of resurrection (anastasis) into a citizenship where their alienation is overcome and 
they are enabled to contribute their part in the polis.50  
 
It has been suggested that, for Luke, the prodigal son represents what it means to be a 
“sinner who repents.”  If this is the case, then the story requires listeners who can also 
identify themselves as sinners needing to put right their own relationships through 
practices of contrition, confession, restitution, and atonement.  Moreover, as the 
journey of the prodigal shows, these practices involve the whole person in all their 
mental, physical, spiritual, and emotional capacities that together point to a consistent 
way of life.  Repentance, in other words, is a life-ethic that requires practice.  No 
community should know this more than the church where, week after week, these 
very practices are fostered in response to the call to be renewed in heart, mind, and 
body.  By calling sinners into a communion of repentance, the church embodies the 




According to Marshall, genuine repentance indicates the presence of a power working 
to effect change in a person’s identity and destiny.  This is evident in the life of the 
prodigal son, who now stands as a markedly different person than the careless and 
hurtful young man who departed from his father.  While the language of justice 
(dikaio) is not found in the parable, the narrative depiction of this restorative power 
point to what we have described as the justice of God – the active liberation of the 
ungodly to a communion of peace and right relationship.  Accordingly, repentance 
serves as a crucial marker of divine justice at work, enabling sinful offenders to 
undergo the difficult journey of relational renewal.  Repentance, however, represents 
only one side of the reconciling process, the side of the penitent.  Justice awaits the 
reception of the penitent by their victims, those who have the power to forgive and so 
confirm their new identity.   
 
                                                




This is the real power of the parable, so perfectly captured in the figure of the father 
embracing his repentant son.  The injustice committed by the young son was first and 
foremost against his father, so it is fitting that this parable of the justice of God 
reaches its fulfillment as the father restores his lost son as an outworking of 
compassionate forgiveness.  The justice enacted in the parable has the concrete 
meaning of a “compassionate commitment to restoration,” which means that 
restorative justice from a Gospel perspective is a compassionate justice.51  “It is a 
justice that is enriched, informed, and empowered by the space it gives to 
compassion.”52  The divine economy of justice does not operate according to a 
punitive logic; rather, it employs the logic of compassion, forgiveness, and restorative 
love, in response to the sinner who repents.53   
 
Marshall is right to point out that the pivotal shift in this parable occurs when the 
father was “filled with compassion,” which then issued in a commitment to the son’s 
restoration.  Yet this begs the question of what exactly is being restored?  I suggest 
that the restoration in view in this parable can be understood in terms of belonging.  
The prodigal’s actions have placed him in a moral position where he is 
excommunicated from belonging, and his reintegration is a journey to find how he can 
belong once again.  The father, on the other hand, reflects a concern for human 
victims who, as a result of experiencing the trauma and fear of being harmed, no 
longer feel like they can safely belong.  Perhaps this is why he throws a public feast 
and he goes out from the banquet to plead with his older son to join in the celebration.  
The restoration of victims is ultimately a reinstatement of their belonging, which 
involves dealing with their trauma, as well as returning to them the respect and dignity 
that comes with safely belonging. 
 
Marshall’s reading draws out numerous features of the father’s compassionate 
attributes as he responds to his younger son, and he contrasts them with the retributive 
response of the older son.  For the purpose of brevity I have grouped Marshall’s 
discussion of these attributes into three categories: the justice of mercy, reintegrative 
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honour, and the building of compassionate community.  These three qualities are vital 
to restorative approaches and each can be extended to show the kind of ecclesial ethic 




We noted in the previous chapter that the Hebraic notion of tsedeqah understood 
justice as going hand in hand with mercy.  In contrast to this thicker view of justice, 
the Latin notion of iustitia reflected a greater separation between the concepts of 
justice and mercy, such that the former represented a concern to reward or punish 
while the later was viewed as a denial of the principle of just desert.  
 
In the parable it is the older brother who represents this thin understanding of justice 
when he implicitly accuses his father of behaving unjustly in showing mercy to his 
prodigal brother (vv. 29-30).54  The older brother reacts angrily at the news that his 
younger brother has been received back without suffering any punishment, which then 
leads him to highlight the injustice of his father in not rewarding his own virtue as a 
law-abiding and industrious son.55  By failing to punish the wrongdoer and by not 
rewarding upright behaviour, the father fails to act justly according to the older son’s 
understanding of justice. 
 
But the justice of the father operates not according to the logic of just deserts but 
rather according to that “divine form of justice,” as Marshall writes, “that is 
committed to reinstating penitent offenders to full participation in the life of the 
community they have spurned and even bestows honor on them for choosing again the 
path of freedom and life in place of alienation and death.”56  The father stands in the 
biblical tradition of divine tsedeqah, a justice that had the distinctive character of 
                                                
54 Ward points out that if it were not for the older brother’s questioning, then, justice itself would be 
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father’s decisions, but rather he “became angry and refused to go in” to the feast. 
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does the parable indicate that the father felt wronged by the prodigal son or in any way violated … 
there is no reason to assume the he [the father] forgives his son for anything,” Mayo, Limits of 
Forgiveness, 75. This is a very narrow reading of the text and a complete failure to account for the 
injustice expressed by the older son in response to the father’s forgiving actions towards the younger 
son.  




restoration.  The parable has an unmistakable echo of God’s merciful justice in 
restoring his covenantal partner even after she had squandered her covenantal 
inheritance (cf. Isa 42:6, 49:6).  This observation only heightens the drama of the 
parable, since it draws Jesus’ listeners to recognize their place in this story and brings 
them to question their expectations of God and his justice.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to point out that according to a restorative 
understanding of justice, the father’s merciful actions are an act of justice rather than 
an act of grace that transcends justice.  In this we are following Marshall’s claim that 
“there is no justice without mercy and mercy is essential to attaining justice in its 
thicker or restorative sense.”57  Justice is not transcended by the virtue of mercy or 
love, rather, justice is itself configured around the very meaning of mercy.  To read 
this as a story about justice being transcended would be to ignore the biblical and 
relational framework within which the story is cast and to read it instead in the light of 
the notion of iustitia.58  
 
Two striking features of the father’s response exemplify merciful justice.  First, he 
never lets go of the filial relationship that the young son had so woefully betrayed, 
thus showing his commitment to a relationship marked by unconditional love.  As 
Volf recognizes, 
 
The most significant aspect of the story is, however, that the father who 
lets the son depart does not let go of the relationship between them …  
Against the force of the wrongdoing suffered and the shame endured that 
sought to push the son out … he became a father of the ‘lost’ son, of the 
‘dead’ son (v. 24).59   
 
This is a difficult undertaking for the father, because it requires him to renegotiate his 
own identity as a father in response to the alterity of his son.  According to Volf, this 
is the “basic thought” behind the parable: “the will to give ourselves to others and 
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‘welcome’ them, to readjust our identities to make space for them, is prior to any 
judgment about others, except that of identifying them in their humanity.”60   
 
The merciful justice of the father means that he always keeps in view what Marshall 
calls the “true relational identity behind the persona of sinful offender” – “this son of 
mine” (v. 24).  This stands in stark contrast with the older brother who sees only a 
criminal who ought not to be trusted and so refuses to affirm his own fraternal 
relationship to his brother – “this son of yours.”61  From the perspective of this 
parable, a restorative conception of justice must entail a steadfast commitment to the 
relational identity of wrongdoers as the key to their future, rather than maintaining a 
narrow focus on their past deviant acts as fixing their character and so also their 
future.  Restoration begins in recognition of the fundamentally relational nature of 
human beings, because what is most in need of repair and healing are the relationships 
ruptured by wrongdoing.   
 
The second feature of the father’s merciful justice is his willingness to take even the 
smallest sign of repentance as a marker that a hoped for future is already dawning.  
Even though the young son had prepared in advance a confession of his guilt and was 
willing to offer himself as no more than a slave, the father’s compassion led him to 
embrace his son before these words could be uttered.  Simply to see his son on the 
horizon was enough for the father to know that his “return” was underway, that the 
transformation in his son had commenced.  In fact, the father is so overcome with 
emotion at the sight of his son that he disregards all sense of decorum by “hiking up 
his flowing robes and exposes his legs to public view” as he runs out to greet him, 
falling on his neck and showering him with kisses.62   
 
                                                
60 Ibid., 29 (original in italics). Volf makes clear, however, that while this “will to embrace” is a prior 
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61 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 224. The older brother goes so far as to attach further scandal to 
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narrative. This is an example of “deviance labeling,” according to Marshall, where criminals are further 
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235-36. 
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It is crucial to observe that while the father is exuberant about the return of his son, he 
still “makes room for moral accountability,” as Marshall points out.63  He listens to 
the boy’s confession without challenging its accuracy or denying the reality of his 
own victimization.  There is no attempt to minimize the harm done by the boy, or to 
excuse what he did.  While his relationship to his son does not rest on moral 
performance, he still leaves room for the son to make a response that would either 
reinforce or renounce his wrongful past.64 
 
What is so overwhelming for the father is not simply the return of the son but his 
transformation through repentance into a new creation.  The boy has passed through 
“death” – his own self-inflicted punishment – and now he is “alive;” he had been 
“lost” but is now ‘found” (vv. 24).  As Marshall notes, “No injustice transpires when 
the lost are recovered, when the dead are restored to life, when sinners are forgiven.  
Justice is vindicated in such transformations.”65  To celebrate at the first sign of 
repentance is to rejoice in the reign of God’s justice, which brings people from their 
previously alienated and destructive state into a reality where new forms of relating 
are made possible.  This eschatological dimension to justice calls for a different kind 
of perception in the midst of conflict, one that is attentive to small signs of 




As noted in Chapter One, the system of retributive punishment insists that punishment 
is for the purpose of communicating that some actions are wrong, shameful, and 
deserving of the inflicted suffering.66  Offenders have the right to be treated with a 
dignity that assumes they know right from wrong and are willing to face the 
consequences of their actions.  Even though these claims are made in the name of 
dignity and so appear to be humane, in practice it is more truthful to say that 
punishment is for the purpose of imposing shame on offenders.  As Whitman points 
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65 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 241. 
66 On the communicative or expressive value of punishment see, Duff, Punishment, Communication 




out, the failure of retributive philosophers to account for how degradation occurs in 
punishment, and what can be done to prevent it, has resulted in a sizable gap between 
the philosophy of punishment and its actual practice.67    
 
Public shaming, or what Whitman calls the “dynamic of degradation,” has always 
been an obvious aspect of punishment.  This dynamic often goes unrecognized due to 
the philosophical concern with the intent or purpose behind punishment, rather than 
how it functions as an interpersonal and societal dynamic.  By attending to the social 
function of punishment, Whitman observes that degradation is not some “incidental 
by-product of punishment,” but rather “punishment only works if it succeeds in 
making the punished person feel like an inferior.”68  Criminals are commonly 
regarded as a public risk to society, and tend to be treated as if they were polluted, 
which leads punishers to “ritually degrade them … assigning the offender to the status 
of an inferior.”69  This is particularly evident in North American penal practice, where 
public shaming has become the norm through the use of barred prison doors, day-glo 
uniforms, chain gangs, indeterminate sentencing, and an institutional culture of 
violence.   
 
Unlike North America, European penal practice is still influenced by residual notions 
of mercy and amnesty, which have prevented “tough-on-crime” practices taking too 
deep a root.70  The connection between rituals of shaming and what Whitman calls a 
“harsh justice” should make us wary of putting any reliance on shame as a mechanism 
for restoration.  This applies to the restorative justice theory of “reintegrative 
shaming” – where the offender is given the opportunity to confess his feelings of 
shame at his behaviour and so be accepted back into the moral community – which, in 
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Marshall’s opinion, still relies too heavily on the mechanism of shame to produce 
comprehensive restoration.71   
 
One of Marshall’s most significant observations about this parable concerns the way 
in which the father reverses the effects of shame.  Whereas the younger son had 
prepared himself to accept the consequences of his shameful actions by being 
disowned as a son and treated as a slave, the father resolves not to treat him as he 
deserves but rather to deliver him from the incurred shame.  Emulating the pattern of 
God’s justice, the father celebrates his repentance and spares no resource to enact his 
full return to a place of honour.  This is the concrete meaning of the justice of God in 
response to repentant wrongdoers, a markedly different response from the public 
shaming rituals enacted through the criminal justice system. 
 
The father’s actions are multiple.  First, the boy is re-clothed so as to signify his return 
to filial standing (vv. 22).  Marshall argues that the changing of clothes was a 
metaphor for moral and spiritual transformation, which once again underscores the 
boy’s entering into a new moral reality.  Second, the boy is given a ring to signify that 
he now shares in the sovereignty of the household (vv. 22).  This reverses his first 
shameful act of exacting an inheritance as an affront to the welfare of his family, since 
he is now bestowed with the family’s authority as a gift to acknowledge that he is 
ready to wield such responsibility.  Third, the father throws a lavish feast before the 
entire village so as to “lift the cloak of shame from his son’s shoulders and underscore 
his reinstatement as an esteemed member of the family.”72   
 
All of these actions signify the irreducible importance of relationships as the son is 
brought from a state of complete alienation to a place of belonging and respect in 
relationship.  It is because wrongdoing is understood in the context of relationships 
that such importance is given to signs of repentance.  Without repentance there are 
little grounds to hope for a future that includes both the wrongdoer and the one 
wronged in a relationship of mutual trust and respect.   
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Nicholas Wolterstorff attempts to give an account of this connection between 
repentance and relational repair.  He suggests that repentance signifies that the moral 
condition of the penitent is significantly different to that of the wrongdoer on account 
of their altered stance towards the wrong done.  The penitent has moved from a 
position of standing behind and therefore justifying their actions and has joined the 
victim in condemning their wrongdoing as wrong.  When a “wrongdoer offers the 
victim his repentance,” Wolterstorff notes, he does so “in the hope that the victim will 
regard him in a new moral light, treat him as having a new moral identity.”73  
Repentance signifies a moral solidarity with victims, and it is on account of this moral 
solidarity that a different relationship can emerge.  To the extent that this moral 
solidarity is met with forgiveness by victims, there can emerge a “new insight into the 
moral character of the other; thereby they open up the possibility of a renewed 
relationship.”  Wolterstorff goes on to note that “Punishment of the wrongdoer 
achieves neither of these; it neither liberates the parties from the moral pit in which 
they find themselves nor does it enable reconciliation.”74  
 
This celebration of repentance is what differentiates the father’s response from that of 
classic retributivism.  He honours the change that has occurred in his son, evident in 
his return and confession.  Retributivists, on the other hand, prioritize procedural 
uniformity and an external rules-based notion of justice that offers little space for the 
moral and relational position of wrongdoers.  In the narrative, it is the older brother 
who expresses such distrust of judicial leniency.  He seems to prefer, in Marshall’s 
words, “the simplicity of punitive ostracism to the complexity of wrestling with the 
ambiguities that always surround situations of human offending and the 
corresponding obligation to employ Brien’s ‘gentle virtue of mercy’ in the interest of 
achieving moral outcomes.”75  Furthermore, by honouring the repentant wrongdoer, 
the older brother believes that the honour due him as a law-abiding individual has 
been usurped.76  Honouring law-breakers is equivalent to dishonouring law-keepers, 
                                                
73 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2011), 188, cf. 
72. 
74 Ibid., 189-90. 
75 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, 241. 
76 Marshall argues that behind this “distrust of judicial leniency” lies a character trait of “embittered 




according to the retributive logic of the older brother; the inclusion of one constitutes 
the exclusion of the other.   
 
The older brother’s polarized thinking illustrates a core presupposition behind legal 
responses to wrongdoing, and this returns us to where we began this section.  The 
primary objective of the law is to judge between the guilty and the innocent, the 
wrongdoers and the wronged, law-keepers and law-breakers.  While such absolute 
polarities rarely correspond with reality, the apparatus of legal judgment still 
functions against the background of an adversarial and bipolar system of justice.77  
The older brother embodies this adversarial approach when, in order to make the 
accusation of injustice stick, he portrays his younger brother in the worst possible 
light, while presenting himself as a paragon of righteousness (vv. 29-30).78  Degrading 
wrongdoers or exacerbating their shame helps maintain a status differentiation 
between the righteous and the unrighteous.  In the thinking of the older brother, this 
status differentiation should result in his receiving more of his own share, and 
providing him with more privilege (vv. 23).  The father, on the other hand, exhibits 
the radical generosity of God’s forgiveness and the depth of solidarity with sinners 
and wrongdoers that were embodied in Jesus’ own life and ministry. 
 
The father’s actions unequivocally proclaim the restoration of his son to a place of 
belonging, and so also affirm the new commitment of his son to right living.  Yet in 
order for such a transformation to be lasting the father must enlist the commitment of 




Before the establishment of a centralized system of laws, our historical survey noted 
that there existed a period of community justice whereby wrongdoing was primarily 
                                                                                                                                       
celebration thrown for his brother somehow detracts from his own virtue and devalues his standing in 
his father’s eyes,” ibid., 239.  
77 The two dominant systems of legal judgment are adversarial, where a judge or jury judges in favour 
of either the prosecution or the defense after the two sides have contested their case, and inquisitorial, 
where a judge or panel investigates a case to determine if any charges should be brought, cf. Peter J. 
Van Koppen and Steven D. Penrod, ed. Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Justice: Psychological 
Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems (Springer, London: Limited, 2012).  
78 Volf writes that the older brother “encourages self-righteousness and the demonization of others,” 




conceived as an offence against the entire community.  The social fabric of the local 
community was endangered whenever the values of that community were flagrantly 
disregarded, not least the value of trust upon which any notion of civic order is 
based.79  In the parable, the younger son provoked the outrage of the village 
community in at least three ways: he allowed the ancestral ownership of the land to 
fall into the hands of outside opportunists, he publicly shamed his father who, due to 
his wealth, was also a village patriarch, and he became unclean by his association 
with pigs and Gentile outsiders.  It is significant, therefore, that the father’s actions 
seem to have taken place in public before a watching community, and that the father 
eventually enlists this community to participate in his son’s full restoration by the 
throwing of a feast.   
 
Through his actions, the father did not simply intend to placate the village’s urge for 
vengeance.  Instead, as Marshall points out, the father models “the restoring love of 
God.”  This parable is intended,  
 
… to furnish a model for how believers are to treat those whom the 
wider community judges to be treacherous offenders worthy only of 
punishment.  They are to emulate the graciousness of God toward them 
– which means inviting their repentance, receiving their confession 
without objection, and restoring them to full participation in 
community.80 
 
The father furnishes a restorative communal response towards penitent wrongdoers in 
at least two respects: by a public display of forgiveness and, second, by an act of 
hospitality.  While the word “forgiveness” is never used in the parable, it occupies a 
crucial place in the overall narrative.  In the Mediterranean social order, where honour 
and shame played a central role in public life, forgiveness “was as much about 
restoring honor as assuaging guilt.”81  Marshall argues that the father’s restorative 
actions were an “outworking of the discipline of forgiveness,” which in the case of his 
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son meant his reintegration to a place of belonging in the community.82  Through his 
public actions the father acts in a representative fashion on behalf of the community to 
forgive his son.   
 
This parable clearly demonstrates a privileging of the needs and voice of primary 
victims over any secondary concerns.  While the village members may have had their 
communal ethic threatened by the prodigal’s actions, no one has been more shamed or 
injured than the father.  He is the primary victim.  At the very least this means that the 
father’s forgiveness is considered to be final, that the village members have no right 
of redress that supersedes that of the father.  Moreover, if we take in full seriousness 
the boy’s confession – “I have sinned against heaven and you” – then he represents 
God’s forgiveness of this son as well, which is likewise final.  The restorative power 
of primary victims is evident in the father’s response when he takes upon himself the 
collective injury caused by the wrongdoer and releases him from his bondage of guilt 
by an act of forgiveness.  The resonance with how God in Christ acts to forgive his 
wayward creation by bearing their transgression is all too evident. 
 
Forgiveness is neither easy nor cheap, which is why Marshall stresses that forgiveness 
takes place within the “moral space created by remorse, repentance, confession, and 
accountability, and demands moral effort on the part of both giver and receiver.”83  
For the father to forgive, he must first judge his son as having done wrong, otherwise 
there would be nothing to forgive.  Forgiveness is inescapably a form of judgment, 
which is why receiving forgiveness is often as difficult as the giving of forgiveness.84  
Yet in the same instance, by forgiving the father relinquishes any right of redress, 
otherwise he would be exercising a conditional forgiveness that is no forgiveness at 
all.  A forgiveness that first awaits the redress of retributive justice is not forgiveness; 
it is simply the refusal to act vindictively.85  A forgiveness patterned after this 
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restorative response is an active rather than passive action.  It enlists both the victim 
and the offender in a relationship whereby the actions of the past are healed and 
repaired, rather than allowing old wounds to fester and destroy. 
 
Earlier in the thesis we noted that the language of forgiveness and reconciliation no 
longer feature as prominently in the restorative justice vocabulary as they once did.  
The more secular sounding language of healing and repair is now preferred, though 
not without some of the same criticism.86  However, this lexical shift is misleading, 
since both sets of words describe the same relational process and the same hoped for 
outcome.  Forgiveness is embodied as healing, and to experience emotional healing is 
to be, at some level, in the grip of forgiveness.  
 
Marshall describes the ensuing feast as a “feast of forgiveness” because of the costly 
and transformative work that has made this renewal of relationship possible.  The 
father’s acknowledgment of the boy’s repentance and his response of compassionate 
forgiveness models a better system of justice to the rest of the community.  This is a 
justice that, taking into account “the ontological reality of human relatedness,” is 
fulfilled in “the making right of relationships.”87 
 
The second way in which the father exhibits a communal ethic of restoration is 
through an act of hospitality.  The throwing of a feast to mark the celebrated return of 
his repentant son is an invitation for others to participate in the restoration of the 
“lost” and “dead” son (vv.24).  Feasting takes on even greater significance within its 
Lukan context, where it symbolically represents the dawning eschatological age of 
God’s salvation being made available to all.  The metaphor of a feast echoes God’s 
election and deliverance of Israel in the Jewish Passover, and looks forward to the 
Last Supper where God gathers the new Israel to participate in his heavenly 
banqueting.  The restoration in view of God’s justice is “liturgically enshrined in 
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cf. Article 3.1. 
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eating,” as Ward argues.88  Lending further weight to this eschatological allusion is 
the father’s emphatic “must” to celebrating in the presence of “life,” thus pointing to 
the signs of resurrection present in the son’s return. 
 
Acting as the host to this banquet, the father extends his invitation in the expectant 
hope that others will join him.  This is, however, a vulnerable act by the father.  It 
opens him up to the possibility of rejection if his invitation be declined, which would 
only compound his humiliation and loss of status within the communal order.  
Hospitality is often a risky enterprise, but no risk was considered too great so as to 
outweigh the enjoyment of receiving a lost son back into full communion.   
 
It is this risky hospitality in search of a fully restored relationship that embodies the 
way of God’s justice in the world.  Hans Boersma rightly points out that in order to 
draw humanity into a pure unconditional hospitality, God had to step into “a world 
that is already beset by violence, injustice, and inhospitality …  [I]ncarnation and 
crucifixion mean getting involved and getting ‘messed up’ in the quirks and quarks of 
a thoroughly inhospitable situation.”89  In the midst of the world’s injustice and 
inhospitality, God establishes a place of pure hospitality through the cross of Christ, 
which has also been shown to be the site of God’s restorative justice.    
 
Significantly, the older son refuses to participate in the feast of forgiveness.  This 
refusal indicates not only a judgment against his younger brother but also a failure of 
perception, as “he feels no need of forgiveness himself.”90  The older brother’s 
legalism and penchant for just deserts leads him to be outraged by his father’s 
compassionate forgiveness, which he considers to be a flagrant denial of justice.  
Were he to take up his place alongside his father in this practice of “open-handed 
hospitality,” he would not only be endorsing the ritual of forgiveness, but he would 
also be extending the offer of livelihood to his empty handed brother.  According to 
                                                
88 Ward confirms this theme of eschatological feasting in Ward, Politics of Discipleship, 273. 
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always deconstructing the latter. The result, however, is that justice remains the only thing that is 
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this parable, the practice of restorative hospitality has the concrete definition, in the 
words of Marshall, of being ready to share our “‘living’ (bios) and ‘substance’ 
(ousia), so that they [offenders] may again participate as equals in the social and 




To conclude this discussion, we return to Broughton’s comments about what Marshall 
brings to the interpretation of Scripture.  According to Broughton, Marshall’s reading 
is distinguished by being prescient, peaceable, and performable.92  A prescient 
reading engages with the historical context of the text, while bringing contemporary 
concerns to the interpretive task.  By following Marshall’s reading of this parable, we 
have been able to address contemporary justice concerns, like, for example, the role of 
shame in modern penal practice.  A peaceable reading fosters reconciliation between 
divisive identities or cultures, which in this parable has been evident in the restored 
relationship between father and son, victim and wrongdoer, village and prodigal.  A 
performable reading brings the theological-imaginative thrust of the narrative together 
with its concrete enactment in relationships and community.  The reading of this 
parable has given insight not just to some generic truth about wrongdoing, repentance, 
or compassion.  Rather, we have described in concrete detail the relational nature of 
wrongdoing, the stages on the journey of repentance, and the ways in which 
compassion has been enacted through embrace, honouring, and feasting.  
 
We have seen that Marshall’s approach of bringing a “restorative justice lens” to the 
interpretation of Scripture opens up a fruitful perspective for furthering restorative 
justice in a more theological direction through engagement with Scripture.  While not 
suggesting that restorative justice should be used as a master metaphor for interpreting 
all Scripture, or suggesting that all Scripture points unambiguously to a restorative 
understanding of justice, Marshall has nevertheless shown that restorative justice 
provides fresh insight into texts that do have a clear justice dimension.  This is 
especially true with texts that point to the justice of God’s kingdom as embodied in 
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the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.  A restorative conception of justice makes for 
a better reading of Scripture than do readings that presuppose a purely legalistic or 
retributive conception of justice.   
 
It would be expected that the community that has grappled with this story generation 
after generation should appreciate the difference between a retributive conception of 
justice and justice understood as a restorative and relational reality.  Unfortunately 
this has not always been the case.  For this reason, Marshall believes  
 
part of the mission of the restorative justice movement is to remind the 
Christian community of what it supposedly believes and ought to practice 
more consistently, to call the church’s attention back to what Jesus himself 
expounded in his teaching and embodied in his life.93   
 
 
In the next chapter, I will follow Marshall’s lead by bringing a restorative justice lens 
to the interpretation of one of Paul’s epistles to a church struggling to live out its faith 
in God’s saving justice in a pagan environment.  We will investigate the extent to 
which Paul reflects a similar theological imagination about the nature of God’s justice 
that we see reflected in the teaching of Jesus.  
 
                                                













I have argued that the justice of God is best understood as a liberative, salvific and 
restorative justice, rather than a retributive or retaliatory justice.  As such it is 
inherently relational.  Such an understanding of the justice of God constitutes a better 
reading of Scripture and also results in a better performance of Scripture.  That is to 
say, it summons the people of God to respond to God’s justice by embodying this 
same kind of restoring justice in its life together.   
 
Our goal in this chapter, as it was in the previous one, is to extend the church’s 
imagination as to how it might bring about the kind of restoration and healing we have 
been describing.  As the body of Christ, the church has been given everything it needs 
to witness to the justice of God.  Our intention, then, is not to import a series of 
restorative practices from elsewhere to enable the church to be more restorative.  
Instead, it is to search for clues from the church’s own theological and Scriptural 
resources.  We have already done this in our analysis of Jesus’ parable of the “Tender-
Hearted Father and His Two Difficult Sons,” as Marshall calls it.1  We now turn to 
some selected features of Paul’s great epistle to the church in Corinth.  Our aim is not 
to provide a detailed exegetical treatment of 1 Corinthians, but to identify theological 
themes that can help guide the church to better enact God’s restorative justice in the 
world.   
  
In what follows we will first explain why the Corinthian correspondence is a good 
choice for probing into how Paul understood the justice of God taking form in the 
church.  We will then draw out a number of features that together show what it means 
                                                




for the church to “become the justice of God” (2 Cor. 5:21).  In particular, we will 
trace how Paul calls on the Corinthians to practice relationships formed after the way 
of the cross, where God’s justice was decisively revealed.  Their fractious and 
conflict-ridden relationships (1 Cor 1-4; 12-14) were evidence that they were mis-
embodying God’s justice, and therefore were in need of new justice practices such as 
caring for the least, seeking unity, exhibiting relationships that are fraternal and 
koinōnial, and listening for the Spirit.  It is through such practices that the church lives 
out the “ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:20) by localizing its experience of 
reconciliation with God in particular contexts.  We will see that the church has 
uniquely theological reasons for why its “doing of justice” ought to take the form of 
restorative justice.  We begin, however, with a word about the context in which Paul 





The authorship, chronology, and sequence of the Pauline corpus have long been a 
matter of intense debate in Pauline scholarship.  Rather than rehearsing that debate 
here, which would distract us from our chief interest, it will be enough to draw on 
Douglas Campbell’s recent work to locate 1 Corinthians in its historical context.2  
Less than two years before writing the letter, Paul was involved in a serious conflict in 
Antioch with Cephas, one of the leaders of the Jerusalem church.  After resolving this 
conflict through a conciliatory, though confrontational, process, Paul was incarcerated 
somewhere close by the Lycus valley, on his way back from Syrian Antioch, as he 
was heading towards the Aegean.  During his imprisonment, Paul wrote a cluster of 
letters to fledging communities and households in the Lycus valley (Ephesians, 
Colossians, and Philemon).  No doubt his prison-time would have clarified a number 
of matters, not least his understanding of the place of the church within the economy 
of God’s justice.3   
                                                
2 See the recent treatment of Paul’s epistolary chronology, Douglas A. Campbell, Framing Paul: An 
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In Ephesians, Paul writes, “I therefore, a prisoner in the Lord, beg you to lead a life 
worthy of the calling to which you have been called … making every effort to 
maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (4:1-3).  He summons his 
readers to be “renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to clothe yourselves with the 
new self, created according to the likeness of God in true justice (dikaiosune 
aletheias) and holiness” (4:23-24).  The church is renewed in the likeness of God’s 
justice by sustaining its relationships in the bond of peace.  The purpose of this calling 
is that, “through the church the wisdom of God in its rich variety might now be made 
known to the rulers and authorities” (3:10).  Included in these “rulers and authorities” 
would be those representing Roman justice currently holding Paul captive.  Paul was 
no stranger to Roman justice, yet the call to justice he urges the church to pursue is to 
be found in the bond of a liberating peace, which is wholly unlike the incarcerating 
“justice” he is currently experiencing.4 
 
After his release from prison, Paul experienced a range of setbacks.  In an 
unpreserved letter to the Corinthians, he outlined his plans to take up a collection for 
the poor in Jerusalem.  This collection would not simply convey economic help, it 
would also serve to promote peace between Jewish and Gentile believers (cf. 2 Cor 8-
9).  The collection would be an occasion for ethnically diverse communities to testify 
to the peace they now share in Christ.  Evidently the Corinthians responded to this 
proposal somewhat assertively, and it became clear to Paul that the congregation was 
divided in its loyalty to him.  The church was also splintered into factions along social 
and economic lines, and relationships within the church had become abusive, 
disempowering, and outright antagonistic.  It is at this point that Paul writes his 
“Letter of Tears” from Ephesus (2 Cor. 2:4), which could well be our 1 Corinthians.5   
 
This background shows that 1 Corinthians was written in order to address multiple 
failures in this community’s witness to the saving justice of God.  The actions of the 
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Corinthians testify to their mis-embodiment of the gospel of God’s justice, and Paul’s 
efforts to rectify this situation afford us great insight into what a true embodiment 
should look like.6  Paul thought the Christians in Corinth had capitulated to a 
conception of justice drawn from their surrounding cultural context rather than the 
form of justice revealed in the crucified Messiah (1:18-31).  In reply, he describes 
practices that reflect what it means to be in Christ, “who became for us wisdom from 
God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (1:30). 
 
In spelling this out, Paul’s argument moves through three main phases.  First, he 
reiterates the nature and calling of the Christian community by emphasizing its 
obligation to embody the gospel of Christ crucified (Chaps. 1-4).  This entails 
relationships that are fraternal and koinōnial, grounded in the relationship God has 
extended to them through Christ’s cross.  Second, Paul addresses certain practices that 
reflect a failure to embody their call (Chaps. 5-11).  These include sexual 
licentiousness, taking fellow believers to court, and abuses at the Lord’s Supper.  
Third, Paul suggests how the church might healthily confront practices of injustice by 
employing a restorative ethic (Chaps. 12-14).  This involves the recognition of unity 
in diversity, the obligation to show mutual care, training in how to love well, and 




At the beginning of his letter, Paul is quick to explain his reason for writing.  Those 
simply identified as “Chloe’s people” have reported to him that there is “quarrelling” 
in the church (1 Cor. 1:11).7  This was no small squabble; it was a major dispute about 
“who belongs to whom.”  Most commentators agree that the factionalism was a result 
of the Corinthians’ enthusiasm for a style of sophist rhetoric, with its resultant 
arrogance and competitiveness.8  Rather than understanding that all believers belong 
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to One alone, they had displaced Christ with favoured human heroes and so were 
forming the church after “human inclinations” (3:3-4).  The result was a community 
suffering rampant sexual immorality, court action between members, elitist attitudes, 
disregard for the faith and conscience of new believers, drunkenness and abuses at the 
Lord’s Table, and allowing the poor to go hungry while the rich got fat.   
 
Paul considers each of these issues to be symptomatic of a deeper malaise – 
absconding from the call to participate in God’s redemption of the world through 
relationships that are fraternal and koinōnial.  The problems in Corinth require a 
theological as much as a pastoral response if there is to be an end to the selfish and 
antagonistic spirit rife in the congregation.  Paul does this by redefining their identity 
as a people “called out” from the world and into the communion God has established 
in Christ.   
 
Paul employs the language of “calling” no fewer than five times in the opening 
chapter.  He starts by referring to himself as one “called to be an apostle of Christ 
Jesus” (1:1), and describes the Corinthians as “called to be saints” (1:2) and “called 
into the fellowship (koinōnia) of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord” (1:9).  The language 
of “calling” here echoes the call of Israel to be God’s covenantal partner: “The Lord 
spoke to Moses, saying: ‘Speak to all the congregation of the people of Israel and say 
to them: You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy”’ (Lev. 19:1-2).9  By 
referring to the Corinthians as “called,” Paul is saying that, like Israel, they too have 
been addressed by God and called to be a holy people.  Their reply involves them in 
“calling on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1:2), which shows how “God’s free 
Self-identification and Self-presentation to humanity in Christ” is a relational reality.10  
It is “an event of communion” between persons, and all those who are called in Christ 
must now understand their being in relation to this event of communion.11   
 
Paul’s reference to the Corinthians being “called into the koinōnia of his Son” is 
ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so.  It can refer both to the communion the 
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Corinthians share with Christ, as well as to the communal relations with one another 
that the Corinthians exhibit in Christ.  As Torrance observes, “God’s Self-
communication also must be understood as a generative event of communion.  
Through the presence of the Spirit, the koinōnia or communion that God establishes 
with humanity engenders communion at the ‘horizontal’ level.”12  The church is 
thereby called into a communion of fraternal relationships – “brothers and sisters” 
(1:10) – as it shares in the filial status of being God’s children in Christ.  The church 
is to reflect the communion God has established with humanity by bringing that 
humanity to participate in koinōnia with his Son, and it does this by exhibiting 
relationships that are intimate, life-sharing, and sacrificial.13   
 
By drawing attention to this koinōnial context, Paul is at the same time hinting at the 
weakness of the Corinthians in sustaining the kind of relationships that really matter.  
This offers a crucial insight into Paul’s understanding of the church – it is to be 
known by the quality and character of its relationships.  Throughout the letter Paul 
expends considerable effort in re-orientating the nature of relationships in the ecclesia.  
Fundamentally they are to be conformed to the message of “Christ crucified” (1:22), 
an event that is incomprehensible when judged according to human standards, yet for 
“us who are being saved (viz., the church), it is the power of God” (1:18).  Salvation 
comprises an event of liberating power that progressively unfolds in the corporate life 
of believers.  Paul is effectively arguing that Jesus’ cross defines for the church the 
very shape and character of God’s restoring justice in the world.  To be saved is to be 
transformed by a power that is re-creating relationships in a way that is marked by the 
cross.  
 
That the Corinthian church is full of quarrelling and divisions is a sign they have 
failed to comprehend the nature of God’s saving justice.  This would suggest that their 
own salvation is in question, for, as Gorman points out,  
 
justification means a transfer from the realm of the unjust/unjustified into 
the realm of the just/justified, which simultaneously means a 
transformation, a conversion from being unjust people to being just people 
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and thus a transition from practices of injustice to practices of 
Christologically shaped justice.14   
 
Paul addresses the root of the matter by asking the Corinthians to consider their own 
“call” (1:26), which was itself a testament to the restorative and benevolent nature of 
divine justice.  He reminds them that, “not many of you were wise by human 
standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth.”  Most were from 
the ranks of “the low and despised in the world” (1:26-31).  And yet they were called 
to live in communion with God, who showers them with every gift of “speech and 
knowledge of every kind,” and ensures they have everything they need (1:4-7).  Their 
elevation from a state of social marginalization to a place of covenantal communion 
was itself a demonstration of God’s liberating, saving justice at work.  Now, as a 
just/justified people, they must embody that same justice in their life together.  This 
requires their recognition of how the worldly markers of status – wisdom, power, 
wealth, and nobility – were reduced to nothing in the light of how God had revealed 
himself in the cross (1:28).    
 
Paul’s argument is that the cross of Christ empties the powerful of their power and the 
wise of their wisdom, so that power and wisdom may be conceived anew through 
him.  Justice too – the justice of the “the rulers of this age” who crucified the Lord of 
Glory (2:8-9) – must also be reconceived, since, for the church, the Crucified One is 
both the “wisdom of God and the justice of God (theou dikaiosune)” (1:30).15  The 
Corinthians must consider whether the character of their relationships testifies to the 
wisdom and justice of the present age, where the powerful dominate the low and 
despised (1:29; 2:6,8), or to the new age, inaugurated by the life, death, and 
resurrection of God’s Messiah.  Paul calls them, as Hays argues, to a “conversion of 
the imagination,” whereby they might find their “primary identification with fellow 
believers rather than seeking legitimacy according to the status-defining standards of 
their native civic culture.”16   
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Paul illustrates what it means to live under the sign of the cross by contrasting the 
Corinthians’ attitude towards leadership with his own example of apostolic suffering 
(3:4 – 4:13).  The factionalism in the church stemmed from their elevation of human 
leaders to a position whereby the body of Christ “belongs” to them.  This not only 
displaced Christ; it reflected the prevailing practices of wider society (3:4, 20, cf. 
Matt. 20:25-28).  The cross inverts social reality and reflects the wisdom of a different 
kind of justice, one that relinquishes power over others and suffers on their behalf.  
This wisdom, Paul argues, is made known through those who participate in the age of 
the Spirit (2:10-13).  Having received the Spirit of the new age, the Corinthians must 
disown the patronage of and rivalry between leaders, instead recognizing their 
“common purpose” as they “work together” in building up God’s church (3:5-9).  
Instead of boasting in what human leaders confer on them, they must recognize that 
all things are theirs in Christ (3:21-23).  Leaders are re-schematized as “servants” 
(3:5), “stewards” (4:1), and “labourers” in the construction of a building belonging to 
the one Master of the house (3:9).  To this end, Paul appeals to the Corinthians to 
“imitate me” and “my ways in Christ Jesus, as I teach them everywhere in every 
church” (4:16-17).   
 
Paul’s apostolic “ways in Christ Jesus” are synonymous with the inverted reality of 
the cross, the way of non-retributive love: “When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, 
we endure; when slandered, we speak kindly” (4:12-13).  Paul is sustained in this non-
retaliatory stance by his belief that this is the very nature of God as revealed in the 
cross.  Having crucified the axioms of “this age,” Paul considers his life to be 
transformed by the light of the cross, which brings light to the darkness and discloses 
the purposes of the heart (4:4-5).  Paul expects this same transformation to be evident 
in the practices and character of the church.  This is what it concretely means for the 




Of the many issues traversed in chapters 5-11, here we will focus on three issues with 
a clear justice-dimension that illustrate how the Corinthian Church was failing to 




the church, the second is a chronic matter of litigiousness between church members, 
and the third relates to practices associated with the Lord’s Supper.  Each of these 
issues employs forensic categories – “pronouncing judgment” (5:3), “appointing 
judges”(6:2-4), and “eating and drinking judgment” (11:22, 27-31) – though in an 
ecclesial context and with a strong orientation towards the reintegration or restoration 




Paul brings the Corinthians’ attention to the matter of one of their members having 
sexual relations with his father’s wife (5:1-8).  Such sexual licentiousness was 
abhorrent even in pagan culture.  In fact, if the woman were indeed married to the 
man’s father and not his concubine, it would have a breach of pagan law as well.17  
The apostle is dismayed at not only the Corinthians’ toleration of such an incestuous 
practice, but also at their celebration and sense of pride in the man’s freedom – “you 
are arrogant!” (5:2).  They probably saw him as an exemplar of the motto that “all 
things are lawful to me” (6:12; 10:23).  According to Paul, this stands in stark conflict 
with their call to embody Christ crucified by exhibiting relationships that are humble, 
holy, and just.  
 
Justice and holiness are two sides of the same coin.  As a people called out from the 
world to share in communion (koinōnia) with God’s Son, the church embodies the 
justice of God through relationships patterned after the way of the cross.  This 
transformation takes the form of being “called to be holy” (klétois hagiois, 1:2).  This 
is why holiness or sanctification (hagiasmos), as Gorman argues, “is not an addition 
to justification but its actualization.”18  Holiness is how one lives out the justifying 
justice of God.  For Paul, sexual libertinism is a denial of the transformation of 
relationships into the form of the cross.19 
 
                                                
17 See the discussion in Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 152, fn. 19. 
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A notable feature of Paul’s response is how he directs a sense of shame, not at the 
individual culprit but at the whole community.  The responsibility for the wrongful 
relation is held collectively.  Paul calls the entire community to account, not because 
they are all involved in similar sins, but because, as Yoder points out,  
 
… there is a kind of moral solidarity linking all the members of the body 
so that if individuals persist in disobedience within the fellowship, their 
guilt is no longer the moral responsibility of those individuals alone but 
becomes a kind of collective blame shared by the whole body … unless I 
am the agent of that person’s sharing in restoration, he or she is the agent 
of my sharing guilt.20 
 
The church must respond collectively to the wrongdoing because they have a special 
responsibility to be a community sanctified in “sincerity and truth” (5:8).  Were the 
church to endorse or even tolerate those who unremittingly engage in wrongdoing, it 
would cease to bear witness to its participation in “the kingdom of God” (6:9), and 
would instead inherit the fate of their previous life outside of Christ.  By holding the 
entire church to account, Paul hopes to bring about a collective repentance that will 
issue in the disciplining of the offender (5:13) and the restoration of right relationships 
throughout the whole community.21   
 
This does not mean the community is to have no concern for the recalcitrant offender.  
Paul encourages the Corinthian community to pass judgment on the wrongdoer by 
handing “this man over to Satan for the destruction of the flesh” (5:5).  This text has 
created much confusion in the history of interpretation, even leading some to take this 
as a sign that the church should endorse capital punishment.22  This is strongly refuted 
in Marshall’s treatment of the passage, which argues that the penalty was a temporary 
excommunication in the interests of ultimate restoration.23  By “turning over” the man 
to the realm of Satan through expulsion from the worshipping community, the 
Corinthians would communicate to this man that his actions belonged to the world 
over which Satan ruled.  He would no longer enjoy the protection of participating in 
                                                
20 Yoder, “Binding and Loosing,” 336. 
21 This is the view expressed by both South and Marshall, see, J.T. South, ‘A Critique of the 
‘Curse/Death’ Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 5:1-8,’ New Testament Studies 39, no. 4 (1993): 539-61; 
Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 154-55. 
22 Havener argues that “capital punishment [is] required by Paul” as part of a “curse for salvation,” I. 
Havener, “A Curse for Salvation - 1 Corinthians 5:1-5,” in Sin, Salvation and the Spirit (Collegeville, 
MN: The Liturgical Press, 1979), 334-44 (quote at 341). 




the gathered community of believers.24  Yet the ultimate purpose in withholding full 
communion was to “encourage repentance and restoration of the obstinate sinner.”25  
In the very act of holding the wrongdoer to account the church was extending to him 
the possibility of being restored to the community by turning away from an unholy 




Another matter that Paul singles out for comment is the practice of bringing disputes 
within the ecclesia before the secular courts (6:1-11).  Paul expresses his deep dismay 
over this situation.  He is not alarmed at the existence of grievances or conflict in the 
church per se, but he is deeply concerned with how they are resolved.  For the church 
is called to embody God’s justice-making and peace-making as an alternative to the 
injustice and violence of the world.26  
 
The practice of taking fellow believers to court over “trivial” and “ordinary” matters 
(6:2-3) reflects a failure by the Corinthians to embody God’s justice in at least two 
ways.  First, Paul considers the courts to be part of the realm of the unjust (adikon, 
6:1), certainly not reflective of the reality that is being transformed by God’s 
cruciform justice.  Marshall points out that civil litigation in first-century Roman 
Corinth often favoured those with greater status and wealth.  One’s case was greatly 
enhanced by showing up the inferiority of the other party or by tarnishing their 
character.27  By dragging their disputes before the court, the Corinthians were 
                                                
24 This concurs with Fee’s reading, “In contrast to the gathered community of believers who experience 
the Spirit and power of the Lord Jesus in edifying gifts and loving concern for one another, this man is 
to be put back out into the world, where Satan and his ‘principalities and powers’ still hold sway over 
people’s lives to destroy them,” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 209. 
25 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 155. Marshall’s reading concurs with Fee, who argues that it would be 
“out of character with Paul’s theology as we meet it elsewhere that one who sins within the Christian 
community should be so punished in the present age that he lies beyond the redemptive, restorative 
love of that community,” Fee, Corinthians, 212. 
26 Or, as Hauerwas puts it, “Christians are called to live nonviolently, not because we think nonviolence 
is a strategy to rid the world of war, but rather because as faithful followers of Christ in a world of war 
we cannot imagine not living nonviolently,” Hauerwas, War and the American Difference: Theological 
Reflections on Violence and National Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), xii. 
27 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 150-51. This opinion is widely shared, for example, Sampley writes, 
“… civil courts were not to be trusted for justice. Even Roman citizens did not have equal opportunity 
before the law. Wealth, position, and standing … were the best assurance of favorable judgment in the 




emulating the ways of “the unrighteous,” reflecting the priorities and practices of this 
age rather than the new age.  Practically, this would have resulted in the weaker 
members of the church suffering injustice at the hands of their fellow believers.28  For 
this reason Paul retorts, “Why not rather be wronged?  Why not rather be defrauded?’ 
than to wrong or defraud fellow members of Christ” (vv. 7-8).   
 
As an alternative to this deplorable situation, Paul advocates an extrajudicial 
procedure of private arbitration between members of the church, a procedure that 
reflects their standing as “saints” or holy ones who will one day “judge the world” and 
“judge angels” (vv. 2-5).29  Lawsuits in court are “already a defeat” for believers, 
regardless of the outcome.  This is the second reason why Paul opposes civil litigation 
– it was a forum not at all conducive to reconciliation, and as such it fails to reflect the 
form of justice they have experienced in Christ (6:7, 11).  Paul’s suggestion of an 
internal process of mediation differs from the external dispute resolution achieved 
through civil litigation.  The latter focuses on resolving “trivial disputes” between 
litigants (6:1-3), whereas the former is concerned with restoring to rightness 
relationships between “one brother and another” within the community of faith (6:5).   
 
Paul ends his instruction on this matter with another reminder to the Corinthians of 
their new identity in Christ –  “… this is what some of you used to be.  But you were 
washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ 
and in the Spirit of God” (6:11).  The “deft wordplay” of this passage is often lost in 
English translations, but Hays underscores its justice dimension by translating it,  
“You used to be unjust (adikoi) … but you were justified (edikaiōthēte).”30  In other 
words, you used to practice injustice but having been washed and sanctified and 
justified in Christ, you must no longer practice injustice, especially within the 
community of faith.  This is also, as Gorman points out, an issue of the church’s 
witness.  For by bringing their matters before the courts of the unjust, they are 
                                                                                                                                       
Light of Roman Law (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 3; cited in Edward M. Keazirian, Peace and 
Peacemaking in Paul and the Greco-Roman World (New York: Peter Land, 2014), 166.  
28 As Thiselton titles this section in his commentary, “Legal Action by the Socially Influential as an 
Abuse of Power,” Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the 
Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 420. 
29 See Marshall, Paul “advocates private arbitration, an extrajudicial procedure available under Graeco-
Roman law and supported by Scripture (Deut. 16:18-20), wherein a community member is selected to 
mediate between the disputing parties,” Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 151. 




implicitly communicating to their pagan neighbours that the church is not a place 
where reconciling love is practiced.31  By their actions they testify to a counter-gospel 




Our third example relates to one of the central practices of the Christian community, 
the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34).  The Corinthian practice of this meal appears to have 
been hosted by one of the wealthier members of the congregation and involved a 
substantial feast to which individual guests contributed their own offerings.32  The 
host in this instance was failing to delay the serving of the meal until all were present, 
which meant that the food was not being evenly distributed between rich and poor, 
some were going away drunk, while others left hungry (11:21).  Paul castigates the 
Corinthians for allowing their factionalism and divisions to become a source of 
injustice towards the poor and weak (11:18-19).  In so doing they had allowed what 
was meant to be a radically counter-cultural practice to become a tool for reinforcing 
cultural norms. 
 
The origins of the Christian meal, of course, lay in the meals that featured regularly in 
Jesus’ ministry, particularly the Last Supper.  Crossan describes the original character 
of these meals:  
 
The table companionship practiced by Jesus thus recreated the world, 
redrew all of society’s maps and flow charts.  Instead of symbolizing 
social rank and order, it blurred the distinctions between hosts and guests, 
need and plenty.  Instead of reinforcing rules of etiquette, it subverted 
them, making the last first and the first last.33   
 
This was not the practice of the Corinthians, which is why Paul tells them that their 
gatherings are “not really the Lord’s supper they eat” (v. 20).  In fact, insofar as they 
                                                
31 “When members of the community of the just take their matters to the courts of the unjust, they are 
obviously saying something to those courts and to all who are aware of their actions,” Gorman, 
Becoming the Gospel, 239. 
32 As surmised by Paul F. and Maxwell E. Johnson Bradshaw, The Eucharistic Liturgies: Their 
Evolution and Interpretation (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2012), 10. 
33 John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San 




continue in their unjust practices they “eat and drink judgment against themselves” 
(v.29). 
  
An important clue lies in Paul’s reminder to the Corinthians about the proper 
performance of this meal.34  When the meal is practiced in a way that Jesus is 
“remembered,” the gathered community “proclaims” Christ crucified (vv. 25-26).  
This meal was meant to be both a remembrance (anamnēsis) and a proclamation 
(katangelos) of the event that decisively revealed the character of God’s liberating 
justice, especially towards the weak and vulnerable.  Just as God had chosen the weak 
of the world to shame the strong (1:27), so the church was called through its liturgical 
life to enact this same reality.  The Corinthians’ disregard of the poor was a direct 
refutation of God’s justice and it reflected, as Hays writes, “an odd amnesia about 
Jesus’ death.”35 
 
Paul calls on the community to transform its practice, so that it “may not be 
condemned along with the world” (v. 32).  The divisions in the community need to be 
healed, and their gatherings must not be allowed to degenerate into private dinner 
parties, otherwise they will incur the same fate as those who stand outside of Christ.  
Interestingly, Paul’s final words on this matter stop short of calling for a more radical 
economic equality among the Corinthians.  In the opinion of Gerd Theissen, this is a 
compromise for Paul: “Within their own four walls they are to behave according to 
the norms of their social status, while at the Lord’s Supper the norms of the 
congregation have absolute priority.  Clearly this is a compromise.”36  At the same 
time, we must not underestimate the revolutionary potential of a dissident community 
truly living as the ecclesia of Christ, especially when the social norms that apply in 
the church are understood to be the first installment of an eschatological 
transformation that will soon affect the whole world. 
 
It is clear, then, that the Corinthians had allowed their distinct call to become severely 
compromised.  Rather than embodying Christ crucified in a lifestyle that is holy, 
                                                
34 By “proper performance,” I do not mean the right liturgical pattern for administering the Eucharist, 
which is arguably not Paul’s intent in this passage. Rather, Paul is concerned with the enactment of this 
meal in a way that points towards the life and death of Jesus. 
35 Hays, First Corinthians, 199. 
36 Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress 




reconciled, and liberating, they were mirroring the priorities and norms of the 
surrounding culture.  By their sexual immorality, litigiousness, and general disregard 
for the weak and poor, this community was contradicting what Gorman describes as 
God’s gift of justification – “to be part of a new creation, to participate in the very 
purpose of God for humanity: becoming the embodiment of God’s saving, 




This section brings to a head Paul’s understanding of what it means to be “spiritual” 
which, in contradistinction to the Corinthian “pneumatics,” is defined in terms of the 
mutual edifying of relationships in the Spirit-filled community.  One of the striking 
realities experienced by the Corinthians on entering into koinōnia with Christ was the 
gifts of the Spirit and the new reality of inspired speech (cf. 1:4-8).  In their previous 
life as pagans (“Gentiles”), they were guided by idols that “could not speak” (12:2), 
that is, by non-communication.38  Idols that cannot speak will fail to be heard and will 
in turn fail to generate genuine communion, both vertically and horizontally.39  The 
new era, by contrast, is one of inspired speech brought about by the Spirit.  It is, 
however, also open to any number of abuses, as readily attested by the Corinthians.  
Most notable is their tendency to situate the various manifestations of spiritual gifts 
within a context of selfish and prideful individualism.   
 
The individualism of the Corinthian community had a particularly libertarian shape.  
Several times Paul quotes what appears to be a slogan of some in the church, “All 
things are lawful to me” (6:12, 10:23, cf. 8:9).  Each time Paul limits the application 
of the motto by confronting it with a concern for the other as well as for self: “Not all 
things are beneficial” (6:12); “Do not seek your own advantage, but that of the other” 
(10:24); “take care that this liberty of yours does not somehow become a stumbling 
                                                
37 Gorman, Becoming the Gospel, 249. 
38 This insight is corroborated by Zizioulas who argues persuasively that both historically and 
existentially the concept of the person and with it the concept of communion is “indissolubly bound up 
with theology,” John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church 
(Crestwood, N.Y.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 27. 
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block to the weak” (8:9).  Some Corinthians had allowed their inspired speech to 
heighten their singularity and exceptional role in the church.  Such spiritual elitism led 
to a hierarchy in which some members were no longer being valued on account of 
their unimpressive spiritual prowess.  
 
Paul confronts this individualism at its theological root by insisting that those ruled by 
the Spirit must think in terms of the “common good” (12:7) rather than individual 
competitiveness.  Those who regard themselves as “spiritual” must see themselves as 
persons-in-relation with Christ and his body.  Hence, Paul’s language subtly shifts 
from “spiritual gifts” (pneumatika) to “gifts of grace” (charismata).  The first term 
was a favourite of the Corinthians and emphasizes the experience of spiritual energy; 
the second was Paul’s preference and emphasizes the gift nature of the experience.  
Accordingly, the attention shifts away from the gift to the giver of the gift, who gives 
these gifts for the common good.40  
 
While the charismata created problems for the Corinthians, Paul never repudiates the 
belief that the new aeon is one of inspired speech and knowledge (1:5-7).  Brock 
contrasts this with the modern era, which has become supremely sceptical towards 
any claim to having heard the word of God.  This is especially so when it fosters 
certainty and banishes the fear of others, both of which are considered fuel for the fire 
of religious war.  Modern humanity has replaced dependence on divine leading with 
the “safer language of decision making and planning.”41  If Christian theology were to 
succumb to such scepticism, it would soon lose all certainty about ever having heard 
God’s Word and would be severed from its source.  Moreover, it is only the inspired 
speech of the Spirit that makes possible proper self-criticism.  Only the interruptive 
Word that comes from “outside the thought and habits of our age is able to take 
seriously the depth of our embedding in those very ways of life.”42  It is the rule of the 
Spirit that empowers the church to exhibit relationships that are restorative.   
 
 
                                                
40 On this interpretation of Paul’s usage of pneumatika and charismata see, Jr. C. M. Robeck, 
“Prophecy, Prophesying,” in Dictionary of Paul and His Letters (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity 
Press, 1993), 758. 
41 Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 173. 






One significant feature of Paul’s response is the way he draws together the diversity 
of expressions in the church into a more profound unity.  He does this by locating the 
variety of gifts, services, and activities, in the one mission of God.  There is an 
unmistakable Trinitarian structure here: “there is a variety of gifts but one Spirit, a 
variety of services but one Lord, a variety of activities but one God who activates 
them all in all” (12:4-7).  Paul urges the Corinthians to recognize both the diversity 
within the church’s life, as well as the grounds for its unity in the nature of the triune 
God.  A favouring of certain gifts over others distorts the character of the church 
because it fails to see the many gifts in the ecclesia and how they cohere in the nature 
of the one God.  This is an important observation.  Paul values the diversity of people 
and gifts within the church on account of the more profound unity they share in 
communion with God.   
 
This thoroughly theological grounding of “diversity in unity” has been particularly 
highlighted in the contentious work of John Zizioulas, who argues that the distinct 
notion of humans having a personality arose within the patristic debates about the 
triune persons.43  Personhood, with all its corresponding uniqueness, is only 
explicable within the communion generated by the triune life of God.44  Zizioulas 
goes further in arguing that within the church the notion of the “individual” must, of 
necessity, give way to personhood as conceived in communion.  There are certainly 
resonances here with Paul’s instructions to the Corinthians.  The apostle is urging his 
readers in Corinth to recognize that the diversity of functions within the church, as 
well as the diversity of persons, are affirmed on the grounds of their more profound 
unity in the Spirit, as they share together in the life of God.  
 
For Paul, the church’s unity was constitutive of its sharing in the life of Christ.  The 
Corinthians were expected to embody this unity by valuing each person equally, in the 
light of the Spirit’s presence in their life (12:8-10).  The church, as it participates in 
God’s restoration of the world, must be committed to the good of all persons through 
                                                
43 For an argument against Zizioulas see, Stephen R. Holmes, The Holy Trinity: Understanding God’s 
Life (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2012). 




fostering an awareness of, and respect for, the deeper unity that exists between them.  
Living restoratively flows from this commitment to value the gifts and personality of 




In the second half of chapter 12, Paul employs his distinctive metaphor of the church 
as the body of Christ.  For our purposes, three observations are pertinent.  First, Paul 
reminds the Corinthians that they share in Christ’s reconciled body through the 
practices of baptism and Eucharistic celebration (v.13).  Second, their reconciled form 
of life extends to the division between weak and strong, honourable and less 
respected, such that dissension along these lines is tantamount to a rejection of Christ 
himself (vv. 22-24).  Third, as the church lives out this reconciled life it testifies to a 
mutuality of care such that solidarity in suffering and rejoicing become the telos of 
this community’s life together (vv. 25-26).   
 
Paul’s description of the church’s “body politics” enables us to see how the church 
embodies God’s restorative justice by working to reconcile vast social, economic, and 
ethnic divisions; by cultivating practices that localize this reconciliation in a form of 
life; and by nurturing a common life grounded in relationships of mutual care, to the 
extent that suffering and celebration become communal experiences.  In all these 
ways the church’s reconciled life is governed by the rule of the Spirit (12:8-11, 28-
30); it is the Spirit’s ordering of this community according to different gifts that 
makes possible its reconciled form of life.  
 
In v.13, Paul urges the Corinthians to recognize their common reconciliation, 
conveyed in the acts of baptism and Eucharistic fellowship.  It is notable that Paul 
does not urge the Corinthians to realize the ideal of reconciliation through practicing 
the sacraments, which would suggest that reconciliation is a goal attained via the 
church’s perfection of certain habits.  Rather, as Wannenwetsch suggests, Paul’s 




“we.”45  The reconciled reality in which the church participates is a common 
experience – “we were all, Jews or Greeks, slaves or free.”  The issue for the 
Corinthians is whether or not they are living in a way that is consistent with this 
eschatological reconciliation. 
 
The church’s continual practice of Eucharistic fellowship and shared citizenship 
through one baptism is the church’s attempt to localize its experience of God’s 
reconciling justice in the world.  It is through these practices that the church enacts the 
proclamation that the world is no longer to be divided along social, economic, and 
ethnic lines.  As Wannenwetsch points out, the church’s worship represents a 
conscious restructuring of the polis whereby wider social divisions are giving way to a 
new, more fruitful ordering of political society.46  It is in the church’s “political 
worship,” which Wannenwetsch describes as the Christian “form of life,”47 that the 
Spirit gathers the many into the one body.  This is in order to “proclaim the Lord’s 
death until he comes” (11:26), a death that has decisively disclosed God’s redemptive 
justice upending the present unjust social order.   
 
In a clear targeting of the spiritual elitists in Corinth, Paul employs the body metaphor 
to argue that those who appear weak or inferior are indispensible to the proper 
working of the body and that in their absence the body would become deformed or 
dismembered (vv. 22-24).  Indeed the presence of these “inferiors” in the church is an 
occasion for the church to show what it already enjoys, the reconciling power of 
God’s justice.  Conferring honour and respect on those who are weak, poor, isolated, 
suffering, and marginalized, marks the erasure of those features of human existence 
that divide, isolate, and ruin.   
 
Paul then brings his discussion of the body to its striking conclusion.  God has so 
arranged the body so that there might be an equality of care among the different 
members.  This tangibly means that what happens to one is experienced in solidarity 
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by all (12:26).  A koinōnial fellowship in both suffering and joy is meant to 
characterize Christian community.  By participating in Christ’s body, the church 
exists in the form of a “being there for others,” a formula that Bonhoeffer used to 
refer to the vicarious solidarity of Christ with humanity.  Just as Jesus exists only as a 
“man for others,” so also “the church is only the church when it exists for others.”48  
This is the form of “true transcendence,” according to Bonhoeffer, the genuine 
encounter with the neighbour in need.  Paul’s view of the church certainly presses in 
this direction, as he suggests that within the Corinthian church there is to be a 
vicarious sharing in the suffering or joy of each and every member.  As members 
bound together in the one body by the Spirit, there exists the foundation for an equal 
commitment to the wellbeing and flourishing of every other member.  This means an 




Paul’s instruction to the Corinthian community on what it means to be governed by 
the Spirit contains an interlude in Chapter thirteen.  This chapter is well known for its 
exposition of the meaning of love, and is frequently the reading of choice at 
ceremonial occasions to describe the affective feeling between two parties.  But Paul’s 
exposition of love must be understood within the ecclesial context in which it occurs.  
Love is the appropriate disposition of those who live under the rule of the Spirit; it is 
the fulfilling of the “law of Christ” (Gal 6:2), and as such it describes the character of 
the community that lives under God’s reign of justice.  According to Paul, those who 
strive after the “greater gifts” of the Spirit, which no doubt would appeal to the 
Corinthians, must seek to inhabit the “more excellent way” of love (12:31).  Without 
love, no gift, nor understanding, nor boasting, has any value, and as such nothing can 
be gained without love (13:1-3). 
 
Elsewhere Paul speaks of love as the “fruit of the Spirit” (Gal 5:22), which seeks to 
work for “the good of all, and especially those of the family of faith” (Gal. 6:10).  
Here he describes what this looks like practically: love is patient, kind, generous, 
humble, and polite (vv. 4-5a).  Instead of being insistent, irritable or resentful, it is 
                                                





open, flexible, and contented (vv. 5b).  More than anything, it rejoices not in 
wrongdoing (adikia), corruption or falsity, but in truthfulness, where people are 
genuine and honest (v. 6).  These qualities of love are all ways of being in 
relationship, of inhabiting a character and lifestyle that is restorative towards others.  
As Marshall writes in relation to the command to love one’s neighbour, “neighbors 
are not simply created by legal fiat; they are discovered through love, and love is a 
quality of human relationships before it is a category of law.”49  The things that Paul 
says love is not are the attributes that feed conflict and reproduce antagonisms; the 
things he says love is are the qualities that make the restoration of peaceful relations 
possible.  Those who are trained to love do not display the combative mode of self-
assertion but instead strive to restore relationships to wholeness.   
 
Paul is under no illusion that human love, like human knowledge, will always remain 
partial this side of the eschaton (vv. 8-12).  But even now we are “fully known” (and 
fully loved) by God (v.12).  This may be an allusion to the cross, where humanity is 
known in its completeness – “in our transgressions” – it is where God makes room for 
the sinful other. 
 
Miroslav Volf argues that this “knowing” or “enlarged thinking” reflects what he calls 
“double vision;”50 where the will to embrace the other – even the unjust other – 
precedes the rightness of one’s cause.  This requires the reversing of perspectives, 
genuinely seeing things from the perspective of the other, and making space within 
ourselves for the viewpoint of the other.  This protects us from “blind justice,” as Volf 
writes: “We need to see our judgments about justice and our struggle against injustice 
through the eyes of the other – even the manifestly ‘unjust other’ – and be willing to 
readjust our understanding of justice and repent of acts of injustice.”51  Abiding in the 
justice of love as revealed in the cross, the church becomes practiced in attending to 
the experience of others.  Love in this sense is extremely costly, since it involves 
laying aside judgments about the other, who may well happen to be “the enemy.” 
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While Paul recognizes a diversity of gifts within the church, he nevertheless singles 
out one gift in particular as essential for the church to be “united in the same mind and 
the same purpose” (1:10).  Some of the Corinthians had elevated the gift of tongues as 
the quality that distinguished this new aeon of inspired-speech, but Paul is quick to 
point out the limited nature of this form of speaking.  It is the gift of prophecy that has 
greater import because of its intelligibility.  Prophecy connects the gathered 
community to the God who speaks by opening up new forms of dialogue within the 
community.  Those who speak in tongues, on the other hand, unless attended by 
interpretation, fail to generate genuine dialogue because “nobody understands them” 
(14:2).  Prophecy, by contrast, builds the community’s capacity to communicate 
meaningful words to one another and therefore to generate unity (vv. 11).   
 
As a spiritual gift, prophecy assumes a God who not only speaks but who continues to 
speak and act in the worshipping community, thus bringing believers to share in 
koinōnial fellowship with God’s Son.  The close connection between prophecy and 
revelation is attested by Paul’s linking of the two terms (14:6, 30-31, cf. 26).  
According to Robeck, it is “revelation when spoken [that] forms the basis of the 
prophecy,” and both come by means of the Spirit.52  Hence, while the edification of 
fellow believers is the outcome of prophetic speech, the source of this edification is 
the God who has revealed himself to be for us in Jesus, by continuing to be with us 
through his Spirit.  Prophecy is not viewed as the exercise of individual prowess or 
status.  Rather, it is the divinely gifted form of speech that is given for the good of the 
community in establishing koinōnia.   
 
The primacy Paul gives to the gifts of speech, and of prophecy in particular (12:28), 
suggests that the church is to cultivate forms of dialogue that build up the community.  
Every feature of the church’s life must be disciplined by the gifts that declare, 
expound, and apply revealed truth.53  It is significant that Paul speaks of the church as 
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gifted not with a set of skills to perform ethical action in some remarkable way, but 
rather with a new language and grammar in order to discern in what ways her actions 
are ethical.  The gift of prophecy in particular, serves the gathered community with 
this purpose in mind.  Yoder describes the function of prophecy as a “kind of 
discourse” that “states and reenforces [sic] a vision of the place of the believing 
community in history, which vision locates moral reasoning.”54  According to Yoder, 
prophecy serves to direct the gathered community by communicating words that 
situate the life of the church under the leading of the Spirit.  The community of faith 
recognizes this gift to the extent that it lives in expectation that the Spirit is at work, 
shaping a community that speaks and listens to one another. 
 
Paul is clearly aware that words have the power both to build-up and to tear down, 
which is why he provides a number of guidelines to the exercising of this gift.  First, 
prophecy must be conformed to the way of love described in Chapter thirteen (14:1).  
The non-retaliatory and peacemaking disposition of love must be detectable in those 
who would prophesy, which means that even prophets must not “insist on their own 
way” when they have some revelation (13:2, 5, cf. 14:30).  Second, those who 
prophesy should speak words that build up, encourage, and console the church (vv. 3, 
5, 12, 26).  Prophecy is not directed primarily to individuals but to the empowering of 
the collective gifts in the church.  Third, prophecy must be recognizable as a 
disciplined form of human discourse that requires the “weighing” of other members 
(vv. 29).  Prophecy does not communicate a vision that is entirely unverifiable or 
which depends on completely trusting one individual’s vision alone.  Nor is the 
responsibility for judging prophecy the domain of a certain office of prophets (30-31, 
cf. 1 John 4:1, 1 Thess. 5:19-21).  Prophecy is given for the entire church, as it 
discerns together the things that make for peace (cf. vv. 33, 1:10; 1 Thess. 5:12-22).  
Fourth, prophecy also has a role in calling unbelievers to repentance.  When 
unbelievers hear prophetic utterances in the church they are “reproved,” or “called to 
account,” having the secrets of their hearts “disclosed,” which leads to submission to 
God and the worship of him (vv.24-25).   
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One further feature deserves highlighting, which we might call the mindful character 
of prophetic speaking.  We have already referenced numerous times Paul’s appeal for 
the Corinthians to be “united in the same mind” (1:10), which is a matter of being 
attuned to the Spirit who gives believers “the mind of Christ” (2:16).  Having this 
“mind” requires that no one be excluded on the basis of being of “lesser” value 
(12:12).  On the contrary, it means rejoicing in the reordering of the church’s body 
politics, such that every voice is heard and contributes to the church’s discernment.  It 
is against this background that we must read Paul’s repeated appeal to the character of 
the church’s worship.  Nothing is more effective for building the church up in unity 
than fostering the mind of Christ as the church gathers to pray, to praise, or to instruct 
(14:15-19).   
 
Prophecy is a gift exercised within a “pneumatic democracy,” as J.C. Beker puts it, a 
community committed to fostering the equality of all members, not least in its pursuit 
of arriving at shared convictions.55  The church is to foster this unity in the Spirit 
through forms of dialogue guided both by meaningful words and mindfulness in its 
discernment.  When Paul writes in Ephesians that the church is “to maintain the unity 
of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (4:1-6), he is affirming that, in the words of 
Marshall, “a commitment to peace-building is a necessary corollary of the church 
being the body of Christ.”56  The church lives restoratively by fostering peace and 
justice through mutual dialogue guided by the Spirit.  
3. In	Summary	
 
The goal of this chapter has been to extend the church’s imagination as to how it 
might embody the kind of restoration and healing that the bible attributes to the justice 
of God.  We have highlighted selected features in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians in an 
attempt to help guide the church today to better embody God’s restorative justice.  
The epistle has proven to be a rich resource for achieving this goal, on account of the 
extent to which the Corinthians failed to embody God’s restoring justice.  This failure 
occasioned Paul’s writing of the epistle – to remind the church of its calling.  He 
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sought to correct the unjust practices of the Corinthians by providing an account of 
how God’s justice had been revealed in the cross of Jesus, a justice the church must 
embody through cruciform practices of justice-making and peace-making.   
 
The failure of the Corinthians to enact Christ crucified through practices of justice can 
largely be attributed to their lack of theological discernment.  They had allowed the 
priorities and values of their surrounding culture to go unchallenged by the gospel.  
Their unconverted notions of wisdom, power, nobility, and justice, had produced a 
factionalized church where the weak, poor, and unimpressive were being treated 
unjustly.  Paul’s resolve to know nothing but “Christ crucified” was a direct challenge 
to the Corinthian Christians and to the pagan culture they inhabited.  Paul’s letter must 
be read in the light of what it would mean for the Corinthians to embody this 
cruciform reality in their context, to assess their life in the light of the one who 
became the power, the wisdom, and the justice of God (1:18-30).  In him, the church 
too is beckoned to “become the justice of God” (2 Cor. 5:21).   
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, we will turn to what this means for the contemporary 
church.  The prescriptive or normative task drawn from the theological interpretation 
of Scripture will give way to the more suggestive task.  Here we will plot practical 














The previous chapters have outlined a theological account of restorative justice that 
draws on the church’s own resources of faith, especially its reading of Scripture.  To 
complete our task, we now need to ask what positive difference this account makes to 
the church’s practice of restorative justice?  This chapter will examine three aspects of 
the church’s life with respect to this question.  First, we will suggest some of the ways 
in which the church is already engaged in forms of restorative justice within its own 
liturgical life.  Second, we will suggest how restorative justice offers a way of 
strengthening the church’s common life of decision-making, planning, and relational 
disputes.  Third, we will look to one specific instance of where the church’s missional 
life has extended restorative justice through an in-prison programme called the 
Sycamore Tree Project.  While not exhaustive, the suggestions offered here will 
hopefully stimulate the church’s imagination as to how it might further embody the 
justice of God in the world.   
 
Before embarking on this task, however, we need to address some of the criticisms 
made of ecclesial ethics, specifically, whether the church should be the primary locus 
of an alternative praxis of justice-making.  These criticisms serve to highlight a core 
presupposition behind the work of ecclesial ethics.  This is that the church, as a 
community of readers of Scripture, is best placed to embody God’s justice as it is 
disclosed in the biblical narrative.  Insofar as it is a community formed in the practices 
of forgiveness, repentance, and reconciliation, it is ideally placed to develop ways of 
responding to wrongdoing that do not rely on harsh and violent punishment.  One 
reason why the church often fails to live out more fully its own vision for justice is 






The order of this chapter is intended to reflect the way in which the church is a locus 
for restorative justice.  By inviting sinners and victims to participate in the liturgical 
acts of confession, the declaration of forgiveness, passing of the peace, culminating in 
the Eucharist as the celebration of its reconciliation, the church remembers and 
proclaims the restoring justice it has received in Christ.  At the end of the worship 
gathering, the church is commissioned to go out into the world to proclaim and 
embody this same justice of right relationships.  This chapter follows this movement 
from worship to witness, beginning with what happens within the church through its 
liturgy and common life and moving onto initiatives that bring restorative justice to 
bear on the world.  These examples show that by displaying embodied practices of 
restorative justice that are theologically informed, the church as church may still be a 
catalyst of the restorative justice vision, as hoped for by its early pioneers. 
2. Ecclesial	Ethics:	Sectarianism,	Idealism,	or	Not?	
 
From its inception, ecclesial ethics has been plagued by the criticism that an excessive 
focus on the distinctive life of the church issues in a sectarian, fideistic and tribalistic 
account of Christianity.  The phrase “sectarian temptation” was coined by James 
Gustafson in 1985 and has been reiterated in more sophisticated forms ever since.1  
Theological sectarianism “isolate[s] Christianity from taking seriously the wider 
world of science and culture and limits the participation of Christians in the 
ambiguities of moral and social life in the patterns of independence in the world.”2  It 
insulates Christian theology and ethics from the critical assessments and correction of 
“other modes of construing reality,”3 all “in order to maintain the uniqueness or 
historic identity of Christianity.”4 
 
While the occasion for Gustafson’s comments can be attributed to the growing 
influence of Stanley Hauerwas in the field of Christian ethics, he does not limit his 
comments to Hauerwas’ work.  He directs the charge of sectarianism against those he 
terms “Wittgensteinian fideists” like D. Z. Phillips and Paul Holmer, the “cultural 
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linguistic” approach to doctrine of Lindbeck, those engaged in a hermeneutically 
enclosed fideism associated with “narrative theology,” and not least those “Anabaptist 
ecclesiologies” that construe God as the tribal deity of Christians rather than the 
Creator of the world.5  This suggests that Gustafson’s understanding of sectarianism is 
broad enough to encapsulate a number of different developments in contemporary 
Christian theology.  Sectarianism is no longer a peripheral concern directed at a few 
errant groups of unorthodox Christians.6   
 
According to Gustafson, those associated with the ecclesial turn falsely assume that 
“there is, or can be, a kind of Christian tribe living in a kind of ghetto whose members 
are (or can be) shaped in their inner dispositions, their religious passions and their 
moral outlooks almost exclusively by the biblical or Christian language or 
narratives.”7  The root of this error apparently lies in a problematic dependence on the 
teaching and example of Jesus for the church’s ethical thinking, as well as an 
inadequate doctrine of creation.8  Gustafson’s counsel to Christians is to participate 
responsibly in the “patterns and processes of interdependence of life” on account of 
how “God orders life through nature.”9 
 
This criticism of ecclesial ethics betrays the widely held assumption that the church is 
a subset of a more comprehensive reality (nature, civil society, the world).  The 
implications of this for Christian socio-political responsibility is that theology and 
ethics ought to be done in the service of something other than what Christians do 
within the confines of the church.  This explains the criticism of those, like Jeffrey 
Stout, who argue that if ecclesial ethicists like Hauerwas “were to stop thrashing his 
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outside of the authority of the church, a “relatively novel sociological use of the term” has emerged 
with writers like Gustafson. The definition of a sect now seems to “indicate a group whose practices 
put it at odds with the dominant culture and political elites of the nation-state. The underlying 
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political actor, is a particular association of civil society that is encompassed by the larger universal 
political sphere of the nation-state,” Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy, 139. 
7 Gustafson, ‘Sectarian Temptation,’ 90. 
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dismisses any central role for Jesus in Christian ethics. They seem to imply that, 1) God as Creator can 
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nature must be allowed to correct knowledge gained through the reading of Scripture and discipleship 
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liberal straw man, rediscover the language of justice, and put that language to use in 
prophetic works of social criticism, his reviewers would surely stop charging him of 
sectarianism.”10  From this perspective, if ecclesial ethics wants to show a 
commitment to social engagement, then it must do so within the order of state and 
society rather than within its own ecclesial community.  
 
Underlying the perspective of critics like Gustafson and Stout is the belief that the 
church as described by ecclesial ethicists does not, in fact, exist.11  Concentrating too 
much on the church diverts energies that could be spent on the more general task of 
forming democratic citizens.  As this study has shown, however, it is for theological 
reasons that ecclesial ethicists are attempting to recover the resources needed to form 
Christian character, including the resources of a church that has been trained to resist 
the vices of individualism and violence.12  This is not to say that ecclesial ethics is 
uninterested in “the activities and institutions that constitute our common life 
together,” as Stout alleges; it means rather that engaged Christians need to first grasp 
their own grammar and practice, their own place to stand.13    
 
Ecclesial ethics is concerned first and foremost with the formation of Christians 
according to the grammar and practices that are constitutive of the church’s worship 
of God.  It is wrongly assumed that given this focus ecclesial ethics is commending an 
inward-looking church, where Christians cannot develop friendship or find co-
                                                
10 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
160. 
11 “In its Hauerwasian form, virtue’s rejection of the way of the world leads to an unpleasant dilemma.  
On the one hand, the stronger its claim to represent virtue as distinct from the way of the world, the 
more quickly it degenerates into a form of ‘conceit’ that cannot honestly be sustained. The actual 
church does not look very much like a community of virtue … This is why Hauerwas has difficulty in 
articulating the ‘for’ of his position as clearly as he articulates the ‘against,’” ibid., 161. 
12 Hauerwas’ position is not always helpful in clarifying this goal. He writes, for example, “My own 
theological convictions will not let me escape by distinguishing between visible or invisible churches, 
or by suggesting that I am recommending ideals to be realized, or by claiming that the theologian’s task 
is to say what the church ought to be, not what it is,” Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front, 18. Such 
statements make it appear that Hauerwas is arguing that the church is already a community of virtue, 
when he is in fact calling on the church to recognise what is has already received in Christ so as to live 
in virtue. 
13 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 152. Hauerwas writes elsewhere that he is not advocating for 
Christians to withdraw from social engagements. Rather, “I just want them to be engaged as Christians.  
[Moreover, the] image of retreat is all wrong. The problem is not that Christians, to be faithful, must 
withdraw. The problem is that Christians, particularly in liberal social orders like that of the United 
States, have so identified with those orders that they no longer are able to see what difference being 
Christian makes. I am not trying to force Christians to withdraw but to recognize that they are 
surrounded. There is no question of withdrawing, as all lines of retreat have been cut off,” Hauerwas, 




operative endevours with those outside the church.  Nor does this focus commit 
Christians to shun those who, by their example, testify to the peace and justice 
Christians have learnt to recognize in Christ.  All of these assumptions fail to 
appreciate the kind of formation of Christian character being advocated.  For example, 
it is in worship that Christians are formed to welcome the stranger and be reconciled 
to their enemies just as they have been received and reconciled by God in Christ.  
Friendship and hospitality are frequent themes in ecclesial ethics, and are never 
simply constrained to those relationships inside the church.14 
 
Ecclesial ethics calls for an engagement with the world in a way that does not render 
the church invisible.  The church is to be engaged as church, not allowing the world 
to dictate the terms of reference or language upon which engagement should happen.  
This requires Christians to be trained to recognize where the surrounding culture is no 
longer hospitable to the church.  It is not a question of “complete involvement in 
culture or complete withdrawal,” as Gustafson presumes, but rather one of selective 
participation.15  The pressing issue is for Christians to work for justice in a way that 
reclaims the visibility of the church in recognition of the dawning of God’s 
eschatological justice in the midst of history. 
 
According to Hauerwas, the point at which Christians must withdraw from 
involvement with the state, culture, or society, is when  
 
… government and society resorts to violence in order to maintain internal 
order and external security … Such an admission, however, hardly 
commits me to a sectarian stance, unless one assumes, as some do, that 
every function of the state depends on its penchant for violence.  Indeed, I 
believe it to be the responsibility of Christians to work to make their 
societies less prone to resort to violence.  Surely one of the ways they can 
do that is by using the law as a means to settle disagreements short of 
violence.16 
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The commitment to nonviolent peacemaking espoused by ecclesial ethics is not a 
symptom of sectarianism, as it “demands strenuous political engagement, because 
such a commitment forces us to expand our social and political imaginations.”17  
 
This is why the approach taken in this study aligns with the concerns of ecclesial 
ethics.  The forerunner of the restorative justice movement emerged as a result of the 
recovery of a radical Anabaptist ecclesiology that emphasized the peacemaking 
witness of the church in sites of power exercised by the state.  Mennonites, often 
accused of being sectarian and withdrawn, began to develop alternative processes for 
resolving conflict and the harm caused by crime as an embodiment of Jesus’ politics.  
While not entirely of the justice system, the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program 
nevertheless existed within this system to provide an alternative (nonviolent) option 
for responding to wrongdoers and victims.  The point at which restorative justice was 
reticent to participate fully in the justice system was when it might collude with the 
violent, punitive impulse that seeks justice by inflicting pain on offenders.18  This 
required Christians to be directly engaged with wrongdoers, victims, the judiciary, 
policy makers, community members, and correctional officers, all of which testifies to 
the non-sectarianism of this ecclesially-formed approach to justice-making.   
 
The account of restorative justice developed in this study is one that springs from the 
life of the church.  It is therefore important to draw attention to the ways in which the 
church is already engaged in forms of restorative justice within itself.  In other words, 
before examining instances of restorative justice beyond the church, we need to 
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others would argue that restorative justice is viable only as it relies on the coercive stick of retributive 
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consider the restorative dimensions of what takes place in the weekly life of the 
congregation and the difference it makes to its members.   
3. Worship	as	the	Ecclesial	Context	for	Restorative	Justice	
 
One of the principal aims of ecclesial ethics has been to reclaim the importance of the 
liturgical life of the church.  In its liturgical performance, the church orders itself by a 
series of specific acts that are intended to shape the character and imagination of its 
members.  This section will explore how these liturgical acts – which involve an 
invitation, story-telling, confession, declaration of forgiveness, acts of reconciliation, 
and commissioning – are all ways that the church lives out a justice that restores.  We 
must first address, however, why worship features so prominently in the church’s life. 
 
Worship occupies a special place in the church’s life because this is where the core 
principle of the Christian life is discovered: God is to be worshipped.  It is in worship 
that the church proclaims that the God who has revealed himself, in his person and in 
what he has done, is doing, and will do, is a God that is worthy and deserving of 
praise.  Worship takes the form of our response to God, which means that it is God 
who both initiates and perfects our worship.  God initiates worship by revealing his 
nature and deeds as worthy, but also by gathering a community that exists for the 
purpose of worshipping him.  As Peter writes, “you are a chosen people, a royal 
priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people, that you may declare the praises of him 
who called you out of darkness into his wonderful light” (1 Pet. 2:9, NIV).   
 
Our worship all too often fails to reflect the worth of the one being worshipped and it 
is rarely offered with wholehearted devotion.  Jesus’ criticism of the Pharisees applies 
to the church also, “This people honors me with their lips, but their hearts are far from 
me; in vain do they worship me, teaching human precepts as doctrines” (Matt. 15:8-
9).  The church responds to this failure as it does with any failure, by pointing to 
Jesus.  By offering in our place the response required of us, Jesus completes our 
worship.  It is on account of his perfect sacrifice and devotion that the church is able 
to worship in “spirit and truth” (cf. John 4:22-24), sharing in Jesus’ spirit as it 
proclaims the truth of the gospel.   




It is the dynamic interaction between the worshiping community and the God who is 
worshiped that gives this activity such a unique character.  Worship is a “form of life,” 
Wannenwetsch argues, since it “embraces the life of believers as a whole, not just 
certain parts of it, be it the political sphere [sic].”19  Wannenwetsch has in mind here 
the way in which Christians bring their everyday concerns into the worshipping 
community, thereby constituting each worship service as a fresh encounter between 
the community and the God being worshipped.20  The performance of the liturgy is 
not simply a ritualistic rehearsal.  More importantly, it is the way in which the 
congregation is formed through word and sacrament, as it remains attuned to the 
needs and concerns of its members.  Included in this is the concern for a justice that 
can restore people and relationships to rightness.   
 
Turning our attention to the specific actions of the Eucharistic liturgy, we notice how 
a number of these actions enact a concern for restorative justice.  The first act in this 
liturgical drama is the invitation of sinners to gather together for worship.  Through 
the call to worship God welcomes into his presence people who are carrying 
disappointments, struggles and hurts, as well as those who carry the guilt and shame 
of having done wrong to others and to themselves.  Because all are gathered into one 
body, this invitation brings together both victims and offenders, often in the same 
person.  If this is not to be done naïvely, then some care and thought must be given to 
preparing the space where this encounter takes place.  This may involve attention to 
the physical layout of the congregation or to ensuring that those entering this space 
are met with the simple gesture of a welcoming face.   
 
It should be emphasized that this invitation has an active rather than a passive 
orientation.  The church that gathers to celebrate the Eucharist recalls the meals Jesus 
shared in his earthly ministry as a sign that God’s kingdom exists for the lost and the 
least.  Jesus demonstrated the message of the kingdom through the forgiveness of sins, 
which he enacted parabolically by eating with tax-collectors and sinners.  “This man 
receives sinners and eats with them” (Luke 15:2).  These common meals were turned 
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into liberative and redeeming events that gathered in the unrighteous to feast with the 
Righteous One, thereby exhibiting the restorative character of God’s justice.  The 
congregation is likewise commissioned to go out to the highways and the byways in 
order to gather in the wrongdoer and the wronged, the good and the bad, so that they 
may taste the banquet of the Lord (Matt. 22:1-10; Luke 14:15-24). 
 
The second liturgical act that enacts the church’s work of restorative justice is the 
confession.  We have already discussed the significance of confessing sin in relation 
to Matthew 18:15-22 and the parable of the Prodigal Son, but we reiterate those points 
here.  First, the presence of concealed sin is a problem for the congregation as a 
whole, not least because it can become a source for untruth, revictimization, and even 
violence.  Confession of sin frees the church to become a community of truthful 
peacemakers by confronting wrongdoing and conflict in a way that prevents the sin 
from causing further harm.  Second, because sin has an irreducibly relational nature, 
confession opens up the possibility for ruptured relationships to be repaired.  As 
Yoder writes, “healing, whether from sin or from sickness, is inseparable from the 
healing of human relationships.”21  Without genuine repentance, which includes the 
act of confession, there is little hope for reconciliation. 
 
Finally, confession of sin reminds us that we owe our lives to God’s unrelenting 
forgiveness.  We need to keep in mind the voluntary nature of this process.  The 
congregation openly confesses that it is a community of sinners because it has learnt 
to acknowledge itself as those who Christ came to forgive.  Unlike the prodigal’s 
confession in the far country, the sons and daughters of the church are made aware of 
their sin in the embrace of the father, who has born their wrongdoing and already 
declared his forgiveness upon it.  This is why the act of confession is a liberating 
event, because it enables wrongdoing to be brought into the open without threatening 
to destroy the fabric of this community. 
 
This takes us into the third liturgical act, the declaration of forgiveness.  Through the 
cross of Christ, God has disclosed his gift of forgiveness for the sake of the world’s 
restoration.  For those who have suffered harm or who are experiencing the shame of 
                                                




having harmed others, they are invited to receive the life of Christ poured out in grace 
and forgiveness.  Through participating in Christ’s self-emptying gift of forgiveness, 
as David Power writes, “we might well enlarge our capacity to ask, give, and receive 
forgiveness.”22  This has important implications for both sinners and victims.  By 
virtue of Christ’s vicarious solidarity with all victims, his declaration on the cross, 
“Father, forgive them …” (Luke 23:34), opens the way for victims to be released from 
their enmity while extending to offenders the offer of divine forgiveness.  The 
congregation thus provides a place where those who may have once been at enmity 
with one another can be made one in the body of Christ. 
 
In any restorative justice encounter there arise a number of strong emotions that need 
to be expressed, and this often takes place through stories.  The fourth liturgical act is 
what I am calling story-telling, which involves individuals in the congregation 
learning to identify their own story in the stories told about God and his people.  The 
inclusion of Scripture readings and the sermon in the liturgy is for the purpose of re-
encountering the story of how God is bringing salvation to his people.  “Scripture 
renders a ‘world,’” according to Hays, a symbolic universe that is undergirded by a 
“grand story of election and promise, the story of [the justice of God], God’s covenant 
faithfulness reaching out to reclaim a fallen and broken humanity.”23  By inscribing 
listeners within the world of the biblical story, it becomes possible to see how 
Scripture is being fulfilled in the life of the church.  According to Richard Hays, the 
church is called to engage in “metaphor-making, placing our community’s life 
imaginatively within the world articulated by the texts,” so that the community might 
be transformed as it “embodies the meaning of the text.”24   
 
Concretely, this means that the present realities and situations facing the congregation 
and its members are to be reinterpreted through the lens of the biblical drama.  It is 
here that the liturgical act of telling stories from Scripture can become a restorative 
justice event.  Scripture contains texts that speak of bringing comfort to the 
downtrodden, rebuilding lives and livelihoods, stories of contrition, repentance, and 
vindication, as well as songs of lament.  These are all important for responding to 
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those affected by conflict.  There are also texts that express a desire for vengeance, 
what is known as the imprecatory psalms. 
 
O God, break the teeth [of the wicked] in their mouths; tear out the fangs 
of the young lions, O Lord!  Let them vanish like water that runs away; 
like gras let them be traodden down and wither … The righteous will 
rejoice when they see vengeance done; they will bathe their feet in the 
blood of the wicked (Ps. 58:6-7, 10). 
 
O daughter Babylon, you devastator!  Happy shall they be who pay you 
back what you have done to us!  Happy shall they be who take your little 
ones and dash them against the rock! (Ps. 137:8-9). 
 
 
What possible place could these prayers have in the church’s worship?  While they 
may evoke great discomfort, they nevertheless express some of the most visceral 
emotions experienced by those who have suffered injustice, violation, and abuse.  
Scripture does not offer a sanitized piety, yet neither does it leave victims alone in 
their anguish.  Rae offers two further comments about the use of these prayers in 
worship.  First, whoever prays to God for vengeance waives the right to seek 
vengeance themselves.  The words in these prayers give voice to the wrath of God in 
the face of human atrocity, but at the same time God removes the prerogative to seek 
vengeance from the one who would pray them.  “Vengeance is mine, I will repay, 
says the Lord” (Rom. 12:19; cf. Deut. 32:35).   
 
Giving up all claim to seek vengeance themselves, those who pray the 
psalm place the ultimate fate of their enemies into the hands of God and 
learn, in the meantime, that they are to feed their enemies if they are 
hungry and give them water if they thirst.25 
 
 
Second, as a prayer to God, those who desire vengeance are directed to the way in 
which God answers this prayer.  They look, in other words, to the one in whom the 
“whole of Scripture” and the “Word of the one God” is fulfilled, namely, to Jesus as 
the Word made flesh.26  The vengeance of God, where his wrath is visited upon the 
world’s sin and evil, is exercised in the cross of Christ.  If the wickedness of humanity 
                                                
25 Murray Rae, ‘Christ in/and the Old Testament,’ Journal of Theological Interpretation 2, no. 1 
(2008): 5. Rae is drawing upon the discussion of Bonhoeffer in Martin Kuske, The Old Testament as 
the Book of Christ: An Appraisal of Bonhoeffer's Interpretation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), 85-
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is intensified in this single event, then those who would pray these words are taught to 
see in Christ’s sacrifice the way that God responds to his enemies: by transforming 
them through his declaration of forgiveness.  Once again, by inhabiting the story of 
Scripture, the church embodies the way of God’s justice at work to restore victims and 
offenders to right relationship. 
 
The church’s liturgical performance reaches its climax in the celebration of the 
Eucharist, what might appropriately be called the act of reconciliation.  In the 
Christian tradition, the Eucharist has been conceived of as a sacramental enactment of 
the reconciliation brought about in and through Christ.  Its character as an event where 
relationships are restored to rightness is drawn from the presence of Christ becoming, 
in some way, real in the breaking of bread.  In partaking of this meal, the church does 
not simply recall a past event locked away in history.  Rather, Christ’s once and for all 
reconciliation is sacramentally re-membered in the body of Christ, where the presence 
of the risen Lord is acknowledged.  This gives the Eucharist an eschatological 
character in which, in Moltmann’s words, “Christ’s redeeming future is anticipated 
and this hope celebrated in remembrance of his passion.  In this meal his past and his 
future are simultaneously made present.”27 
 
The church has not always taken seriously its performance of the Eucharist as an 
invitation to embody God’s restoring justice.  In the post-apostolic church, admission 
to the Eucharist was reserved for committed believers alone, and then only after 
months, sometimes years, of preparation and self-reflection.  The rigour with which 
the Eucharist was taken reflected the eschatology of the time.  Commenting on the 
eschatological significance of the Eucharist, Cavanaugh writes,   
 
At the Eucharist the feast of the last day irrupts into earthly time, and the 
future breaks into the present.  The ekklesia or church … is not merely the 
church in its flawed earthly manifestation but the church in its full and 
proper sense, the eternal gathering of all creation by Christ into the 
Father’s Kingdom.28   
 
This purportedly lies behind Paul’s warning to the Corinthians to “discern the body” 
when eating the bread and drinking from the cup, lest they “eat and drink judgment 
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against themselves” (1 Cor. 11:29).  The Eucharist is an event that is set against the 
horizon of the eschatological judgment of God on the world, which is why the church 
must be prepared for final judgment by practicing God’s restorative justice in a 
manner worthy of the Lord. 
 
Adding further weight to the pursuit of reconciliation as a presupposition for 
partaking of this meal was Jesus’ instructions in Matthew 5:23-24.  These words are 
often read in association with the “altar” of the Eucharistic table: “So when you are 
offering your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has 
something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled 
to your brother or sister, and then come and offer your gift.”  This injunction contains 
several important features.  First, it fosters self-reflection on the nature of one’s 
relationships, whether or not they exhibit the reconciliation expected of those who 
have a share in Christ.  Second, leaving a gift at an altar temporarily hastens the need 
to reconcile, adding an incentive to complete this work quickly.  Finally, returning to 
the altar signifies the inseparability between human and divine reconciliation, that 
both are essential for the church to worship rightly.  It is likely that Jesus’ words were 
originally an allusion to Leviticus 6:1-7 where restitution to and reconciliation with 
those who one had harmed was a prerequisite to reconciliation with God. 
 
The post-apostolic church developed two practices in particular that expressed this 
work of restoring relationships.  Fist, as a prelude to the Eucharist, members would 
embrace each other with a “Holy Kiss,” as a testament to the peace and reconciliation 
at work in their relationships within the ecclesia.29  Second, bishops were urged to 
mediate and settle disputes between church members on the second day of the week, 
giving ample time to establish peace by the day of the Eucharist.   
 
The practice of the Eucharist is a remembrance of one meal in particular, the night of 
Jesus’ betrayal leading to his sacrifice on the cross (Luke 22:17-20).  The breaking of 
bread symbolizes the suffering body of Christ, the body that was tortured and 
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relationships. The acceptable gift is prayer offered in peace, in brotherly concord. Pure worship 
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sacrificed in solidarity with all other victims.30  The church becomes the body of 
Christ when it “performs an anamnesis of Christ’s sacrifice,” as Cavanaugh argues, 
“suffering in its own flesh the afflictions taken on by Christ.”31  This joins the church 
to the cause of all those who have been victims at the hands of others, seeing in their 
plight, the agony that was suffered by Christ.  The pouring of the wine symbolizes the 
new covenant, where sinners are washed clean by the blood of Christ.  The church as 
the body of Christ is the one place where the fate of wrongdoers is determined not by 
their past but by the new life promised in Christ’s resurrection. 
 
Finally, the Eucharist is also where ecclesial discipline takes place.  In the previous 
chapter, we discussed Paul’s urging of the Corinthians to “excommunicate” an 
unrepentant offender, a practice that continued to develop in the early church and 
acquired increasing theological gravity.  As the body of Christ, the church understood 
its call to exemplify God’s reconciliation in its own life, which sometimes involved 
withdrawing communion from wrongdoers until they had repented.  Hein elaborates,  
 
Since the early Church made no adequate distinction between ecclesiology 
and soteriology – the Church being identical with those who were to be 
saved and were therefore already saved – the ecclesiological motives for 
eucharistic excommunication were often equally soteriological.32   
 
The Eucharist was reserved, in other words, for those who were open to being 
disciplined by it and so standing against the forces of a world mired in violence and 
division.  The motive for excommunication was not so much to punish offenders, but 
rather to communicate that sin that has not been repented has no place in the 
Eucharist.  The offender excommunicates himself or herself by failing to be penitent.  
The congregation, however, extends to them the possibility of restoration by inducing 
them to change their conduct.  “As an invitation to reconciliation,” as Cavanaugh 
argues, “excommunication done well is an act of hospitality, in which the church does 
                                                
30 Cavanaugh particularly draws out this feature of the Eucharist in his discussion of torture under the 
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31 Ibid., 267. 
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not expel the sinner, but says to her, ‘You are already outside our communion.  Here 
is what you need to do to come back in.’”33 
 
The final liturgical act is the commissioning of the congregation.  Having enacted the 
work of restorative justice through the liturgical event that culminated in the 
Eucharist, Christians have also become practiced in the work of restorative justice, 
which they are now to proclaim and embody in the world.  Just as the Eucharistic life 
of the church does not end at the altar, so too the church must take its performance of 
restorative justice beyond the confines of the congregation in order to invite others to 
participate in the restoring justice of God.   
 
The inseparability between the church’s worship and its commissioning to serve 
others was given special emphasis in the apostolic church.  This is especially clear in 
Acts 2:42-7 where mention of the breaking of bread is placed side-by-side with the 
sharing of material resources, as summary descriptions of the church’s daily 
existence.  One of the earliest ministries recognized in the church was that of diakonoi 
(Acts 6:1-6), from which we get “deacons,” whose task evidently included gathering 
the contributions to the common meal and distributing what was not eaten among the 
poor and widows.34  The implications for the contemporary church are spelled out by 
Moltmann.  
 
As the supper with Jesus and his disciples demonstrates fellowship with 
his mission to the poor, the imprisoned, the sick and the despised, so in the 
same way the Lord’s supper leads to mission and missionary tasks for the 




The church’s liturgical performance, then, is a prime example of where restorative 
justice is already embedded in the life of the church.  It is through these practices that 
the church reveals its solidarity with victims and offenders, receives reconciliation in 
and through Christ, and disciplines its members to be restored to right relationship.  It 
may be tempting to suppose that Christian expression of worship and so also of 
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restorative justice concludes at the end of the liturgy, but liturgy and worship are to be 
the work of our whole lives.  The commissioning given at the end of a service of 
worship indicates that the gestures of forgiveness and reconciliation learned and 
practiced in the Eucharist are to be enacted throughout the week that follows. This is 
what Christian life consists in.  In what follows, I want to explore how this restorative 
ethos may be carried through to the church’s common life and missional life.  
Specifically, how might the church continue to express its core commitment to a 
restorative conception of justice as it engages in decision-making or deals with 
relational disputes, right through to its ministry to prisoners and victims of crime?   
4. The	Church’s	Restorative	Witness	in	the	World	
 
We mentioned earlier the criticism of ecclesial ethics that argues the church, as 
advocated by scholars like Hauerwas, does not exist.  As Healy succinctly puts it, 
“Hauerwas’s church is the one he worships in, but he seems to prefer, and talk more 
about, the one he constructs for himself.”36  This is evident in presentations of the 
church’s life that are idealized or romanticized, and which fail to account for most 
people’s experience of the church as a messy, confused, and confusing body.  In 
response, Hauerwas has argued, 
 
The people of God are no less an empirical reality than the crucifixion of 
Christ.  The church is as real as his cross.  There is no “ideal church,” no 
“invisible church,” no “mystically existing universal church” more real 
than the concrete church with parking lots and potluck dinners.  It is the 
church of parking lots and potluck dinners that comprises the sanctified 
ones formed by and forming the continuing story of Jesus Christ in the 
world.37 
 
If ecclesial ethics is concerned with the church of parking lots and potluck dinners, 
and many other features in between, then how might the common life of the 
congregation better express its commitment to peacemaking and restorative justice?  
With this question in mind I want to explore the work of Thomas Porter, a lawyer and 
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minister in the United Methodist Church, who advocates for the creation of a culture 




In his 23 years as a lawyer for his denomination, Porter participated in several church 
trials.  He noted that the way churches deal with conflict or theological differences is 
often no different from the adversarial retributive model of the courts, where he 
worked as a trial lawyer.  It is no better at the level of local congregations.  Due to a 
severe lack of relational and conflict-resolution skills, many congregations struggle to 
discuss difficult issues and employ healthy decision-making processes.  After 
experiencing the restorative and spiritual process of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, he sought to develop a more constructive, and biblical, 
way of dealing with conflict within churches.   
 
As a lawyer and mediator, Porter realized early on the significance of getting people 
to a table where they could engage each other and work together to address the issues, 
the harms, and the problems that divide them.  He noticed the many connections 
between this work of conflict transformation and what happens at the “Table of Holy 
Communion.”  “The Table is a place of accountability to God, to each other, to the 
cosmos.  It is a Table of restorative justice, of healing.  The Table is a banquet table 
placed in the presence of our enemies.”39  Porter became convinced that it was at this 
table, where the Eucharistic liturgy is practiced, that Christians are formed to be 
peacemakers and ministers of reconciliation.  It is in here that Christians find the 
“place, the time, the ritual, and the spiritual power for healing relationships and doing 
the work of reconciliation in this world.”40  Porter’s observations reinforce the 
perspective we have been developing in this chapter. 
 
Yet Porter also highlights how at this table Christians call to mind the conflict that 
surrounds them, whether present in other places or within the church itself.  Indeed, 
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the very practice of the Eucharist has historically created great divisions within the 
church, not all of which have been healed.  This is why Porter raises the question, 
“how does conflict inform Holy Communion and how does Holy Communion 
transform conflict?”41  He identifies several features of conflict-transformation 
processes that are consistent with the biblical story and the practice of Holy 
Communion.  In essence it involves providing a sacred space where people can 
recognize their interdependence and connection, with a sense of equality and respect, 
so that all voices can be heard, which requires deep listening and respectful speaking, 
where all feel responsible and accountable for outcomes, so that problems can be 
solved and relationships healed.42 
 
Porter’s description of healthy congregational processes bears many similarities with 
Paul’s commendation to the Corinthian church in 1 Cor. 12, discussed in the previous 
chapter.  To be “spiritual,” as Paul conceived it, was to participate in relationships that 
were mutually edifying in recognition of how each person carried gifts that were 
essential for the common good (vv. 7).  Within the body of Christ, there are no 
autonomous individuals, since all are members of one another through baptism into 
the one body (vv. 12-13).  Practically, this required honour and respect to be shown to 
those who were “inferiors” according to this world – the weak, the poor, the isolated, 
suffering, and marginalized (vv. 22-24).  The reconciling power of God’s justice, 
manifest in the cross of Christ, has inaugurated a new order.  The church is to witness 
to this new reality, expressed through a mutuality of care such that solidarity in 
suffering and rejoicing becomes the telos of the community’s life together (vv. 25-
26).   
 
As Porter sought out processes for embedding what he calls “justpeace” within the 
church, he was drawn to the power of Peacemaking Circles.  “The circle is a vessel 
for grieving together, for healing, for talking through an issue, for making decisions, 
for working through difficult conversations, for dealing with conflicted situations, for 
developing a team, and for celebrating together.”43  He concludes from his experience 
of using them, 
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I found the circle process a great gift to the church and the world … Sitting 
in circle expresses in a physical and symbolic way the interconnectedness, 
interdependence, and unity of all life as found in God … In fact, circle 
process calls the church back from doing business like the Chamber of 
Commerce, to doing ‘worshipful work,’ and seeing its task to discern in 
and through community the will of God.44   
 
The connection between Peacemaking Circles, worshipful work, and community 
building brings together the strands that we have been exploring in this study.45 
 
Modern Peacemaking Circles did not emerge from the same Christian epistemic base 
we have pursued in this study, though as the resonances with 1 Corinthians show they 
are deeply congruent with Christian conviction.  Influenced in part by the indigenous 
tradition of Talking Circles, they began in the Minnesota criminal justice system as a 
form of restorative justice that focused on the harm caused by crime and devising 
strategies for repairing the harm through a dialogical process.46  Early on they focused 
on the sentencing process, yet it was not long before they were applied to other parts 
of the criminal justice system.  Some courts began operating in the format of a Circle, 
probation programmes for reintegrating prisoners employed the use of Circles, and 
some innovative practitioners began taking Circles into contexts beyond the justice 
system.47  Circles are now used in schools, workplaces, social services, churches, 
neighbourhood groups, and families.48  
 
The authors of Peacemaking Circles describe Circles as having both an inner and 
outer frame.  The outer frame designates the visible structural elements of Circle 
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processes.49  Ceremony or rituals are used to mark out the Circle time as “sacred 
space,” leading participants into a different way of relating and being present to one 
another.  The talking piece is used as a symbolic tool for regulating the tone, pace, and 
purpose of dialogue.  The keeper maintains the space of the dialogue, ensuring that 
participants remain attentive to the established guidelines.  The guidelines describe 
the behaviours and commitments expected of one another in order to speak openly 
and truthfully.  Consensus making involves exploring what decisions can be supported 
by all participants without the use of coerced obligation. 
 
The inner frame is concerned with the underlying philosophy or view of reality that 
underpins Circles.  They are not a neutral, value-free process.  The “underlying 
worldview,” the “view of the cosmos,” as the authors of Peacemaking Circles put it, 
is “one that sees the universe as characterized by wholeness, unity, and 
connectedness.”50  Grounded in this conviction about reality, the Circle process is 
based on a fairly simple notion: “Because we all want to be in good relationships with 
others, when we create a space that is respectful and reflective, people can find their 
way through anger, pain, and fear to find common ground and take care of one 
another.”51  Circles exist to strengthen relationships by building on people’s desire for 
connectedness.  
 
This overview of Peacemaking Circles certainly does not exhaust the depth of insight 
often experienced by its practitioners.  Pranis, for example, speaks of Circles as 
creating,  
 
… possibilities for freedom: freedom to speak our truth, freedom to drop 
masks and protections, freedom to be present as a whole human being, 
freedom to reveal our deepest longings, freedom to acknowledge mistakes 
and fears, freedom to act in accord with our core values.52   
 
Their power to transform conflicts has convinced many practitioners that Circles 
provide a way through contemporary society’s most intransigent problems.  “With 
Circles, the center of conflict can become the center for practicing democracy to a 
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degree that few of us have experienced anywhere else before.”53  Circles offer a way 
of practicing democracy that overcomes the many shortfalls of majority rule.  
Agreeing on the values that guide decision making, including all voices, seeking 
common ground, and building relatedness are just some features of the “radical 
democracy” to be found in Circles.54   
 
Porter describes his use of Circles within the church as a ritual that facilitates good 
listening, truthful speech, and peaceable outcomes.  These are the elements essential 
to building a healthy common life within the church.  Given his particular theological 
commitments, Porter adapts the format and language of Circles to fit the ecclesial 
context.  He urges congregations to develop “relational covenants.”    
 
Relational covenants emphasize the relational nature of our understanding 
of how we should be treated in community, and recognize that this 
relationship with each other is embedded in the covenant God has made 
with God’s creation.  The covenant expresses our greatest values and give 
[sic] us a structure in which we can address relational brokenness.  As 
people called to imitate God, the covenant is one that we continually and 
lovingly work to restore when it is broken.  This understanding 
significantly affects how we react to breaches of the covenant.55 
 
 
A relational covenant communicates the shared expectations and aspirations of the 
community regarding how each member wants to be treated.  It outlines a set of 
promises to one another and to the community as a whole.  It is specifically focused 
on the practices of listening and speaking, and the level of confidentiality expected.  It 
is not intended to be a list of rules about negative conduct or how deviant conduct 
should be brought back into line.  It is instead an affirmation of the vision and 
character of the community, and gives expression to the kind of conduct that 
expresses that vision. 
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Following the formation of a relational covenant, Porter leads the community or group 
into a “facilitated conversation.”56  Circles are essentially a structured form of 
dialogue orientated towards making connections and building understanding between 
people, on the basis of which more difficult conversations and conflicts can take 
place.  These dialogical practices ensure that people are listened to, that they are given 
a chance to tell their story, and that decisions are made in a consensual way.  Each of 
these three elements – listening, story-telling, and consensus – is essential for 
restoration to occur.  
 
To help to facilitate listening, a talking piece is passed around the Circle.  This 
practice serves two purposes.  At a basic level, it regulates dialogue to ensure that 
each person has the opportunity to contribute.  Since no one speaks unless holding the 
piece, interruptions and disruptive speech are minimized.  An added benefit, as Pranis 
points out, is that it slows the pace of conversation and encourages thoughtful and 
reflective interactions among participants.57   
 
At a more profound level, the talking piece focuses everyone’s attention on the person 
holding it, which in turn may become a healing moment as the holder experiences 
“being heard.”58  In most group processes, people compete with each other to be 
heard, which often leaves people with the feeling that they have been talked to but 
rarely heard.  The talking piece shifts participants from a position of “adding their bit” 
to a disposition of respectful and genuine listening.  Circle dialogues also foster the 
practices of silence and patience as essential features for cultivating attentive listeners.  
This challenges dominant attitudes towards time, which is often viewed as a limited 
resource that must be used efficiently and resourcefully. 
 
“The Circle Process is a story-telling process,” explains Pranis.  “Every person has a 
story, and every story has a lesson to offer.  In the Circle, people touch one another’s 
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lives by sharing stories that have meaning to them.”59  While advice and information 
can contribute to a conversation, listeners more readily absorb stories than subscribe 
to another’s advice.  It is often through the wisdom of stories that dialogue is guided 
towards a deeper apprehension of truth.  Umbreit describes the difference between 
conventional approaches to dialogue, which are highly cognitive and oriented towards 
problem-solving, and restorative dialogues that focus on “honoring the enormous 
healing power” of stories.60 The power of storytelling lies in its self-revealing nature.   
 
In telling our stories we articulate how we understand what has happened 
to us, why and how it has impacted us, and how we see ourselves and 
others.  Our way of constructing our stories, which shapes our view of 
reality, becomes more transparent to us [and others] when we speak the 
story out loud to others.61   
 
Stories invite people to venture to the root of the conflict, helping others understand 
its impact on people.  They provide an opportunity to give voice to the grief, trauma, 
and enslavement the conflict has caused.  Stories call others to participate in the 
healing or change that needs to take place. This is evident in 1 Corinthians, where 
Paul retells the story of Jesus’ Last Supper as the basis for challenging abusive 
practices in the church’s life (1 Cor 11:17-34) 
 
Porter uses a story to illustrate how Circles can be used to affirm the kind of work 
churches are called to do. 
 
Two churches were at war with each other.  One church had been in 
existence for over one hundred years.  Behind this church was a large 
cemetery.  The church had membership of a few hundred.  This old 
country church found the city spreading out and around it.  Another United 
Methodist church bought land a mile away.  This church already had 
several thousand members and was growing.  The old country church was 
deeply threatened.   
A war developed between these two congregations to the point 
where they were sending e-mail viruses to each other.  I spent time with 
each congregation, listening to their concerns and hopes.  We then 
gathered a circle of five representatives from each church, surrounded by 
the members of both churches, about four hundred people whose only job 
was to listen.  We decided that all ten people would bring something to 
share in the circle that symbolized why they loved their church …  
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One member of the “country church” brought an electrical plug.  I 
was eager to hear why!  When it was his turn to describe what he had 
brought and its importance to him, he explained, “When I joined this 
church, I was asked to help one of the senior members of the church rewire 
the church.  From him, I learned all I know about electrical wiring, but, 
more importantly, I learned what it meant to be church.”  This plug and all 
the other objects on the table in the center of the circle became a ritual 
affirmation of each church and reminded everyone throughout the evening 
what was best about these churches that they were trying to affirm 
together.62 
 
It is significant that Porter concludes his study with a discussion on the Eucharist as 
the place where Christians become practiced in the kind of peacemaking and justice-
making he associates with Circles.  We may take from this that, at least for Christians, 
Circles must be understood, communicated, and practiced in the light of worship – not 
the other way around.  How congregations navigate their common life, with all its 
decision-making, planning, and relational disputes, must be done in a way that reflects 
what has been learned in the liturgy.  While Peacemaking Circles may help 
congregations in cultivating the kinds of relationships and dialogues that are essential 
for restoration to occur, it should not be forgotten that the church pursues restorative 




Designed by Daniel Van Ness and facilitated by Lisa Rea, the Sycamore Tree Project 
was pioneered in 1998 at a Texas medium security prison.  It was replicated soon after 
in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and has since spread to over thirty-four 
countries.  The Sycamore Tree Project is an initiative of Prison Fellowship.  
According to the organisation’s mission statement, its goal is to be, “Engaging the 
Christian community to pursue justice and healing in response to crime to the end that 
offenders are transformed, relationships are reconciled, and communities are 
restored.”63  Prison Fellowship also pioneered “Communities of Restoration” – an 
intensive “character-focused, faith-based” programme where prisoners learn to live, 
serve, and work alongside others in a supportive environment, with the aim of 
transforming attitudes and behaviours in prisoners.  They also advocate for justice 
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reform in a restorative justice direction.  This includes legislative change, promoting 
healing dialogues between community members and prisoners, and lobbying 
organizations, like the United Nations, to foster the use of restorative justice in 
criminal justice systems around the world.64 
 
In this section we will focus on the Sycamore Tree Project as one specific instance of 
where the church’s missional life has extended its work of restorative justice through 
an in-prison programme.  This programme takes its name from the New Testament 
story of Jesus’ encounter with the despised tax collector Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1-10).  
According to Van Ness, this narrative contains many of the features of a restorative 
justice encounter, with the unique addition of Jesus facilitating this encounter through 
to its restorative end.  We will briefly summarize the restorative features of this 
narrative before exploring how the Sycamore Tree Projects brings this restorative 
reality to bear on its work in prisons.65 
 
Van Ness first points out that it is Jesus that sets up this restorative justice encounter.  
Zacchaeus, on account of his short stature, had climbed a sycamore tree in the hope of 
seeing Jesus, who was expected to pass by that way (Luke 19:2-4).  “When Jesus 
came to the place, he looked up and said to him, ‘Zacchaeus, hurry and come down; 
for I must stay at your house today’” (vv. 5).  All we know of Zacchaeus at this point 
is that he is a chief tax-collector, who is very rich, and yet the crowds had not given 
him the space to see Jesus as he processed through their town.  Given his profession, 
it is likely his fellow countrymen despised him.  Tax-collectors were profiteering 
opportunists, Jewish collaborators with the colonizing Empire who extorted payment 
from the already oppressed Jewish people.  
 
Jesus’ summoning of this “white-collar offender” to leave the security of the tree and 
enter into the crowd brought together an offender with his victims.  Van Ness 
surmises that Zacchaeus and his victims had become accustomed to separation.  It 
may have been the case that Zacchaeus, like many others who commit crime, felt no 
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65 I will be following Van Ness’ sermon, “Today Salvation Has Come,” delivered at Wesley Church, 
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empathy for those he had defrauded.  Whatever the case, in this narrative it is the 
distance between the crowd and Zacchaeus that defines their relationship.  This 
separation is overcome, first, through the presence of Jesus’ person and, second, as 
Jesus calls down this wrongdoer to meet his victims.  The first important step towards 
a restorative encounter happens through an encounter with Jesus. 
 
By announcing his wish to feast at the house of Zacchaeus, Jesus provoked a strong 
reaction from the crowd.  His words were intentionally provocative according to Van 
Ness, for they “began a dialogue that was ultimately redemptive.”  The crowd is the 
first to speak, grumbling together, “He has gone to be the guest of one who is a 
sinner” (vv. 7).  Behind these words Van Ness detects the deep pain and 
disappointment from those who were seeing their hoped for Messiah choosing to side 
with their abuser.   Jesus’ actions had prompted these victims to express their deep 
hurt.  In response, it appears that Jesus simply listened.  He created a space where 
victims would be heard, and then he waited to see what would happen next. 
 
Zacchaeus had also been listening.  Turning to Jesus he said, “Look, half of my 
possessions, Lord, I will give to the poor; and if I have defrauded anyone of anything, 
I will pay back four times as much” (vv. 8).  Van Ness regards this as a confession, an 
acceptance of responsibility that he is the one who needs to make things right.  In the 
presence of Jesus, Zacchaeus realizes that “truth is not something for others to 
discover and prove [as in a criminal trial]; truth is something to acknowledge and 
disclose.”  Recognizing the intangible harm he has caused the town and its citizens, 
Zacchaeus elects to undergo a “kind of community service,” or at least a self-imposed 
fine of giving money to charity.  More importantly, he promises to make full 
restitution to those he has directly harmed.  These are the signs of a repentant sinner 
according to Van Ness: confession, acceptance of responsibility, facing the truth, and 
making restitution. 
 
This brings us to the final part of the dialogue, and this time it is Jesus who speaks.  It 
was Jesus who set up this encounter, who brought Zacchaeus the offender together 
with his victims, and now having heard from both parties, Jesus declares the purpose 
of this encounter.  “Today salvation has come to this house, because he too is a son of 




Jesus wanted to “bring salvation into this conflict,” argues Van Ness, which tangibly 
means the restoration of offenders through repentance and their reintegration by a 
community that acknowledges this son of theirs.  Jesus came to inaugurate a justice 
that restores and, through the lens of this narrative, this restorative justice happens 
through being encountered by Jesus.    
 
The story finishes here, and yet the reality remains.  The next day Jesus was already 
on his way, leaving behind him Zacchaeus and the crowd.  Van Ness highlights the 
need for binding commitments following a restorative justice encounter.  In order to 
fulfill his promises, Zacchaeus would need to list his victims and begin paying back 
his debts.  He would need to live on less money, and change his tax collecting 
practices or abandon them completely.  As for the crowd, they would need to decide 
how they might treat Zacchaeus.  Would they remain hostile towards him or extend an 
offer of forgiveness?  This is the kind of hard work that follows restorative justice.   
 
The Sycamore Tree Project invites a group of prison inmates and victim surrogates to 
explore together the themes of repentance, confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation 
in the hope that offenders will commit to a life of restitution and victims can begin the 
journey of healing.  While variations of the programme structure exist, it is common 
to include a panel of six victims and six inmates.  The group meets over eight sessions 
to share their own personal experiences of crime through the use of small group 
discussions, role-plays, and readings.  Towards the end of the course, inmates are 
encouraged to formulate a “covenant” outlining the commitments they will make on 
leaving the programme.  In the final session there is an opportunity to celebrate those 
who have graduated, and notable dignitaries from the wider community are invited.  
 
Despite being identified as a faith-based, restorative justice initiative, to my 
knowledge no theological treatment of the Sycamore Tree Project exists.  This attests, 
once again, to the paucity of attention given to restorative justice by those working in 
theological ethics.66  This inattention has contributed to some confusion about the 
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programme’s purpose.  Not understanding the theological ethos behind restorative 
justice, some Christians have interpreted the purpose of Sycamore Tree as primarily 
an avenue for getting inmates “saved” without the attendant emphasis on 
reconciliation.67  As the Zacchaeus narrative showed, however, salvation describes the 
entire process of restoring relationships to rightness as mediated through an encounter 
with Jesus.  An individualistic understanding of salvation that leaves people and 
relationships unchanged is not the salvation brought by Jesus.   
 
One of the challenges facing the Sycamore Tree Project is its ability to challenge the 
understanding of justice that undergirds the prison setting in which it operates.  Most 
restorative justice programmes operate in diversionary or pre-sentence settings rather 
than in post-sentence or correctional settings.  This is because restorative justice 
emerged initially as an alternative to the expanded use of imprisonment by directing 
attention to the resources available in local communities, like the church, for dealing 
with wrongdoing.  Early advocates of restorative justice often drew a sharp contrast 
between the restorative conception of justice underpinning community responses to 
crime and the retributive impulses that shape criminal justice institutions.  As Russ 
Immarigeon, one of the early pioneers, writes, “Incarceration is the institutional 
manifestation of the punitive impulse that restorative justice is designed and intended 
to challenge.”68   
 
The prison regime and environment present numerous challenges for embedding an 
alternative practice like restorative justice.  At its best, Sycamore Tree creates a space 
where prison staff, inmates, policy makers and community members are invited to 
rethink the purpose of imprisonment.69  Do prisons exist only for the purpose of 
punishment, or can they exist to foster restoration and healing as well?  Operating 
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Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2004), 150. 
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within what already exists, initiatives like Sycamore Tree invite those within the 
system to see beyond the dominant rationale informing the institutionalized forms of 
the justice system.  
 
One way in which Sycamore Tree fulfills this task is by raising awareness that crime 
is a matter of relational injury.  Prisoners often lack empathy and an awareness of the 
human impact of their offences, an issue that is further compounded by being 
separated from healthy examples of empathy and remorse while in prison.  Alongside 
prisoners, the prison regime and the offender-focused role of correctional staff 
generally fail to accommodate the experience and needs of victims.  The Sycamore 
Tree Project unsettles this neglectful complacency by providing a space where actual 
victims are enabled to tell their story of victimization, to explain through the use of 
personal narratives the relational and human impact of crime.  Like the crowd in the 
Zacchaeus narrative, this fosters victim awareness in offenders as well as providing an 
opportunity for victims to experience the healing effects of giving voice to their 
story.70 
 
Participants often recount how their attitude towards others changes as a result of 
exchanging stories of wrongdoing and victimization.  Victims no longer feel afraid of 
prisoners, prisoners express a hope that change and forgiveness are possible, and 
unlikely friendships begin to form between both.  As Van Ness writes, “in the context 
of shared emotions, victim and offender achieve a sort of empathy.  This may not 
make the victim feel particularly positive about the offender but it does make the 
offender seem more normal, less malevolent.”71  This observation suggests a unique 
facet about justice from a restorative perspective.  When justice is understood as that 
which restores relationships, it becomes vitally important to attend to the way in 
which people express meaningful experiences and events – including traumatic or 
shameful events – through the use of personal and collective narratives.  Justice is 
                                                
70 Victims are open to restorative justice because, as Lisa Rea puts it, “the current system does not 
adequately acknowledge the impact violent crime has on victims, or hold offenders accountable to their 
victims in meaningful ways,” Lisa M. Rea, ‘Restorative Justice: The New Way Forward,’ Christian 
Reflection: A Series in Faith and Ethics: Prison, Journal of The Center for Christian Ethics, Baylor 
University (2012): 33. 





experienced in the listening and telling of stories, especially when they open up ways 
of healing the memory of the past.   
 
The power of restorative justice initiatives like the Sycamore Tree Project lies in their 
ability to foster truthful and healing exchanges between those who have experienced 
trauma, shame, hurt, and distrust.  People are invited through these encounters to 
participate vicariously in the experience of others and so become participants in their 
recovery also.  Even though in-prison programmes like Sycamore Tree bring together 
unrelated or “surrogate” victims and offenders, the effects of these exchanges are no 
less tangible.72   
 
Building awareness of the relational realities of crime and justice is one reason why 
the church ought to lend support to initiatives like the Sycamore Tree Project.  
Recognition of the relational injury of crime is of pivotal importance in seeking the 
restoration and reintegration of offenders.73  Zacchaeus was moved to repentance 
upon hearing the pain he had caused to his fellow countrymen.  This was even more 
noticeable in Jesus’ parable of the Prodigal Son, where the repentance displayed by 
the younger son was brought about by remembering the relational bond to his paternal 
victim and by his realization of how his behaviour had caused injury to this 
relationship.  This suggests that the first step in repentance involves wrongdoers in 
undertaking a truthful assessment of their life as relational and social beings.   
 
The Sycamore Tree Project attempts to embed this same movement in its programme, 
albeit without identifying repentance as the overarching reality.  In the curriculum, 
repentance is expressed as one theme alongside “confession” and “restitution,” with 
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perhaps the greatest emphasis given to the session on “taking responsibility.”74  It 
would, however, be more conducive to a theological conception of restorative 
reintegration if these movements were situated within the overarching reality of 
repentance, as this would more clearly communicate the vertical as well as horizontal 
dimension involved.  In a Christian sense, repentance is not a journey taken alone.  It 
requires learning to see oneself as dependent on the mercy of others and of God, 
which is arguably the key insight imparted to participants in the Sycamore Tree 
Project.   
 
This raises the question on the extent to which the success of Sycamore Tree is 
dependent on participants being encountered by something beyond themselves.  In the 
Zacchaeus narrative it was clear that the encounter between the crowd and Zacchaeus 
would not have taken place were it not for Jesus’ presence.  He not only brought about 
the encounter, he started a dialogue between the two parties, and finally moved the 
dialogue towards a restorative outcome.  If the Sycamore Tree Project is genuinely 
patterned on the reality of Jesus’ reconciling presence, then it must find ways of 
acknowledging its dependence on this spiritual dimension.  It might do this through 
prayer or other gestures that communicate how through the Spirit, God’s gift of 
reconciliation is made available to those who ask and seek after it. 
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Sycamore Tree Project is the way it 
opens up a space for offenders to experience forgiveness and reconciliation with those 
who are not their direct victims.  While repentance is the means by which wrongdoers 
adopt a different relationship to their crime, it is not until the penitent have been 
conferred with forgiveness that restoration can be fully achieved.  However, can those 
who are not primary victims offer such forgiveness?  This matter was left unanswered 
in response to Zacchaeus’ repentance.  Yet in Jesus’ parable of the Prodigal Son, it 
was the principal victim of the offence that conferred forgiveness.  Without the 
father’s generous pardoning of his prodigal son the parable’s potency would be lost 
and its legacy stilled. 
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By bringing together a group of unrelated victims and offenders in a carefully planned 
and facilitated format, Sycamore Tree acts as a rehearsal of the movements hoped for 
in a fully restorative response to wrongdoing: repentant offenders, forgiving and 
compassionate victims, and reconciliation outcomes.  It guides people through a 
restorative justice process not unlike what the church does through its liturgical 
performance.  What might take months or years in a fully restorative justice process, 
the programme offers in a condensed format each of the steps that need to be present 
in order to repair the effects of crime.  As a rehearsal, there is no expectation that all 
situations of wrongdoing will progress in this way, but this is no reason to forego 
learning what it means to respond out of a restorative sense of justice.  In order to be 
successful, however, this requires at least some participants who have learnt to 
recognize the signs of genuine repentance and the way to restoration.  This is where 
the church could continue to extend or enrich the programme. 
 
The church should be an ideal place to find participants for the Sycamore Tree Project 
who have been formed in the kind of restorative liturgy enacted in the Eucharist.  To 
“participate in the Eucharist,” as Cavanaugh writes, is an “invitation to participate in 
God’s reconciliation of the world,” which “opens up new possibilities undreamed of 
in a merely worldly politics.”75  Sycamore Tree might rightly be considered an 
extension of the church’s Eucharistic life according to this description.  It needs to be 
emphasized, however, that this does not involve leaving the church behind but rather 
taking the social actions performed in the Eucharist beyond the altar and into the 
prison environment.  Restorative agents are sent out into the world to embody the 
sacramental life of the church, bringing others into the knowledge of God’s 
reconciling justice as they share about the ways in which God’s forgiveness and grace 
has been tangibly experienced.   
 
It is through the church’s liturgy that Christians learn to speak the language of the 
biblical narrative.  Through the very same process, they are being formed as persons 
and learn the gestures of restorative, reconciliatory practice for responding to conflict.  
When done thoughtfully, worship is the context wherein Christians develop the 
sensitivity to recognize the movements so essential to human interaction, especially 
                                                




when strong emotions are present, and to perceive when and how intervention or 
silence is most appropriate.76  By bringing their ecclesial formation to bear on the 
Sycamore Tree process, Christians can provide a language, an understanding, and set 
of skills that can help guide others to experience the transformative effects of a 
restorative encounter. 
 
The perspective of those who have survived terrible abuse and harm at the hands of 
others and who have learned to forgive is an invaluable feature of any restorative 
justice encounter.  The church has something unique to offer here too.  While 
sensitive to the needs of victims, the church attests to the power of forgiveness made 
available in and through Christ.  Christians who have joined their agony with this 
offer of forgiveness become a living testimony to the message that transformation 
through forgiveness is possible.  This is a much-needed message within today’s 
prisons where hope is in such short supply.  Even for those who have not been 
victimized, learning to be in solidarity with the pain and suffering of others provides a 
valuable perspective on the human effects of wrongdoing.   
 
We have argued that the church is already embedded in its own form of restorative 
justice, which it rehearses week after week as it embodies the story of God’s justice 
through its liturgical practices.  What the Sycamore Tree Project condenses into just 
eight sessions on a programmatic basis, often under budgetary constraints and the 
pressures of the prison regime, the church could offer through being a place where the 
same movements of repentance, confession, forgiveness, and restitution are practiced 
on a free and regular basis.  This is crucial for at least two reasons. 
 
First, Sycamore Tree is just a starting point for exploring the significance of 
restorative justice, and there is a need for places where these initial insights can be 
deepened.  Participants often enter the programme with a great deal of hesitancy and 
guardedness, yet this changes as they progress and by the final session they 
commonly express a desire to begin again in light of their changed attitude.  For 
offenders who are not able to meet their own victims, or victims their assailants, the 
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healing effects of this programme are nevertheless significant.  The church is ideally 
situated to be a place where people can regularly encounter the ethos of restorative 
justice as it is recapitulated through the church’s liturgy, and thereby deepen what 
they have begun to experience through Sycamore Tree. 
 
Second, one of the downstream effects of high incarceration rates is an equally high 
percentage of prisoners being released back into communities, and often without 
adequate support.77  The programmatic basis of Sycamore Tree is incapable of 
embedding restorative justice across the many communities where ex-inmates are 
being relocated.  Churches might extend to released wrongdoers a community where 
restorative justice is a way of life, not just a one-off programme.  By bringing people 
into relationships that practice accountability, honesty, and respect, the church 
demonstrates a concern for restorative reintegration.78 
 
This points to a final reason why the church’s witness to restorative justice might 
extend to the Sycamore Tree Project.  The celebration ceremony that completes this 
programme anticipates the acceptance of the repentant wrongdoer back into the 
community.  While valuable as a single event, the real need is to have communities 
where the covenantal promises made can be lived out.  Just as importantly, the 
offender’s restoration relies on the existence of communities where the shame of their 
offending can be lifted and their honour restored.  We noted the importance of 
bestowing honour on repentant wrongdoers in Jesus’ parable.  The church has the 
opportunity to embody this same response by extending its own resources and 
relationships towards those being released.  It might be an agent in the restoration of 
offenders by inviting them to participate in God’s restoring of the world through the 
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One misconception of ecclesial ethics is that it is uninterested in making a positive 
difference in the world, choosing to focus instead on buttressing a Christian culture 
against the travails of wider society.  By contrast, we have shown that a recovery of 
the resources internal to the church, like its performance of the Eucharist or its reading 
of Scripture (cf. 1 Cor. 12; Luke 19:1-10), actually encourages engagement with 
forms of restorative justice beyond the boundaries of the church and provides 
resources for the task.   
 
In the Eucharist, the church recollects the reconciliation it has received in and through 
Christ, and the social actions performed in this practice can be emulated in other 
contexts, like the prison.  Having been formed liturgically in the practices of 
repentance, confession, absolution, and reconciliation, Christians extend the work of 
restorative justice to initiatives like the Sycamore Tree Project.  In doing so, they are 
not leaving the church behind, but are bringing the practices and formation developed 
in the ecclesia into the arena of criminal justice so that through repentance, 
confession, absolution and reconciliation, the well-being of both perpetrators and 
victims might be restored.  
 
The examples of the Sycamore Tree Project and Porter’s use of Peacemaking Circles 
illustrate a number of elements that are crucial to the success of restorative justice.  
First, these processes reflect a fundamentally relational understanding of humanity.  
Wrongdoing is conceived of as a relational injury, and justice is about restoring those 
relationships to a healthy condition.  Second, healing happens when people are able to 
tell their story in a context of truthful and attentive listening.  Victims and offenders 
need places where they can share their stories of trauma and shame, and so invite 
others to participate in their recovery.  Third, restorative justice is about cultivating 
forms of dialogue where people are honest, respectful, and can begin to trust.  In such 
dialogues, strong emotions may emerge and need to be mediated in a way that people 
feel safe, while still being heard.   
 
Each of these elements is crucial to the success of restorative justice practice.  Yet 




On account of how God’s restoring justice is manifest in the cross and resurrection of 
Christ, it is vital to acknowledge the ways in which restorative justice happens 
through an encounter with Jesus Christ.  This is the entire logic of the Eucharist, 
where victims experience the comfort and solidarity of the crucified one and where 
offenders experience the forgiveness and new life made possible by his resurrection.  
This reality of encountering the crucified yet risen Christ is also present in 
programmes like the Sycamore Tree, and needs to be acknowledged as such.  
Likewise in the congregation’s practice of Circles, the transformative effects of 
genuine dialogue happen on account of the work of the Spirit in community, bringing 
together the many gifts for the sake of the common good.   
 
We have suggested that the church has its own reasons and context for exhibiting 
these restorative practices in its life together.  Yet it also has much to gain through 
participating in restorative justice initiatives that take place in the world, not only as a 
way of sharing its own practices but also as a way of more faithfully embodying 








At a colloquium held to mark his retirement as founder and director of the world’s 
first Center for Theology and Public Issues, Duncan Forrester addressed the subject of 
a public theology for the twenty-first century.  He highlighted several key elements 
that should be included in the general field of public theology.  First, it needs to 
engage with the world in a way that respects rather than disparages the distinction 
between Christian discourse and a secular discourse.  This requires attending to the 
academic and practical issues that are pertinent to public debate on any given issue.  
Second, he urged theology to make a “modest but truthful, constructive and 
challenging contribution to public debate,” while always having as its ultimate aim the 
pursuit of “human flourishing in community.”1  He believed that the theological 
disciplines ought to make a difference in a way that “heals, reconciles, helps, 
challenges.”2  Finally, public theology must necessarily be “ecclesial theology,” that 
is, it must be able to speak of the church as the (albeit imperfect) embodiment of the 
Gospel it proclaims.3 
 
This thesis has asked the question, “How does an ecclesial context shape the 
theological apprehension and praxis of justice?”  In particular, we have asked how, in 
view of its members having been admitted into God’s restoring justice in Christ, the 
church might embody in the world this same justice of restoring right relationships.  
This ecclesial focus builds on Marshall’s premise that,  
 
…the first Christians experienced in Christ and lived out in their faith 
communities an understanding of justice as a power that heals, restores, 
and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and kills, and that this reality 
ought to shape and direct a Christian contribution to the criminal justice 
debate today.4   
 
Just as the early Christian communities exhibited a restorative understanding of 
justice within the ecclesia on account of how the justice of God was disclosed in 
Christ as a saving and peacemaking justice, so the church today should seek to embed 
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practices of restorative justice as an outworking of its understanding of the justice of 
God.  
 
This study has charted a direction through some of the challenges Forrester has 
identified.  In particular, we have mined the long history of the Christian tradition to 
show how different conceptions of justice emerged from and shaped in turn their 
surrounding social and philosophical contexts, and with the sphere of corrective 
justice in particular.  We have shown how some of these conceptions of justice owed 
more to the Greco-Roman intellectual tradition than to the biblical story of divine 
justice.  Justice tended to be interpreted in a legalistic and retributive sense rather than 
in terms of the relational reality of reconciliation and shalom outlined in the biblical 
account of God’s dealings with the world.  This retributive logic imported from 
elsewhere was then read back into the divine nature, such that God’s justice acquired 
a particularly harsh and retributive orientation.  In order to recover resources within 
this tradition that accentuate the capacity for justice to contribute to human 
flourishing, I argued that an alternative conception of justice needs to emerge, one that 
is more anchored in the story of Scripture and lived out in the community that reads 
Scripture so that it might be embodied in life.  
 
In Chapter Four we established that the biblical understanding of the justice of God is 
best understood as a saving, liberating, and restorative justice, rather than a purely 
retributive justice.  The nature of divine justice is revealed in God’s restoration of the 
covenantal relationship with his people when they had transgressed the law or were in 
need of deliverance.  It was most decisively revealed in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus, through which humanity is delivered from the powers of Sin and Death and into 
a Spirit-filled and life-giving existence in Christ.  Whatever retributive features of this 
story remain, they must be understood in light of an overall restorative trajectory, and 
must not be allowed to displace the predominant emphasis on the benevolent nature of 
divine justice. 
 
Recognition of how justice is exemplified in God’s own being and through his actions 
places a special obligation on the people of God to reflect this justice within their own 
communities.  This was a consistent feature in our survey of the Christian tradition.  




implications for the church and for wider society.  It was only in the modern, 
increasingly secular era, with its confidence in the powers of human reason and the 
diminution of the traditional theological worldview, that the relative priority of divine 
and human justice was inverted.  It must not be forgotten, however, that the 
established judicial systems for responding to crime and its victims emerged out of a 
confluence of theological ideas on the nature of justice, sin, and atonement.  The 
question this thesis has explored is whether this judicial response is an adequate 
reflection of what it means to do justice as disclosed in the biblical story.  
 
To answer this question, we turned first to the recent trend in theological ethics that 
has emphasized the centrality of the ecclesia as the place where the story of Scripture 
is being fulfilled.  From the perspective of ecclesial ethics, the church is not just any 
community but one that cultivates its imagination and forms its character by engaging 
with the story of Scripture.  The church is where the story of God’s justice is being 
embodied in the common life of a people of faith.  Ecclesial ethics is concerned to 
describe the nature of this embodied life and its significance for ethical 
considerations.  This has issued in a series of significant reassessments, particularly of 
how the social and political nature of God’s justice ought to be worked out in human 
affairs.     
 
While ecclesial ethics has focused on nonviolent peacemaking as the primary witness 
of the church, curiously it has paid little attention to the place of justice in this 
vocation.  Biblically there is a close relationship between the church as the 
embodiment of God’s peace and as the embodiment of God’s justice.  However, this 
insight has not been prominent in ecclesial ethics.  Its treatment of the church’s 
relationship to justice has been slim at best, and often written for the purpose of 
combating problematic liberal conceptions of justice rather than developing the 
church’s own distinctive way of understanding and enacting it.   
 
In order to address this lacuna, I explored how one particular ecclesial tradition has 
developed a way of doing justice from an explicitly restorative angle.  The 
Mennonite-Anabaptist community was largely responsible for the early theology and 
approach to conflict that came to be known as restorative justice.  By uncovering the 




Project, I argued that this practice of restorative justice should be understood as a 
concrete embodiment of the relational and restorative dimensions of the biblical story.  
We observed, however, that the restorative justice field has since eschewed its 
dependence on the theological insights that led to its conception.  Much of this thesis 
has been an attempt to develop restorative justice in a more comprehensively 
theological direction, and through the life of the church in particular.  By bringing an 
ecclesial approach to bear on restorative justice, we have proposed that the church’s 
distinctive contribution to the wider restorative justice field must be informed by the 
ways in which the justice of God is taking shape in its own community.   
 
Chapters Five to Seven provided a series of reflections on how the church should 
center its life on the story of God’s restoring justice.  By attending to Jesus’ parable of 
the Prodigal Son and Paul’s instructions to the church in Corinth, we provided a 
theological reading of Scripture that attests to the ways in which the church might 
better embody a justice that restores.  We also suggested that the church already 
performs, albeit imperfectly, the work of restorative justice through its liturgical life.  
By inviting sinners and victims to participate in the liturgical acts of confession, 
forgiveness, and especially the Eucharist, the church remembers and proclaims the 
restoring justice it has received in Christ.  Having become practiced in the work of 
restorative justice, Christians might bring these actions performed in the Eucharistic 
liturgy to bear on other areas of the church’s life and mission.  The ministry provided 
to prison inmates through the Sycamore Tree Project was offered as a particular 
example of the church’s practice of restorative justice in the wider community.     
 
This study has shown why a theological account of the theory and practice of 
restorative justice is fruitful for articulating and clarifying the witness of the church, 
especially in the face of conflict or wrongdoing.  While the church already has 
resources within itself for responding peaceably to conflict, drawing upon the recent 
tradition of ecclesial ethics this study has given expression to a largely unexplored 
tradition that combines the peacemaking and justice-making dimensions of the 
church’s witness.  By bringing an ecclesial perspective to the work of restorative 
justice, I have sought to extend the church’s imagination as to how it might better 





Our examination has drawn on diverse areas of research, from the history of criminal 
justice and the theological reflection upon it, through to the distinct approach of 
ecclesial ethics, the theory and practice of restorative justice, and the theological 
interpretation of Scripture.  Such a far ranging, boundary crossing, exercise has been 
necessary because of the complex nature of the church and its place in the world.  The 
church is a historical institution, as well as a community of readers of Scripture.  
Throughout its long history it has produced a range of interpretations of, and practices 
for doing, corrective justice.  The community of faith must continually test whether 
the manner in which it responds to conflict and wrongdoing, whether in the church or 
in society, is reflective of how God is bringing peace and healing to all of the 
constitutive relationships of its life.    
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